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This dissertation estimates property value gains and losses resulting from 
an airport siting decision and the distributional effects among neighborhoods with 
different socio-economic characteristics.  Airports are rich sitings for research 
because they are simultaneously amenities (employment centers, magnets for 
growth) and disamenities (sources of noise, congestion, danger).  The hedonic 
analysis includes characteristics and prices of 21,000 houses sold in Austin 
between 1980 and 2001 combined with GIS maps and census data, to provide the 
capitalized costs and benefits of airports to homeowners. 
Chapter One, “A Comparison of Methodologies to Measure Effects of 
Airport Siting Decisions,” uses four model specifications to consider the removal 
of an airport.  It proposes two modifications to the traditional hedonic model to 
account for the non-linearity in the effect of distance to an airport on house values 
 vi
and to separately measure the amenity and disamenity aspects of proximity.  Here, 
noise, distance, and access are separately identifiable, with noise and proximity 
being disamenities, but access to the facility is a boost to house prices.  House 
values near the old airport changed little with early announcements but changed 
more with groundbreaking then with the final switch to the new airport. 
Chapter Two, “Capitalized Gains and Losses from an Airport Relocation,” 
compares the net value of removing an airport to homeowners near the old airport 
to the net value of adding an airport to homeowners near the new airport.  Houses 
near both airports gain value in net, though the value is larger at the new airport 
because few houses are in close proximity where prices tumbled the most and 
many houses lie along the route where prices climbed the most. 
Chapter Three, “House Price Gains and Losses: An illustration of 
environmental justice in a noxious facility relocation decision,” estimates the 
distributional effects of the airport sitings.  In this case, the same income and 
ethnic groups that bear the burden receive the benefits from changes in house 
prices near both airports, but the variance between the gains and losses are largest 
for the poorest and the tracts with the highest concentrations of Native American, 
black, and foreign-born populations. 
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Even though markets rarely exist for environmental goods, their effects on 
market prices can be measured in an urban setting by virtue of being ‘bundled’ to 
a residential location.  When a household purchases a house, it implicitly buys an 
entire bundle of amenities – public schools, police protection, parks, 
transportation, even air and water quality.  If, however, a model controls for all 
non-environmental factors, then any remaining difference in price can be 
attributed to differences in environmental quality.  The hedonic pricing method, 
using regression techniques, can be used to identify what portion of property 
value differences can be attributed to the environmental differences and to infer 
an individual’s willingness to pay.   
This study applies the hedonic pricing method to analyze the removal of a 
major airport in an urban location.  By the late 1980s, Mueller Airport in Austin, 
Texas was losing its ability to handle the dynamic growth of cargo and passengers 
flooding the airport as a result of the high-tech boom.  If the City wanted to 
maintain this growth and job development, it would need to expand the airport.  
However, Mueller was an old facility, land-locked on only 711 acres in the heart 
of the city.  Moreover, the recent growth in the number and size of planes coming 
into the airport had drastically elevated the noise level imposed on the more than 
30,000 people living in noise impact areas.  The City decided to solve both 
problems by relocating the airport to a new facility on the outskirts of town.   
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Clearly, the city required a larger airport, but what would happen to the 
neighborhoods that surrounded the old airport which both suffered from noise but 
also enjoyed the proximity to air travel?  Do homeowners consider the airport a 
magnet for growth and development, or is it a noxious facility, spewing noise, 
pollution, congestion, even danger on its neighbors?  Planners need the best 
available information before deciding where to put an airport, including not only 
the costs and benefits, but also estimates of who bears those costs and who gets 
the benefits. 
This study answers these questions by combining the effects of airports on 
property values with several other sub-literatures within hedonics: the varying 
influences of noise and distance measures of airports on property values, house 
prices during noxious siting stages, and repeat-sale analysis.  Several data sources 
are brought together, including Geographic Information Systems (GIS) maps and 
census data, on a variety of structural, neighborhood, and environmental variables 
over a twenty-year period.  Due to the variety and length of the data set, the 
hedonic pricing technique can be applied in four different model specifications.  
Thus, not only is this study a determination of the impact of noise and proximity 
to an airport on residential property values in Austin, it is also a comparison of 
analytical methods. 
The first chapter brings together important elements of each of these sub-
literatures.  First, the airport variables are disaggregated into noise and proximity 
in the manner of Espey and Lopez (2000) and Lipscomb (2003), plus a third 
variable that measures the effects of development along the major routes to the 
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airport.  This three-variable specification is unique to this study and hopes to 
answer the open question on the amenity versus disamenity nature of urban 
airports.  In addition, the airport literature in hedonics tends to focus on building 
new airports or expanding current ones.  This study looks at the question from the 
opposite direction; it focuses on houses in a neighborhood where an airport is 
being removed.   
Second, this chapter links the siting stage models with traditional and 
repeat-sale models to find when, if at all, homeowners react to a noxious siting.   
The siting stage models divide the entire twenty-year period into five “stages” 
where households have different levels of certainty regarding the eventual 
relocation of the airport.  The traditional and repeat-sale models, on the other 
hand, examine the reaction to specific events that lead to the relocation of the 
airport.  
Finally, as mentioned above, the first chapter is a comparison of analytical 
methods.  In the siting stage section of the paper, “phase models” are compared to 
“pooled models”.  The repeat sale section begins with a difference-in-difference 
calculation at the means.  These results are then compared to a repeat-sale 
analysis and a traditional hedonic model.  While neither siting stage nor specific 
event models are necessarily better, the conclusion compares results, as well as 
the ease of implementation and interpretation, across all four regression-model 
specifications. 
The results of chapter one indicate the following.  The result of the more 
flexible, non-linear specification of the environmental variables finds that noise, 
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distance, and access to the airport are separately identifiable, with noise and 
proximity being disamenities, but access to the facility is a boost for house prices.  
The different model specifications find different event dates to which residents 
respond to the airport relocation.  By and large, early announcements had little 
effect on house prices, though prices changed more with the groundbreaking than 
with the final switch to the new airport.  This suggests homeowners have rational 
expectations and adjust to the relocation of the airport before the aircraft noise 
actually ceases.  Comparing the different types of models, this paper finds that the 
phase specification is a better fit to the changing valuation of neighborhood 
characteristics across time than the pooled specification.  The repeat sale and 
traditional hedonic models produce similar results that are consistent with 
expectations.  Therefore, the appropriate choice of either a repeat sale or hedonic 
model would depend largely on the data available. 
Chapter two builds on the first chapter by looking at not only the effects 
around an old airport being taken out of a community, but also looking at the 
effects around a new airport being located elsewhere. Coefficients for noise, 
distance, and location on the route to an airport are found using similar empirical 
methods from the earlier research but then applied to the exact houses and 
communities impacted.   
In addition, this chapter discusses hysteresis for airport facilities.  Here, 
the hysteresis question is taken from Barham, Chavas, and Coomes (1998).  They 
define hysteresis quite generally as “situations of irreversibility where particular 
outcomes persist even after the conditions giving rise to their occurrence are 
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removed” (429). This chapter analyzes the housing market in Austin near the old 
airport at three stages, equilibrium, clean-up (when the new airport is being built), 
and recovery (after the new airport opens) over six time periods.  To answer 
hysteresis questions, the original equilibrium prices are compared with the post-
airport closure recovery prices to see if the areas around the old airport rebound 
from the former airport siting.  Bergstrom Air Force Base (BAFB) also goes 
through the same three stages during the model period, equilibrium, clean-up, and 
recovery.   In contrast to the old municipal airport facility, which during the 
model period was not renovated for a new use, the recovery period for former Air 
Force base includes the rehabilitation of the facility into the new municipal 
airport.  The hysteresis section briefly discusses the impact that rehabilitation has 
on an airport closure. 
In the context of Austin’s airports, hysteresis can also be defined as the 
question of whether adding an airport has the exact opposite effect of removing an 
airport.  To answer this hysteretic question, the double-difference estimated 
coefficients are used to calculate the potential efficiency gain from the airport re-
location by comparing the numbers of gainers and losers and the magnitude of the 
house price changes from the public policy decision. This section measures 
whether the decision to move the airport lessened the overall burden to 
homeowners near both airports in aggregate.  Because airports contain some 
disamenity aspects, a Pareto improvement is not possible here.  However, a 
potentially efficient improvement is still possible if the gains near the old airport 
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outweigh the loss near the new airport, or if the amenity aspects of airports 
outweigh the disamenity aspects.   
The decision to move the airport was quite likely made for reasons other 
than increasing or decreasing property values.1  However, it turns out that only 
about half as many houses lie either within the first three miles, in a noise 
contour, or on the route to the new airport as lie within the same designations for 
the old airport.  Also, the airport move was significantly driven by the 
homeowners near the old airport.  Therefore, moving the location of the airport 
addressed the disamenity problem only if a net gain was realized by homeowners 
near the airports, without taking into account the costs and benefits to the city as a 
whole. If the burden to homeowners increases with the airport move, then 
building a new airport simply transferred the disamenity from one area to another 
without reducing it, leaving the City open to the same civil and legal turmoil as 
occurred before the move.  Implicitly, then, this calculation compares the impact 
of being near an airport going in to the impact of being near an airport going out.   
The overall negative impact is expected to lessen due to the strategic location of 
the new facility.2 
Unlike other airport location studies, this chapter uses three different 
estimates of each environmental variable: a single-difference (within-period) 
                                                 
1 It was widely believed that Austin had outgrown the old airport and a larger facility with 
international flights was necessary.  The new location was chosen after years of deliberation and 
voting.  In addition, outside of neighborhood concerns and development coalitions, the new site 
was chosen based on land costs and the pre-existance of runways.  For the city as a whole, I 
assume that since the vote to move the airport passed, at least a majority of citizens believed the 
overall benefits of the new airport would compensate for the additional costs. 
2 When the old airport was first built in the 1930s it was also, presumably, in an area of low 
population density and the city grew in around the facility, creating more of a nuisance than was 
initially anticipated. The same may become true of the new airport over a similar long time frame. 
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estimate, a time-invariant estimate, and a double-difference estimate to measure 
the burden on homeowners near both airports in Austin.  First, an empirical model 
similar to those used in the first chapter for the old airport is expanded to include 
distance and accessibility variables for the newly built airport.  The new airport 
was built on the site of a closed Air Force base in an area of low population 
density.  Due to the small number of houses and the use of the former Air Force 
runways, no houses in the data set are affected by aircraft noise above 65 decibels 
(the level FAA and HUD designate as incompatible with residential housing use).  
This is a limitation of the data, but also a reflection of how few houses are 
actually located near the new airport.  Second, because the data set includes at 
least some houses near both airports over time, it is still possible to isolate the 
relative effects on the neighborhoods near the airports compared to the rest of 
Austin, as well as the effects of moving the airport over time. A difference-in-
differences model is used to compare the estimated coefficients both within the 
model and across time periods. 
However, rather than comparing these types of estimates to each other, 
this chapter uses the combination of results to draw a clearer picture of what 
actually happen to house prices as a result of the airport relocation.  The single-
difference estimates give the effect that different airport characteristics have on 
selling a house in any given time period.  This estimate is useful for determining 
how the airport affects the selling price of a house holding everything else equal.  
The time-invariant estimate gives the effect of a policy over its lifetime, rather 
than focusing on any given period when the house sells.  These time-invariant 
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estimates are often zero and can be quite deceptive.  A policy that has large 
positive impacts in one period but large negative impacts in the next can give a 
zero net impact without realizing the gains and losses to homeowners who buy or 
sell homes in between.  Finally, the double-difference estimate takes account of 
both of the previous elements and highlights the true effect of airports on housing 
values across time. 
The results of this investigation indicate the following.  The single-
difference models with independent regressions for each period finds that 
previous to breaking ground at the new airport, no significant difference in price 
of houses under the noise contours existed, compared to the rest of Austin.  
During the time it took to build the new airport while the old facility was still 
operating, house prices in the noise contours were lower than other prices in 
Austin.  Once the new airport opened and noise ceased at the old facility, houses 
in previous noise contours at the old airport sold at a premium.  When this model 
is extended to a difference-in-differences model, noise at the old airport caused 
temporary declines in house prices compared to the rest of Austin, in reaction to 
the announcements of the impending airport re-location.  Even controlling for 
aircraft noise, a house located in an old airport neighborhood sold for less, all else 
equal.  Except for the closest distance ring, however, these negative distance 
impacts lessen over time.  Access to the old airport was clearly an amenity; 
houses along the route to the old airport suffered permanent value losses when the 
old airport closed. 
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Looking at the new airport, noise is not nearly the factor as it was for the 
old airport because of its location around a former Air Force Base.  Fewer houses 
simply exist within the noise contours.  This is also a factor for close proximity to 
the new airport, although enough houses sold to determine that the houses in the 
closest distance contour sold for lower prices than elsewhere in the city.  The 
double-difference coefficients show that this disamenity effect lessens over time 
in anticipation of the airport opening, but it wanes again during initial flight 
operations.  Again, access to the airport is an amenity.  Despite negative single 
difference coefficients on route, the double-difference coefficients show a 
significant increase in the houses on the route to the new airport after construction 
begins compared to the pre-list period and compared to other locations. 
The hystersis analysis finds that airports do have persistent effects on 
house prices in the surrounding communities, even after the facility is abandoned.  
As would be expected from the different impacts that noise, distance, and route 
have on communities surrounding functioning airports, the hysteretic effects are 
both positive and negative and depend on the number and value of houses located 
in the community.  The history dependence of an airport on the community is 
influenced by redevelopment at the former facility.  The results of converting the 
former Air Force Base into a new municipal airport suggest that while it is not 
advantageous to live very near any airport facility, building a new airport on the 
old grounds significantly reduced the negative impacts on the surrounding 
community that appeared when the Base closed. 
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The net gain calculation that incorporates all houses in Austin impacted by 
the airport move (115,927 total houses) finds that moving the airport from 
Austin’s city center to a more remote location caused a potential gain of $1.5 
billion to all homeowners over the fourteen years after the vote to move the 
airport passed.  This gain is developed from the over $78 million that was realized 
through more than 10,000 houses in the data set that sold during this time period 
and weighted by the total number of houses.  Houses near both airports gain value 
in net, though gains at the new airport are almost twice those at the old airport, 
driven mostly by gains to houses along the route to the new airport. 
When the City of Austin relocated the municipal airport from its 
downtown location to a new facility on the outskirts of town environmental 
justice concerns were raised because both neighborhoods were home to large 
minority and lower income populations.  At the outset of the move it was unclear 
whether the airport served as an amenity or a disamenity and whether the overall 
benefits from building a new facility would benefit a different group than those 
who would bear the burden.  The third chapter, drawing on the models in earlier 
chapters, shows that overall the movement of the airport caused gains to 
homeowners in the surrounding communities.  This is true for both the new and 
the old airport communities and generally true across income and ethnic groups. 
While lower-income and racial minority groups bore larger variance in house 
price fluctuations over model period, they also saw the largest positive percent 
changes in average house prices.  In general, it can be said that the same groups 
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that bear the burden also received the benefits and that the benefits outweighed 
the losses. 
The U.S. EPA defines environmental justice as “the fair treatment and 
meaningful involvement of all people regardless of race, color, national origin, or 
income with respect to the development, implementation, and enforcement of 
environmental laws, regulations, and policies.”3   In this paper, the focus is on the 
first half of the definition, measuring the extent of fair treatment in a local 
government policy decision, evaluating whether a small group of people, 
including a racial, ethnic, or a socioeconomic group, bears a disproportionate 
share of the negative environmental consequences resulting from the relocation of 
a municipal airport. 
In this third chapter, Geographic Information System (GIS) maps are used 
to match house sale price information to the physical locations of the houses to 
determine whether or not one or both airports affect a house, and to match it to its 
1990 census tract characteristics.  Since it is possible to determine which houses 
received benefits and which houses suffered losses, the question here is whether 
houses that received benefits or suffered losses are significantly different from the 
population as a whole in Austin.  If one or more ethnic or income groups suffered 
more losses than others, it could be an indicator of environmental inequity – 
where one group disproportionately bears the burden of a public good enjoyed by 
all. 
                                                 
3 U.S. Environmental Protections Agency website, 
http://www.epa.gov/compliance/environmentaljustice/.   
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The 1990 census data are used (as opposed to the 1980 or 2000 census 
reports that also cover relevant years included in the model) because, as will be 
described in detail later, 1990 was a critical year in the decision whether to 
relocate the airport, and if so, where it would be.  This captures another aspect of 
the environmental justice literature, whether it is relevant to evaluate the 
demographic characteristics of the neighborhoods around a noxious siting using 
current population data or the data from the time of the siting.  The 1990 
population Census captures both of these concepts. At the old airport, 1990 
captures the population who moved in around an established facility, likely 
because of lower house prices.  At the new airport, 1990 captures the population 
at a proposed location before the decision was made to site a new facility.  An 
interesting result of being able to look simultaneously at both an established site 
and a proposed site, is that the demographic characteristics of the airport 
neighborhoods are similar to each other, yet significantly different from the rest of 
Austin.   
This study avoids the debate over the concepts of injustice in intent and 
injustice in outcome because the discussion cannot accurately capture the reasons 
behind the voluntary decision to purchase a home near a noxious facility.  Instead, 
the focus is to find the effects of an exogenous shock on different socio-economic 
groups without labeling these effects as inherently “fair” or “unfair.” 
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Airport History Background 
The movement of Mueller Airport was likely a transparent policy process.  
Talk of moving the municipal airport out of the Mueller location began as early as 
1970, almost 30 years before the new Austin-Bergstrom International Airport 
(ABIA) opened.  In March of 1970 Austin City Manager Lynn Andrew predicted, 
“Around 1974 or 1975 we’re going to have to take a long, hard look at the airport 
and make a decision whether to buy a new site or work out, with the federal 
government, a joint use of Bergstrom Air Force Base.”    
In fact, in 1976 a joint use proposal with Bergstrom Air Force Base 
(BAFB) was submitted to the Air Force, but was denied by officials.  On 
September 20, 1979 a study by R. Dixon Spears recommended a site east of the 
town of Manor (Manor location).  However, within a few weeks the plan was 
replaced once again with a joint-use proposal with BAFB.  Again, the Air Force 
rejected the proposal and in the ensuing years placed twenty-nine conditions for 
building a municipal airport west of the base.  In 1982, then-Mayor Carole 
McClellan recommended that the city focus attention on expanding the current 
airport, instead of building at a new location.  However, after the Austin Chronicle 
ran a newspaper article showing the proposed expansion area widespread public 
disapproval caused the City Council to unanimously vote the proposal down. 
By this time the neighborhood organizations had grown active in their 
“Move-It” campaign to re-locate the airport and its noise. In the fall of 1984 a 
citizen task force, created to study the airport, recommended closing Mueller and 
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building a new facility.  Heavy advertising on both sides of the issue, including 
television spots and rented planes flying over Austin’s downtown, attempted to 
draw a wider audience to the debate and to the polls.  Despite these active groups, 
a referendum on January 19, 1985 on whether to move the airport to the Manor 
location failed by 748 votes.   
By 1987 the number of commercial jets operating yearly out of Mueller 
airport reached its peak: 64,615.  In February, the Austin City Council approved 
studies to find both the cost of alternative sites and the cost of enlarging the 
present facility.  On November 3, 1987 voters rejected the idea of expanding 
Mueller, 88% to 12%.  The referendum to build the new airport at Manor passed, 
but with a less impressive margin: 56% to 44%.  After the vote, it took an entire 
year for the Council to choose a project manager, Sverdrup-Gilbane, for the new 
airport. 
On April 18, 1989 the Austin mayor and other city officials told 
landowners in the Manor area that the city planned on buying their land as early 
as August of that year.  Meanwhile, construction on a new terminal at Mueller 
airport began with a scheduled completion date of January 1990.  The 
construction of the Manor airport was scheduled for completion in 1995.  
However, residents near the Mueller airport were growing concerned that the 
airport was not going to be re-located.  In May 1989, the House State Affairs 
Committee responded to these concerns by unanimously approving a bill to 
mandate soundproofing at three elementary schools near Mueller, regardless of 
whether the City built the new airport at Manor.  In addition, the bill required 
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Austin to have at least 10% of the land for the new airport under contract by 
March 31, 1990.  If the city did not fulfill this obligation, they would be required 
to soundproof all of the public buildings in the flight path. 
In January 1990 Bergstrom AFB was announced as one of bases for 
closure in a nationwide study.  On the 27th, the Mayor Cooke and Council 
member Barnstone called for a moratorium on land purchases at Manor until the 
fate of BAFB was decided.  Several other council members disagreed.  Two days 
later, the U.S. Defense Secretary Dick Cheney officially recommended that 
BAFB be closed.  This announcement caused a split in the support for a new 
airport.  A group who supported keeping BAFB an active base wanted to focus on 
putting the new airport at the Manor location.  Most of the residents near Mueller 
also continued to support the airport at Manor because they feared that starting 
new plans at Bergstrom would delay the move.  However, many others 
immediately supported building the new airport at Bergstrom, should it close.  
Five local transportation experts called on in the days after the announcements 
also disagreed: three said Bergstrom was a cheaper alternative to Manor; two 
others said that Bergstrom had enough flaws to make it “unusable” as a city 
airport. 
On the first of February, 1990 the City Council halted purchases of land at 
Manor and called for a study of BAFB as a commercial airport.  This started a 
period of indecision in which the Council was waiting for the final decision on 
BAFB closure to resolve locating the new airport there, while continuing efforts 
at Manor to abide by a new state law that required Mueller Airport to be moved 
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by December 31, 1996 or undertake millions of dollars in soundproofing all 
public buildings. In March of 1990, a master plan for the Manor airport was 
approved by the Council, followed by a $488,000 contract for appraisal services.  
However, they also limited spending to $45,000 until a decision was made at 
BAFB.  The following month the City Council suspended all but a small fraction 
of the work at the Manor site. 
On the same day, April 20, 1990, seventeen Mueller airport area 
homeowners, claiming that airport noise and pollution harmed their health and 
reduced the value of their property, filed a lawsuit against the City of Austin.  
Their lawyer said residents did not want the airport moved to Bergstrom because 
it would cause further delay to removing the Mueller airport and because it would 
cause southeast Austin residents the same problem the Mueller neighborhood 
residents were currently facing.  The Austin-American Statesman ran a newspaper 
article on May 17th stating that “Black officials call Bergstrom airport racist”. 
Progress continued on all three fronts.  On May 18th, the FAA signed off 
on the Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) for the Manor airport.  However, 
federal officials also announced that should BAFB be closed, it would have to be 
ruled out as a viable alternative before the City could proceed with the airport at 
Manor.  The Council also approved a $200,000 contract for soundproofing three 
schools near Mueller. 
The summer of 1990 further complicated the issue.  First, on July 21st a 
newspaper article reminded the city that the neighborhood closest to BAFB 
already contained several noxious sitings, including two sewage treatment plants, 
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a jail, and a landfill.  Residents of this neighborhood were split on the airport 
location decisions: some thought that an airport would be the answer to economic 
growth after the closure of the Air Force Base took away several thousand civilian 
jobs; others saw an airport as yet another noxious siting, bringing with it noise 
and pollution problems.   
On August 12th, the “Move it to Manor” coalition organized a petition 
drive to demand that the City Council implement the 1987 voter mandate to 
replace Mueller by building a new airport in Manor.   This group implied that the 
talk of moving the airport to Bergstrom was, in reality, a way to keep Mueller 
open longer.   On August 13th, another newspaper article stated that Mueller 
airport was not overcrowded as commonly suggested.  According to the article, in 
1989 there were 186,149 takeoffs and landings, but the current runways could 
handle 300,000.  Further, a FAA report stated that Mueller could handle up to 56 
instrument landings per hour during periods of low visibility, while the peak 
hourly traffic at Mueller was only 30 arrivals per hour.  Finally, since its peak in 
1987, flight operations at Mueller had actually decreased more than nineteen 
percent. 
Countering these observations another article ran in the Austin- American 
Statesman (Statesman) stating that, according to City statistics, more than 27,500 
people lived in areas near the Mueller airport where noise levels exceeded 65 
decibels (the level at which the government recommends against residential 
development).  Another 3,100 people lived in areas where noise levels averaged a 
“deafening” 75 decibels.  This article stated, “property values [had] fallen because 
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of the airport uncertainty” and that “the biggest fear [was] that the airport [would] 
stay put and that the city leaders [would] look to swallow their neighborhoods in 
order to expand Mueller”.   
That same week of August 1990, another article ran stating that closed 
military bases could be economic assets to their communities.  The article stated 
that of the one hundred bases closed by the Pentagon between 1961 and 1986, 
forty-two had become municipal airports.  Ray Reece, the coordinator of the 
“Move it to Bergstrom” organization, was quoted as saying that in Austin moving 
the airport to Bergstrom would both save money and have a beneficial effect on 
the former Base’s neighbors due to the reduction in noise from the military jets.  
He went on to say that communities near Bergstrom would “realize enormous 
economic development benefits” from “increased property values in the vicinity 
of a Bergstrom airport and from commercial and industrial development related to 
such a facility”. 
In October of 1990 the Austin City Council formed a citizen task force 
and gave them sixteen weeks to come up with recommendations for the best way 
to convert BAFB to civilian use.  However, in early December the Austin 
Partnership for a New Bergstrom Mission, an adjunct of the Greater Austin 
Chamber of Commerce, held a news conference in support of finding a way to 
ensure that BAFB would not close.  About this same time, the City Council voted 
down (3-2) a resolution to build a city airport near Manor.   In reaction, five 
people who lived near Mueller filed a lawsuit against the city charging that Austin 
violated noise abatement laws that required them to hire land acquisition 
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consultants by March 31, 1990.  The city had met that requirement by approving a 
contract for the services, but then suspended the contracts a few weeks later.  The 
mayor responded by saying he was waiting for the federal government decision 
on BAFB before he made any airport decisions. 
By January of 1991 the airport issued had divided members of City 
Council and state lawmakers.  State representative Delco filed a series of bills that 
would: (1) allow the state, instead of the city, to take over BAFB if it closed, (2) 
allow voters to create a Travis County Airport Authority with the power to take 
over Mueller airport and establish a new one, and (3) require the city to 
soundproof every public building around the existing airport at a cost of millions.  
The mayor strongly opposed all of these bills.  The City Council postponed 
activities at Manor, but they were divided on whether BAFB could be converted 
to a municipal airport.  Senator Barrientos wanted Mueller airport moved, but 
opposed moving it to Bergstrom, which he saw as just moving the problem to a 
new neighborhood. 
Interestingly, according to a local Austin journalist covering the story 
(Mike Clark-Madison, Austin Chronicle, June 21, 2001), the base closure was not 
widely known in Austin.  In June of 1991 when Bergstrom AFB actually appeared 
on the closure list the citizens of Austin were caught off-guard.  However, the 
City Council was not surprised and in August passed a resolution indicating 
Bergstrom was the preferred site for the new city airport.  The Bergstrom 
residential neighbors were divided at a Town Meeting: some approved of the 
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airport in hopes it would bring economic growth, others already felt burdened by 
too many noxious sitings in the area.   
By the end of December 1991, it was clear that the City Council members 
favored a move to Bergstrom, but were slowed by an earlier resolution that 
promised a public referendum.  Some council members expressed concern that 
public sentiment appeared in favor of keeping the airport at Mueller.  A telephone 
survey of 604 Austin-area residents conducted by IntelliQuest showed 44% 
favored keeping the airport at Mueller, 43% wanted it moved.  The same survey 
also found that 61% were in favor of converting BAFB into an airport with 25% 
opposed.  In contrast, only 21% favored an airport built at Manor with 61% 
opposed.  The City Council voted to abandon the Manor project and vowed never 
to use the bond revenue approved in 1987 for a Manor airport. 
For the next year, the newspapers were surprisingly empty of airport-
related articles.  Early in January 1992 an article ran indicating that more facts 
were needed before a decision on the airport could be made.  Three days later, an 
article ran stating that if the Air Force Base closed, the land would automatically 
revert back to the City of Austin at no charge.  This ceased any major articles on 
the airport for almost a year as Austin waited for the official decision on BAFB’s 
expected closure.   
In February of 1993 the City agreed to soundproof about 500 homes and 
three schools near Bergstrom that would be exposed to excess aircraft noise at a 
cost of $11 million.  An Air Force analysis showed that 5,748 people would be 
affected by commercial aircraft noise.  In March, the Statesman ran an article 
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stating that most aircraft at Bergstrom would travel north and south, creating a 
primary flight path only over the eastern side of the interstate highway.  It also 
noted that the aircraft would be at a much greater altitude than the planes that 
crossed the Mueller neighborhoods.   
Though the move of the airport seemed imminent at this time, the major 
airlines that served Austin still had not taken a position on the proposed relocation 
to Bergstrom.  Some airlines were considering the possibility of staying at 
Mueller, even if a new airport opened at Bergstrom.   Further, in April 1993, 
Bergstrom-area school officials said they still had concerns about the effects on 
students if the airport was re-located to their neighborhood.  On the 18th, the 
Statesman published a door-to-door survey on the effects of converting the Air 
Force Base to an airport that the newspaper had conducted.  The survey found that 
noise was the greatest concern of local residents.   
In May 1993, Austin voters approved a referendum to re-locate the airport 
to Bergstrom when the Base closed.  By mid-June, the city airport team moved its 
offices to Bergstrom.  Finally, in September 1993 the BAFB officially closed, and 
the next month the property reverted to the City of Austin.  With the voter 
mandate in hand, the next year was spent submitting official noise reports to the 
FAA, designing the new airport, and addressing noise concerns of the Bergstrom 
neighbors.   
On November 3, 1994 the City Council approved the name “Austin-
Bergstrom International Airport” and on November 19th, the city celebrated the 
groundbreaking of the new airport.  Actual construction began in March of 1995 
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and continued through May of 1999.  On August14, 1995 the FAA announced 
their approval to fund $30 million to relocate four Del Valle schools in the 
Bergstrom flight path.  Over two years later, on October 2, 1996, the City and Del 
Valle Independent School District reached an agreement over the relocation.  The 
real estate transaction totaled almost $46 million.  On June 30, 1997 air cargo 
operations began at ABIA.  Finally, on May 23,1999 Austin-Bergstrom 
International Airport opened for passenger service.  Operations were halted at 
Mueller airport the night before. 
Access to the new airport was also a concern.  The ABIA Planning 
Committee projected 36,000 auto trips per day to the new airport, about 7,000 
more than were recorded when it was an Air Force Base.  Austin-Bergstrom 
airport is located approximately 8 miles from downtown Austin, whereas the 
Mueller airport was only four miles.  Mueller was directly accessible from the 
major interstate highway (I-35) from both the north and the south, via Manor 
Road.  ABIA is accessible from two major highways, Texas 71 and US 183.  On 
November 8, 1989, the Austin-American Statesman ran an article stating that 
these highways were both “ill-prepared” for additional traffic.   From central areas 
of Austin, it was forecast that many commuters would instead choose to use city 
streets, mainly Riverside Drive, East 7th Street, and Airport Boulevard.  The 
article went on to insist that, “it would be an understatement to say transportation 
planning for the new airport has been poor”.   
The neighborhoods surrounding Mueller airport were crucial in getting the 
airport moved.  Long after the new airport was secure, the Mueller Neighborhood 
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Coalition formed (1996-1997) in reaction to the first consultant presentation for 
the redevelopment of Mueller.  This coalition, consisting of 14 neighborhood 
associations and representing 17,500 households, believed the consultant 
presentation was unacceptable and focused too much on the business community.  
They consider their role to be making sure new development serves the 
community and will actually make a quality of life improvement for the residents.  
(Jim Walker, Mueller Neighborhood Coalition, guest speaker seminar 7/5/01).  
When ABIA opened for passenger service, the redevelopment of Mueller airport 
was still being hotly debated. 
 23
Chapter One: A Comparison of Methodologies to Measure Effects 
of Airport Siting Decisions 
1.1  INTRODUCTION 
Even though markets rarely exist for environmental goods, their effects on 
market prices can be measured in an urban setting by virtue of being ‘bundled’ to 
a residential location.  When a household purchases a house, it implicitly buys an 
entire bundle of amenities – public schools, police protection, parks, 
transportation, even air and water quality.  If, however, a model controls for all 
non-environmental factors, then any remaining difference in price can be 
attributed to differences in environmental quality.  The hedonic pricing method, 
using regression techniques, can be used to identify what portion of property 
value differences can be attributed to the environmental differences and to infer 
an individual’s willingness to pay.   
This study applies the hedonic pricing method to analyze the removal of a 
major airport in an urban location.  By the late 1980s, Mueller Airport in Austin, 
Texas was losing its ability to handle the dynamic growth of cargo and passengers 
flooding the airport as a result of the high-tech boom.  If the City wanted to 
maintain this growth and job development, it would need to expand the airport.  
However, Mueller was an old facility, land-locked on only 711 acres in the heart 
of the city.  Moreover, the recent growth in the number and size of planes coming 
into the airport had drastically elevated the noise level imposed on the more than 
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30,000 people living in noise impact areas.  The City decided to solve both 
problems by relocating the airport to a new facility on the outskirts of town.   
Clearly, the city required a larger airport, but what would happen to the 
neighborhoods that surrounded the old airport which both suffered from noise but 
also enjoyed the proximity to air travel?  Do homeowners consider the airport a 
magnet for growth and development, or is it a noxious facility, spewing noise, 
pollution, congestion, even danger on its neighbors?  Planners need the best 
available information before deciding where to put an airport, including not only 
the costs and benefits, but also estimates of who bears those costs and who gets 
the benefits. 
This study answers these questions by combining the effects of airports on 
property values with several other sub-literatures within hedonics: the varying 
influences of noise and distance measures of airports on property values, house 
prices during noxious siting stages, and repeat-sale analysis.  Several data sources 
are brought together, including Geographic Information Systems (GIS) maps and 
census data, on a variety of structural, neighborhood, and environmental variables 
over a twenty-year period.  Due to the variety and length of the data set, the 
hedonic pricing technique can be applied in four different model specifications.  
Thus, not only is this study a determination of the impact of noise and proximity 
to an airport on residential property values in Austin, it is also a comparison of 
analytical methods.   
The data on 21,386 home sales includes approximately 10,700 repeat sale 
observations (of over 5,350 houses).  These data span the time of five separate 
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“events” that might have been important to houses around the old airport.  Thus, 
the data are used to compare the change in prices around the old airport before 
and after each such event, relative to the change in prices elsewhere.  The four 
model specifications are: (a) a “phase model” that runs separate regressions for 
each of the five stages between events, (b) a “pooled model” that combines all 
stages into the same regression, (c) separate hedonic regressions on all houses for 
each event, and (d) a repeat-sale model for each event.  The repeat-sale analysis 
applies a censored sample procedure to correct for sample selection bias, corrects 
for depreciation between the sale dates, and employs “effects coding” of the time 
dummy variables to control for other time variant effects on properties. 
The effects of airport noise on property values are an entire literature 
within the hedonic literature.4  In addition, several have attempted to separate out 
the costs and benefits of increased airport services to a residential community, 
including Lipscomb (2003) and Espey and Lopez (2000).  Both of these studies 
realize that airports can be both amenities and disamenities, so they both define 
two separate environmental variables: noise and proximity.  However, these two 
main studies come to opposite conclusions.  Lipscomb concludes that closeness to 
the airport is a positive determinant of residential property prices and that airport 
noise is insignificant as a predictor of house sales price.  Espey and Lopez find 
property values in noisier areas are 2.4% less than values in quieter areas and, 
even with controlling for noise, airport proximity is a disamenity, with about a 
                                                 
4 Nelson (1980) is an early survey paper on the effects of airport noise on property values that 
includes thirteen empirical studies over eighteen different airports.  A decade and many studies 
later, Pennington, Topham and Ward (1990) found that early studies of airport noise generally 
overstated the negative effects of airport noise on property values. 
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2.6% difference in value between equivalent houses one versus two miles from 
the airport. 
While not directly addressing airport noise, several studies have expanded 
the hedonic literature to look at house prices during multiple stages of a noxious 
siting.  Kolhase (1991) is an early study of toxic dumps in Houston in three 
discrete years.  Kiel and McClain (1995) added to the literature on siting stages 
with a nineteen-year study of the placement of a waste-incinerator near Boston.  
The model is estimated two ways, a separate regression for each stage, similar to 
Kolhase, and over the entire sample with interaction terms of distance and time 
periods to measure the changing impact of the incinerator.   
Of all the above hedonic models, only Kolhase (1991)5 had a data set rich 
enough to apply a repeat-sale model as a second means of investigating the effects 
of noxious sitings on property values.  Similar in nature to an airport, Gatzlaff and 
Smith (1993) use both a repeat-sale and a traditional hedonic model to evaluate 
the impact of announcing a Metrorail system on residential properties.  They find 
that price indices between the two models are not significantly different.  Finally, 
Palmquist and Smith (2002) combine a repeat-sale analysis with a regression 
discontinuity design to measure the impact of a new interstate highway on 
property values bisected by the road.  They find that in all cases they specified, 
new information about the highway significantly reduced the sale prices of nearby 
houses. 
                                                 
5 Kolhase appended her hedonic siting stage model with a repeat sales model for the years 1980 
and 1985.  Her findings reinforce the original results. 
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This paper brings together important elements of each of these sub-
literatures.  First, the airport variables are disaggregated into noise and proximity 
in the manner of Espey and Lopez (2000) and Lipscomb (2003), plus a third 
variable that measures the effects of development along the major routes to the 
airport.  This three-variable specification is unique to this study and hopes to 
answer the open question on the amenity versus disamenity nature of urban 
airports.  In addition, the airport literature in hedonics tends to focus on building 
new airports or expanding current ones.  This study looks at the question from the 
opposite direction; it focuses on houses in a neighborhood where an airport is 
being removed.   
Second, this paper links the siting stage models with traditional and 
repeat-sale models to find when, if at all, homeowners react to a noxious siting.   
The siting stage models divide the entire twenty-year period into five “stages” 
where households have different levels of certainty regarding the eventual 
relocation of the airport.  The traditional and repeat-sale models, on the other 
hand, examine the reaction to specific events that lead to the relocation of the 
airport.  
Finally, as mentioned above, this paper is a comparison of analytical 
methods.  In the siting stage section of the paper, “phase models” are compared to 
“pooled models”.  The repeat sale section begins with a difference-in-difference 
calculation at the means.  These results are then compared to a repeat-sale 
analysis and a traditional hedonic model.  While neither siting stage nor specific 
event models are necessarily better, the conclusion compares results, as well as 
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the ease of implementation and interpretation, across all four regression-model 
specifications. 
A visual interpretation of the results is given by the maps in Figures 1 and 
2 at the end of this chapter.  These maps plot the percent change in houses prices 
evaluated at the two extreme counterfactuals: as if the airport never changed 
locations and as if the airport was never in the original location.6  Figure 2 focuses 
on the neighborhoods closest to the old airport. 
Each dot on the maps indicates a single house sale.  The color of the dot 
indicates the estimated percent change in price resulting from the location of the 
old airport.  Therefore, the darkest blue dots indicate that the price of the house 
would more than double if the city airport had never been at the old location (and, 
thus, had always been at the new location).  The darkest red dots indicate that the 
price of the house would fall by twenty percent or more if the city airport had 
never been at the old location.  The palest dots (both blue and red) indicate the 
price of the house changes very little with the location of the airport.  Therefore, 
the distribution of the colored dots estimates which neighborhoods become more 
or less desirable as a result of the airport transition. The regression estimates of 
the price changes include variables to account for structural, neighborhood, 
                                                 
6 The estimated prices of houses in the case of a permanent airport at the original site were 
calculated by first running a hedonic regression using only houses that sold before the vote to 
move the airport and then applying the estimated coefficients to all houses in the dataset.  The 
estimated prices of houses in the case of no airport at the original site were calculated by first 
running a hedonic regression using only houses that sold after the new airport opened and then 
applying the estimated coefficients to all houses in the dataset.  Since both hedonic estimates used 
a semi-logarithmic functional form, the percent change was calculated by subtracting the 
permanent original site price from the no airport price. 
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environmental, and time characteristics, in a similar manner to the hedonic 
regressions used in all sections of this paper. 
Looking at Map 2, the neighborhoods with houses in the airport noise 
contours, but at a fair distance from the facility itself, show very large gains in 
value from removing the airport.  Houses in the distance contours, but not in noise 
contours, show much smaller gains, and in some cases losses in value, from 
removing the airport.  However, houses that show the largest losses are often 
those on the major routes to the old airport: Manor Road, Airport Boulevard, and 
to some extent, interstate highway 35 (IH-35), and those on the border of the one 
mile distance contour.  These price changes imply that noise is a disamenity, 
distance from the airport can be an amenity or a disamenity, but being on the main 
routes to an airport is a clear amenity. 
The different model specifications find different event dates to which 
residents respond to the airport relocation.  By and large, early announcements 
had little effect on house prices, though prices changed more with the 
groundbreaking than with the final switch to the new airport.  This suggests 
homeowners have rational expectations and adjust to the relocation of the airport 
before the aircraft noise actually ceases.  Comparing the different types of models, 
this paper finds that the phase specification is a better fit to the changing valuation 
of neighborhood characteristics across time than the pooled specification.  The 
repeat sale and traditional hedonic models produce similar results that are 
consistent with expectations.  Therefore, the appropriate choice of either a repeat 
sale or hedonic model would depend largely on the data available. 
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The next section gives a review of Austin’s airport history background.  
Then the data are described in Section 1.3 and Section 1.4 briefly reviews hedonic 
models.  The estimation of the model is divided by the methodology used: house 
prices during siting stages in Section 1.5 and repeat sales in Section 1.6.  Finally, 
Section 1.7 concludes and previews areas for future work. 
 
1.2  BACKGROUND7 
As with most policy decisions, the decision to re-locate Austin’s 
municipal airport occurred over many years and information regimes.  As early as 
1970, talk began of either finding a new site to replace Robert Mueller Municipal 
Airport (Mueller), or working out a joint use facility with the federal government 
at Bergstrom Air Force Base (BAFB).  However, by 1980 Air Force officials had 
twice denied requests for a joint use facility.  For a few years the City focused its 
attention on expanding the current airport, but widespread public disapproval, 
driven by a multi-neighborhood organization “Move-It” campaign, caused the 
City Council to unanimously vote this proposal down.  After failing once in 1985, 
a voter referendum in 1987 finally passed to build a new airport at a site east of 
the nearby town of Manor (Manor location).8 
                                                 
7An extensive background was compiled to better understand the information regime of 
homeowners in Austin through the airport re-location process, see Background.  The main source 
of information is searching newspaper articles in Austin’s mainstream newspaper, the Austin-
American Statesman as well as articles in the weekly city paper, the Austin Chronicle.  The 
website for the new Austin-Bergstrom International Airport was also referenced.  In addition, 
unique perspectives are provided by (1) planners at the City of Austin Transportation, Planning, 
and Sustainability Department, (2) a local Austin journalist, Mike Clark-Madison, and (3) the 
president of the Mueller Neighborhood Coalition, Jim Walker, in a Community and Regional 
Planning seminar at the University of Texas at Austin.   
8 On November 3, 1987 voters rejected the idea of expanding Mueller, 88% to 12%.  The 
referendum to build the new airport at Manor passed with a less impressive margin, 56% to 44%. 
 31
Although the City began to purchase land at the Manor location in 1989, it 
was simultaneously involved in an expansion project at Mueller to add a new 
terminal.  Then, to complicate matters further, early in 1990 the rumor spread that 
BAFB was slated for closure by the US government.  In June 1991 BAFB 
actually appeared on a closure list.  The City Council passed a resolution just two 
months later indicating Bergstrom was the preferred location for the new airport 
and voted to abandon the Manor project. 
In May 1993, Austin voters approved a referendum to re-locate the airport 
to Bergstrom when the Base closed.  In September, BAFB officially closed and 
the next month the property reverted to the City of Austin.  Approximately one 
year later the City Council approved the name “Austin-Bergstrom International 
Airport” (ABIA) and on November 19, 1994 the groundbreaking was celebrated.  
Finally, on the night of May 22, 1999 all flight operations were halted at Mueller 
Airport, and the following day Austin-Bergstrom Airport opened for passenger 
service. 
 
1.3  DATA 
The data for this study were complied by First American Real Estate 
Solutions from individual sales of single-family residences in Travis County, 
Texas.  The data include information about houses sold in thirty-three zip codes in 
the Austin Metropolitan Area. The total sample consists of 21,386 homes sold 
between January 1980 and June 2001.  Each observation includes the property’s 
address, the sale price, the sale date, certain house characteristics, and the census 
tract location.   
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The data set is built from 9,728 single sales and 5,829 repeat sales.  The 
“full sample”, therefore, refers to the dataset with 9,728 single sales, 5,829 first 
sales and 5,829 second sales.  The “single sample” refers to the 9,728 houses that 
sold only once during the sample period.  The “repeat sample” refers to 5,374 
houses with two valid sale dates in two separate years during the sample period.   
This reflects a loss of 455 repeat sale observations that could not be used because 
the initial and second sales occurred in the same year.   Summary statistics are 
shown in Tables A.1, A.2, and A.3 of Appendix A.   
These data include all available houses from First American9 that were 
sold in the thirty-three zip codes for the entire twenty-year period, so they avoid 
sample selection problems except those arising from the self-selection of houses 
to be sold.  These are not panel data, since they do not show the prices of the same 
houses each year for twenty years, but they do have the significant advantage of 
covering all relevant neighborhoods for all relevant years.  Thus, they can be used 
to show both time-series effects of relocating the airport and cross-section effects 
of one neighborhood compared to another.  In addition, the repeat sample can be 
used for a difference-in-differences approach, looking at a cross-section of houses 
where the same houses sold more than once.  
 The structural variables in these data include the total living area in 
square feet, the total lot size in square feet, the age of house10, the number of 
                                                 
9 It should be stressed these are all available houses from First American, but not all houses that 
sold in Austin during the twenty-year period.  Many attempts were made to acquire all house sales 
in the Multiple Listing Service (MLS) from the Austin Board of Realtors with no success.  
Therefore, a sample selection problem may arise with First American’s selection of house sales 
available for purchase. 
10 Several specifications of age are tested, with slight variations in the results.  Including only a 
single term for age produced the smallest coefficient (-0.00261) and the lowest R2 (0.6501).  
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bathrooms, the existence of a pool or in-house spa, the existence of a fireplace, 
the existence of a garage or carport, and whether the house is constructed of 
wood, a wood and brick combination, masonry, or is a manufactured home. 
Summary statistics are shown in Table 1.1. 
Table 1.1 Summary Statistics for Structural Variables 
Variable Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
Price* $171,102.80 153,115.3 1,129 8,807,557 
Gross Living Area (sq ft) 1,731.49 763.74 298 8,900 
Total Land Area (sq ft) 11,570.83 16,048.06 660 679,971.6 
Age 23.85 18.05 0 101 
Bath1** 0.1861 0.3892 0 1 
Bath2 0.5274 .49993 0 1 
Bath3 0.2864 .4521 0 1 
Fireplace 0.6832 0.4653 0 1 
Pool 0.0603 0.2380 0 1 
Spa 0.0187 0.1355 0 1 
Garage 0.8207 0.3836 0 1 
Carport 0.0884 0.2839 0 1 
Manufactured Home 0.0001 0.0118 0 1 
Masonry Construction 0.0042 0.0647 0 1 
Wood Construction 0.6810 0.4661 0 1 
Wood/Brick Construction 0.3147 0.4644 0 1 
The total number of observations is 21,386 
*All prices are CPI adjusted, 2001=1 
**Bath1 indicates a house has one bathroom, Bath2 has either one and a half or two bathrooms.  Bath3 has more than two 
bathrooms. Less than 5% of houses in the sample have more than three bathrooms.   
To allow for a non-constant marginal value of a bathroom, the number of 
bathrooms variable is broken into a series of dummy variables.  The number of 
bedrooms is not available in the data set.  While bedrooms are an important 
                                                                                                                                     
Adding a quadratic term increased the coefficient on age (-0.0128), produced a positive coefficient 
for the squared term (0.000161), and increased the R2 (0.6549).  Adding a cubed term reduced the 
size of the coefficient (-0.00011) and decreased the R2 (0.6503).  The best fit (R2 of 0.6603) 
resulted when age entered the regression as a series of dummy variables:  0 to 5 years old, 5 to 10, 
10 to 20, 20 to 30, 30 to 50, and over 50 years old.  Leaving new houses as the baseline, houses 20 
to 30 years old had the largest negative coefficient, followed by ages 30 to 50, then 5 to 10, 10 to 
20, and the smallest (though still negative) coefficient on houses over 50 years old.  All of these 
coefficients are significantly different from zero at a 99% confidence level in all models. 
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determinate of house price, Brookshire et al. (1982) finds collinearity between the 
number of bedrooms and the total living area, and thus uses living area as the only 
measure of house size. 
The neighborhood characteristics for each house are matched from the 
1990 U.S. Census of Population and Housing, and from GIS maps.  These 
variables include: distance from the Austin central business district (CBD), 
distance to the University of Texas (UT, a major employment center as well as a 
common destination for over 50,000 students), the percentage of the population in 
the census tract who graduated from high school, a four-year college, and 
graduate school, the racial breakdown of the census tract, the percentage of vacant 
lots in the tract, and the percentage of homes that are owner-occupied.  Summary 
statistics are shown in Table 1.2.  It is a fairly common practice to include both 
the median household income in the census tract and the percent of the census 
tract that is unemployed as proxies for neighborhood quality.  As pointed out by 
Butler (1982), however, “it is impossible to separate the function of, for example, 
income as a neighborhood quality proxy from its role as a characteristic of 
demanders in the neighborhood.”   Furthermore, “the income coefficient will 
reflect both the effect of income on households’ bids and the rationing effect of 
prices in allocating households of different income to different types of housing”  
(Butler, 1982, 96-97).   
The school district of a particular house is another common regressor that 
is left out of this model.  School district information is available in GIS format, 
but after analysis, it was omitted for two reasons.  First, almost 83% of the 
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housing sample is in the same school district, Austin Independent School District 
(AISD).  Second, the school district dummies are highly correlated with the series 
of zip code dummy variables added as neighborhood proxies.11  The zip code 
variables are included rather than the school district variables because zip codes 
reveal greater neighborhood detail: thirty-three zip codes make up the sample, 
compared to only six school districts.  Summary Statistics for zip code dummies 
are shown in Table A.4 of Appendix A and, in addition, they are plotted in Map 
B.1.12    The zip code dummies are also highly collinear with dummies for the 
three cities encompassed by the sample: Austin, Manor, and Del Valle.  All of the 
houses in Manor are in the zip code 78653 and all the houses in Del Valle are in 
the zip code 78617.  Thus, dummy variables for individual cities are omitted from 
the analysis. 
                                                 
11 For example, of the 1,231 houses in the Eanes Independent School District (5.8% of the 
sample), all but nine of them are in the zip code 78746. 
12 Mueller Airport is contained in zip code 78723, but the noise contours extended into 78751 and 
78756 on the northwest, 78722 on the southwest, 78724 on the northeast, and 78721 on the east.  
The mailing address for Austin-Bergstrom International Airport is 78719, though the eastern 
runway is largely located in 78617.  The noise contours extend to the west into 78744 and to 
78742 on the north. 
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Table 1.2  Summary Statistics for Neighborhood Variables 
Variable Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
CBD1* 0.0038 0.0614 0 1 
CBD2 0.0476 0.2129 0 1 
CBD3 0.0771 0.2668 0 1 
UT1 0.0056 0.0747 0 1 
UT2 0.0631 0.2431 0 1 
UT3 0.0832 0.2762 0 1 
% HS Graduates 0.1177 0.0445 0.01 0.23 
% 4-year College Grads 0.1605 0.0696 0 0.39 
% Graduate School 
Grads 
0.0893 0.0632 0 0.25 
% Foreign Born 0.0641 0.0374 0 0.33 
% White 0.7882 0.1731 0.04 0.98 
% Black 0.0859 0.1295 0 0.90 
% Native American 0.0023 0.0045 0 0.02 
% Asia – Pacific 0.0265 0.0243 0 0.25 
% Other 0.0972 0.0929 0 0.72 
% Vacant Lots 0.0904 0.0436 0.03 0.45 
*CBD1 indicates a house is located less than one mile from the Austin central business district, CBD2 indicates between 
one and two miles, and CBD3 indicates between two and three miles.  UT1 indicates a house is located less than one mile 
from the University of Texas, UT2, between one and two miles, UT3, between two and three miles. 
 
The environmental characteristics are developed from the GIS and the 
Noise Exposure Maps furnished by the City of Austin Transportation, Planning, 
and Sustainability Department.  Three variable groups are included: noise, 
distance, and route.  The noise variables are a series of dummy variables that 
capture the noise contours: average noise level greater than 75 decibels (dB), 70-
75dB, 65-70dB, and “undistinguishable from background noise”.  The FAA, as 
well as HUD, defines areas exposed to average sound levels of 65dB or over as 
incompatible with residential housing use.  See noise contours in Map B.3 in 
Appendix B.  These noise contours were developed by the City of Austin for both 
airports and are provided in “Part 150 Noise Study” reports.  The evaluation of 
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the noise contours was conducted using the Integrated Noise Model (INM) 
developed by the FAA, the most commonly used method to predict contours.13  
Summary statistics are reported in Table 1.3.  Due to the small number of houses 
within noise contours greater than 70 decibels, the noise contours for average 
noise greater than 75 decibels has been combined with noise levels between 70 
and 75 decibels (NGT70). 
 
Table 1.3  Summary Statistics for Noise Variables 
Dummy Variable Mean Std. 
Dev 
Min Max 
N6570: Mueller Airport (MA) noise level 65-70 dBs 0.0176 0.1316 0 1 
NGT70: MA noise level greater than 70 dBs 0.0067 0.0815 0 1 
The distance from the airport is also represented by a series of dummy 
variables.  They are measured in six half-mile concentric circles around the main 
terminal.  Often, in the noxious siting and hedonic literature, distance is instead 
measured as a continuous variable and enters into the equation as a natural log.  
With the log specification, the negative effect of living near the noxious facility 
decreases at a decreasing rate, but more distance from the site is always 
advantageous.  In the case of airports, however, proximity to the site may indeed 
be an amenity (controlling for noise). Dummy variables allow for a non-constant 
marginal value of distance from the airport that may change sign.   See Map B.4 
in Appendix B.  Summary statistics are reported in Table 1.4. 
                                                 
13 The INM determines aircraft noise level on an average-daily basis using a ‘Day Night Average 
Sound Level’ metric.  This metric is a 24-hour average sound level weighted with a 10-decibel 
penalty for nighttime noise events. 
 38
Table 1.4  Summary Statistics for Distance from Mueller Airport Variables 
Dummy Variable Mean Std. 
Dev 
Min Max 
MAdist1: Less than ½ mile 0.0115 0.1066 0 1 
MAdist2: Between ½ and 1 mile 0.0353 0.1846 0 1 
MAdist3: Between 1 and 1 ½ mile  0.0250 0.1562 0 1 
MAdist4: Between 1 ½ and 2 miles 0.0240 0.1532 0 1 
MAdist5: Between 2 and 2 ½ miles 0.0311 0.1736 0 1 
MAdist6: Between 2 ½ and 3 miles 0.0496 0.2170 0 1 
 
The map given in Figure 1.3 at the end of this chapter combines the 
Mueller noise contours with a one-mile distance ring for reference. This map 
shows that noise contours are elongated at a diagonal across the interstate 
highway (IH-35) whereas the distance rings form concentric circles around the 
airport building outlines.  Thus, as shown in Table 1.5, the correlation terms 
between the noise and distance variables are relatively low.  At the highest, noise 
level in the 65-70 decibel contour and the 0.5 to 1.0 mile distance ring have a 
correlation of 0.2574.  Therefore, these environmental variables are designed to 
determine the separate impacts of airport noise and proximity to the airport 
(Espey and Lopez, 2000 and Tomkins et al, 1998).  The noise contour variables 
are expected to pick up the effects of actual noise on residents under the flight 
path, while the distance variables pick up other effects of proximity. 
 39
Table 1.5  Correlation Between Noise and Distance Variables 
 N6570 NGT70 
MAdist1 0.1422 0.2171 
MAdist2 0.2574 0.1988 
MAdist3 0.1856 0.1044 
MAdist4 0.1599 -0.0129 
MAdist5 0.0047 -0.0147 
MAdist6 -0.0306 -0.0187 
  *See variable definitions in Tables 3 and 4 
The construction of the “Route” variables is unique to this study.  They are 
designed to pick up the effects of expectations about future land development 
related to the change in transportation through the regions as the airport changes 
location.  It is expected that properties bordering the main routes to the airport are 
valuable for commercial use, thus raising their prices.  In contrast, those 
properties near, but not bordering, the access routes may suffer from increased 
congestion, noise and pollution, thus reducing their prices.   Mueller Airport was 
directly accessed from the city’s major interstate highway (IH-35) from both the 
north and the south via Manor Road. Once the airport closed down, Manor Road 
was predicted to lose much of its vehicle traffic.  Therefore, the Route dummies 
are: one-quarter mile buffer from Manor Road, one-half mile, and greater than a 
half mile. 
The final set of variables is year dummies to control for the general market 
trend in Austin.  The chart in Figure 1.4 at the end of this chapter reports the 
residential housing activity in Austin for all house sales.14  From this chart, all 
                                                 
14 This data is provided by the Real Estate Center at Texas A & M University, 
http://recenter.tamu.edu/data/hs/hs140a.htm, although they are unable to provide individual house 
sales. 
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else equal, it is expected that house prices in constant dollars will be lowest for 
the years 1990 and 1991.  Therefore, in the hedonic regressions, the dummy 
variable for 1990 is left out to serve as the baseline.  This convenient notation 
implies that the dummy for 1991 is expected to be relatively insignificant, but all 
other years will be significant and positive.   
For the standard hedonic models, these year dummy variables take on the 
value of one if the house sold in that year, zero otherwise.  For the repeat sales 
models, the variables to control for time effects are actually pairs of years 
involved in the sale, in the manner of Poulos and Smith (2002).  These sets of 
time dummies are called “effects coding” and are similar to Black’s boundary 
fixed effects, where the year is coded as negative one for the initial sale, positive 
one for the second sale, and zero otherwise. 
 
1.4  HEDONIC MODELS 
The theoretical framework most hedonic models use relies on the hedonic 
price method developed by Rosen (1974).  The sale price of a house in a 
competitive market depends on its characteristics, all else equal.  Because home 
buyers prefer a quiet location to being under the flight path of a jet, the market 
price of a house in a quiet location will be greater than the market price of a house 
in a noisy location.  The general hedonic price of housing is estimated as: 
 
 
1. 1 Pi  =  f ( Sij, Cik, Qim, yeari ) 
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where, for house i, P is the house price, Sij = Sij…Sij is a vector of j structural 
characteristics, Cik = Ci1…Cik is a vector of k community characteristics, Qim = 
Qi1…Qim is a vector of m environmental quality characteristics, and year is the 
year of sale.  This estimation provides the marginal implicit price of each of the 
quality characteristics.  For example, if Qi1 is the noise level, and  ∂Pi /∂Qi1 < 0,  
then the price of a house decreases with an incremental increase in noise. 
No theoretical justification defines the correct functional form for simple 
hedonic or repeat-sale models and as such, previous studies have estimated a 
variety of forms, including log-linear, semi-log, linear, and Box-Cox.  In many 
cases, researchers have ‘let the data determine the functional form’ based on 
goodness of fit.  However, this method has come under scrutiny of various 
forms.15  As a result, this model adopted the most common form, semi-
logarithmic, with the natural log of the housing price a linear function of its 
characteristics, without empirically testing for functional form. 
Leaving aside the time component of the airport re-location on house 
prices for now,16 this section analyzes various specifications for the distance and 
route variables in the hedonic model.  Conventional wisdom and early hedonic 
studies on proximity to the airport suggests that, all else equal, people would 
prefer to live in a quiet location than a noisy one, thus making airports noxious 
                                                 
15 Griliches (1971) pointed out that in the cases where form is determined empirically, most 
researchers settled on a semi-logarithmic relationship.  Butler (1982) added that researchers who 
made these empirical comparisons, “by and large found little basis for choosing one form over 
another”.   Cassell and Mendelsohn (1985) had three additional criticisms of the method.  First, the 
best-fitting criterion does not necessarily lead to more accurate estimates of characteristic prices.  
Second, the transformations required by Box-Cox result in complex estimates of slopes and 
elasticities that make policy analysis difficult (Palmquist, 1991 noted this as well).  Third, the 
best-fit functional form may be inappropriate for the model’s predictions. 
16 Price changes over time are discussed in detail in sections V and VI. 
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facilities when used as proxies for aircraft noise.  As discussed in the introduction, 
more recent literature has suggested that commercial and infrastructure 
development may make airports more attractive neighbors than first perceived.  In 
addition, the availability of GIS software and data has made it possible to 
differentiate the distance from an airport terminal separately from aircraft noise 
contours that follow take-off and landing patterns. Three recent studies on the 
effects of airport noise on property values have attempted to separate out the costs 
and benefits of increased airport services to a residential community by defining 
two separate environmental variables: aircraft noise and airport proximity.  These 
studies, however, have not developed a consensus as to whether proximity is an 
amenity or a disamenity, or whether noise is even an important house price 
determinant.   
The earliest of the three studies, Tomkins et al. (1998), suggests that 
effects of proximity to an airport, including traffic congestion, ease of access to 
airport, and pressures on land use, are more important than aircraft noise.  They 
found that at any given distance to the Manchester airport, house values were 
inversely related to noise levels, but that overall, house prices declined with 
increasing distance to the airport.  They suggest that this finding indicates that the 
positive benefits or airport proximity outweigh the negative effects of noise.  
Espey and Lopez (2000) studied house price sales near the Reno-Sparks airport.  
They find a statistically significant negative relationship between airport noise 
and house prices in addition to a significant negative relationship between 
property values and houses within one mile of the airport. The most recent study 
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that separates the effects of noise and proximity, Lipscomb (2003), finds that 
airport noise is an insignificant predictor of house sales prices but that being one 
mile further from Hartsfield International airport lowers the selling price by 
$36,332 at the mean.  Lipscomb suggests that, “the benefits from being near a 
large air transportation hub outweighs the liabilities.” 
This paper proposes two different methodological differences to account 
for these three different findings on the effects of airports on house values (noise 
is a disamenity but proximity is a greater amenity that overshadows the negative 
effects of noise, noise and proximity are both disamenitites, noise is not a 
significant predictor of house prices and proximity is an amenity).  First, these 
three models, like most in airport hedonic literature, use the natural log of 
distance to reflect the non-linear relationship between distance from the airport 
and the house that sold.  This paper proposes that the relationship between 
distance and house values is non-linear, but in a discontinuous way.  Instead of 
specifying distance so that more distance is always preferable, this model uses 
dummy variables to allow each half-mile distance contour around the airport to 
have a different relationship to house values.  Second, traditional airport hedonic 
studies have used proximity to the airport as a proxy for accessibility to the 
airport, which may or may not be the case.  Since being near an airport is not 
necessarily equivalent to being in an area that is on the route to the airport and 
easily accessible or in an area of infrastructure development, this model specifies 
proximity separately from being on the route to the airport. 
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The first column of Table 1.6 lists the environmental variables for a 
regression as specified in equation 1.1 using the natural log of house price as the 
dependent variable.17   Two types of distance variables are listed, “MAmiles” a 
continuous variable that measures the distance from Mueller airport to the house 
that sold in miles, and a series of dummy variables, “MAdist1” through 
“MAdist6” which are specified as one if the house falls within the half-mile 
contour from the airport and zero otherwise.  The second column, “Traditional,” 
lists the coefficients and t-statistics for a regression specified with MAmiles 
entering as the natural log.  This model finds a result very similar to Lipscomb 
(2003): no effect of airport noise on house values, but a significant negative effect 
from increasing the distance between a house and the airport.  The third column, 
“Dummy,” lists the coefficients and t-statistics for a regression specified with the 
distance dummy variables (and without specifying any access or route variables).  
This model finds a similar non-impact result for airport noise and a more refined 
effect of distance.  Instead of finding that any increase in distance from the airport 
has a negative impact, this model finds that houses within most half-mile contours 
to the airport have no significant pricing differences from houses elsewhere, 
positive or negative, but that two particular distance contours, being within a 0.5 
and 1 mile, and being between 2.5 and 3 miles has a significant positive effect. 
While this result is similar, with noise having little effect and proximity being an 
amenity overall, the implications is that the effects of proximity are not equally 
distributed among all houses within three miles to the airport. 
                                                 
17 The regression output for the structural and community variables are not shown here for brevity 
sake.  Full regression output is available from the author by request. 
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N6570 0.0055 0.0177 -0.0531 -0.0141 
 (0.20) (0.63) (-2.14) (-0.55) 
NGT70 -0.0004 0.0101 -0.0371 -0.0094 
 (-0.01) (0.24) (-0.99) (-0.24) 
MAmiles -0.0552  -0.1589  
 (-2.29)  (-7.15)  
MAdist1  -0.019  -0.023 
  (-0.36)  (-0.49) 
MAdist2  0.0616  0.0744 
  (1.51)  (1.96) 
MAdist3  0.0246  0.0419 
  (0.61)  (1.14) 
MAdist4  -0.0016  -0.0312 
  (-0.05)  (-0.97) 
MAdist5  0.0106  0.0116 
  (0.37)  (0.44) 
MAdist6  0.0288  0.0654 
  (1.58)  (3.95) 
ManorRd2   -0.1317 -0.1251 
   (-3.55) (-3.30) 
ManorRd3   -0.0812 -0.0715 
   (-3.14) (-2.72) 
Note.  The first number is the regression coefficient.  The t-statistics are in parentheses; bold indicates significance at a 
90% confidence level or higher. 
 
Another way to model the discontinuity in the effect of airport proximity 
on house values is to use a spline function.  The spline function is the kind of 
estimate produced by a spline regression in which the slope varies for difference 
ranges of the regressors.  Unlike dummy variables, the spline function is 
continuous, though it is usually not differentiable.  The spline function works in a 
similar fashion to a series of dummy variables but smoothes the transitions from 
one dummy variable to the next.  They are employed when a usually continuous 
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variable, such as years of education, are thought to have natural cut-off points, 
such as diploma effects, where the effects of the continuous variable on the 
independent variable are different. 18 While using a spline function can provide a 
significant improvement in model fit, because it imposes more restrictions than a 
series of dummy variables, it often produces noisy estimates.  In comparing a 
spline function with a series of dummy variables, Schady (2001) found the results 
to be “quite consistent.”  Given that the intention here is to allow greater 
flexibility in the model but not to determine at which points in the data the slope 
of the distance variable changes, dummy variables capture the intention without 
greatly increasing the complexity of the estimation technique. 
The last two columns of Table 1.6 list the regression coefficients and t-
statistics for regressions that include dummy variables to indicate whether the 
house is located directly on the route to the airport (within one-quarter mile), 
MAroute2, or near a route (within one-half mile), MAroute3.   The third column, 
“Traditional with Route” is similar to the “Traditional” model in that distance 
from the airport enters as the natural log of continuous miles, but also adds the 
route variables.  The final column, “Dummy with Route” is the most flexible 
model with both distance and route variables entering the model as discontinuous 
dummy variables.   
Adding route to the airport dummy variables does not change the sign of 
the distance variables in either model, but two other results are worth noting.  
First, adding route dummy variables increases the significance of noise as a 
                                                 
18 See Schady (2001), Lam and Schoeni (1993), and Hungerford and Solon (1987) for examples. 
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determinant of house price.  In the model with dummy variables for distance, 
noise is still not significant at a 90% confidence level, but the sign on the 
coefficients is now negative instead of positive.  In the traditional model, adding 
route to the airport dummy variables actually makes noise a significant predictor 
of house prices with a negative relationship between noise and house price.  
Because the continuous distance variable continues to have a significant and 
negative coefficient, this result is now more similar to Tompkins et al. (1998) 
than Lipscomb (2003).  This indicates that the route to the airport variables may 
able to reconcile the results from these two studies. 
The second effect of adding route to the airport dummy variables to note is 
that the route variables have the opposite sign of the distance variables.  In the 
case of the traditional model, a negative sign on the MAmiles variable indicates 
that increases in distance from the airport decrease house sales prices.  Since the 
route variables are dummy variables, the negative signs on MAroute2 and 
MAroute3 indicate that being along the route to the airport has a negative impact 
on house price.  In the case of the last model, the positive signs on the distance 
dummy variables indicate that houses in those distance contours sell at higher 
prices than houses elsewhere.  The negative signs on the route dummy variables 
indicate that houses in those route designations sell at lower prices than houses 
elsewhere.  This difference in the signs on the coefficients indicate that route and 
distance variables are picking up differing effects related to proximity of the 
airport, some of which are amenities are others which are disamenities. 
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At this point in the model it is not possible to determine whether the 
results here generally support the findings of Espey and Lopez (2000) or of 
Tomkins et al. (1998) and Lipscomb (2003).  This is because these models all 
look at the expansion of currently operating airports in a relatively short time 
frame.  The data used in the above models cover a much longer time frame when 
the Austin airport was in a state of transition, at some points operating and at 
some points not.   Therefore, the interpretation of the estimated coefficients is 
more complicated than positive or negative effects of airports on housing values -- 
depending on the time period, the interpretations change.  For example, early in 
the model years when Mueller Airport is operating and most people expect it to 
continue, a negative coefficient on a route dummy would indicate a depressing 
effect of being on the route to the airport relative to houses elsewhere.  In the later 
model years, when Mueller Airport is closed and the facility is empty, a negative 
coefficient on a distance dummy would indicate a depressing effect of no longer 
being on route to the airport relative to houses elsewhere.  To sort out whether the 
negative coefficients refer to an airport or the lack of an airport, the model must 
be divided into time periods and compared across time as well as across space. 
 
1.5  HOUSE PRICES DURING SITING STAGES 
As Kolhase (1991) and Kiel and McClain (1995) point out, the impacts of 
environmental sitings are not constant over time.  In these two studies, the authors 
investigate the relationship between the fall in house prices and the siting of a 
noxious facility by dividing the siting into distinct stages with different levels of 
risk perceived by potential neighbors.  For Kiel and McClain, these stages are: 
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pre-rumor, rumor, construction (in which the probability that the siting will occur 
goes to one), opening, and on-going operations.  Kolhase had information in three 
distinct years, and therefore ran a different regression for each study period to 
determine when homeowners reacted to the siting.  Kiel and McClain had 
nineteen years of continuous data, and so had the option of either running separate 
regressions for each stage, or of using a pooled regression with interaction terms 
to specify the siting stage.  This method assumes that the marginal contribution of 
each house attribute that is not interacted with the stage dummy remains constant 
over time.  After estimating both types of models, Kiel and McClain use an F-test 
to test the hypothesis that the marginal contribution of house prices is constant 
over time.  They reject the pooled form of the model in favor of individual 
regressions. 
This section replicates the Kiel and McClain methodology, adjusting the 
siting stages for the removal of an airport (noxious siting) rather than the building 
of a new one.  The stages remain the same, but the expected signs of the estimated 
coefficients are the opposite of those previously found.  Based on the background 
section of this paper, the siting stages are defined as follows: 
 
1. Pre-rumor: 1980-1986  Before a voter referendum passed to relocate the 
airport away from the Mueller location. 
 
2. Rumor: 1987 – 1993  The referendum passes to move the airport to the 
Manor location in 1987, but then Bergstrom Air Force Base appears on the 
list for possible closure.  The City simultaneously makes improvements at 
Mueller, buys land at Manor, and performs impact studies at Bergstrom. 
 
3. Construction: 1994-1998  The Base property reverts back to the City in 
late 1993 and a groundbreaking ceremony at Bergstrom is held in early 
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1994.  Construction of the airport at Bergstrom continues through this 
entire period, and efforts at the Manor location cease. 
 
4. Opening: 1999  Austin-Bergstrom International Airport officially opens 
on May 23, 1999.  Mueller Airport ceases operations the night before.19 
 
5. On-going Operations: 2000- June 2001  Housing prices adjust to the re-
location of the airport. 
 
Based on the general hedonic equation described in equation 1.1, the 
model in this section takes the following form: 
 
2.1        , ( ) iiiiik
21
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where  i  indexes the house,  S1 is a vector of structural characteristics,  C2  is a 
vector of community characteristics,  Noise  is a vector of noise level dummies,  
Dist  is a vector of distance ring dummies,  Route  is a vector of distance from the 
major routes to the airport dummies and  dYeark  is a dummy variable for the year 
of house sale to control for annual changes in overall house prices .  All prices are 
adjusted to constant 2001 dollars using the Consumer Price Index. 
A separate regression for each phase is run with two different 
specifications due to the lack of houses that live in the 70 and 75-decibel areas.  
Specification (A) combines all noise levels into one composite level (Noise2).  
Specification (B) allows each noise decibel level to enter separately.  Table 1.7 
provides a comparison of these two specifications.  All phases of both 
                                                 
19 Because the old airport closure and new airport opening happened mid-way through 1999, it is 
difficult to predict what happened to house prices in 1999.  
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specifications pass an F-test, implying that the results as a whole are significantly 
different from zero.  The R2 values range from a low of about 0.63 for the Rumor 
and On-going stages to a high of about 0.73 for the Pre-rumor and Construction 
stages.  Full regression results are reported in Table D.1 of Appendix D. 
 
Table 1.7 Noise Results for Models with a Separate Regression for Each Phase 
Specification* Variable Pre-
Rumor 
Rumor Construction Opening Ongoing









































Note.  The first number is the regression coefficient.  The t-statistics are in parentheses. 
*Specification (A) combines all noise levels into one composite level (Noise2).  Specification (B) allows each noise level 
to enter separately. 
 
The expected result here is that noise will start with a negative effect on 
house prices at the old airport, but that negative effect will disappear with later 
stages as homebuyers realize that the noise will disappear.  Based on the first 
specification - combining all noise variables into one – being within a noise 
contour has a small and insignificant negative effect on house prices within a 
noise contour compared to those in a quiet location for the first two periods.  
Starting with the Construction phase, however, the coefficient on noise for houses 
in Mueller Airport noise contours is negative and significant.  When the new 
airport opens in 1999, the coefficient on noise at the closed airport turns positive 
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and remains significant at the 90% confidence level. This implies that any 
negative effect due to noise that developed during the years when then new 
airport was being built and aircraft operations continued at the old airport, 
disappeared with the noise.20  In the final, on-going operations stage, the 
coefficient is still positive, but is not quite significant at the 90% level.  It is 
difficult to know what to expect in this stage given that redevelopment of the 
former airport site had not yet begun.   
The result of the second specification in Table 1.7, where each noise 
contour dummy enters separately, is similar in pattern, with a few idiosyncrasies.  
In the first, Pre-Rumor, stage the 70-to-75 decibels noise contour has a positive 
coefficient.  Though it is not significant at the 90% confidence level, it is 
nevertheless a strange result, likely driven by the very few data points that fit into 
the criteria of both selling before 1987 and living in a loud contour.  The 
intermediate stage coefficients tend to follow the above pattern with varying 
levels of significance.  For the 70-to-75 decibels contour, the most significant 
coefficient is in the on-going stage, implying that the area where Mueller Airport 
used to be located is an attractive neighborhood now that is it no longer plagued 
by noise. 
The coefficients for the distance variables are shown in Table 1.8.  As 
would be expected, when changing the noise variables in specifications (A) and 
(B) results for distance are almost identical, so only specification (B) is reported. 
                                                 
20 This may seem unintuitive; with no aircraft noise it seems like the coefficient on noise should 
be zero.  However, the noise variable actually indicates a geographic location.  In the absence of 
noise, that location may be more attractive than other locations.  Referring back to Map 1, houses 
in noise contours on the west side of IH-35 are located in the affluent neighborhood that organized 
the “Move-It” campaign. 
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Table 1.8. Distance Results for Models with a Separate Regression for Each Phase  





























































Note.  The first number is the regression coefficient.  The t-statistics are in parentheses. 
 
The variables for distance from Mueller Airport (MA) tend not to be 
significant, and show no consistent pattern.  At the Pre-Rumor stage, distances 
within a mile have a weak, but positive coefficient.  A distance between one and 
1.5 miles from the airport have a significant positive coefficient, compared to a 
house located more than three miles away (at 90% confidence level).  However, 
moving just one additional half mile out, the coefficient turned negative and 
significant, only to turn back to positive and significant between 2.5 to 3.0 miles 
away.  No coefficients are significantly different from zero at the Rumor stage.  
During the construction of the new airport, the distance variables looked similar 
to those during the Pre-Rumor stage, significant and positive at a half to one mile, 
negative from one to 1.5 miles, and positive again from 2.5 to three miles.  After 
the opening of ABIA, no distance variables are significant at the 90% level.  In 
the last stage, on-going operations, being within half a mile of Mueller had a 
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negative effect compared to a house more than three miles away, but being within 
2.5 to three had a significant positive effect.   
While these distance coefficients may seem random and therefore 
meaningless, the point of the distance variables is to measure proximity to an 
airport separately from noise effects, and to control for distance when looking at 
noise.  These results show that noise effects tend to be negative while Mueller 
was in operation (as expected), whereas distance variables indicate more often 
than not that houses within three miles of the airport are no different than houses 
farther away.  In fact, with the exception of being 1.5 to two miles away, any 
significant effect of being near Mueller when it was open was positive.  A 
particularly noticeable indication that the noise and distance variables pick up 
different effects occurs in the last period when being within a 75-decibel contour 
has a positive effect, but within a half-mile a negative effect. 
The coefficients for the route variables are shown in Table 1.9.  As would 
be expected, the results of noise specifications (A) and (B) are almost identical for 
route, so only specification (B) is reported.  The first variable, ManorRd2 
indicates a house is within a quarter mile of the main route to the Mueller Airport, 
Manor Road. The coefficient on this variable is negative and significant during all 
but the Rumor stage (where it is not significantly different from zero).  This 
implies being on Manor Road is not a desirable location, regardless of whether it 
is on route to an airport or not.   This may not imply anything about development, 
and may simply mean that people do not want to live along a busy street.  The 
second variable represents a house between 0.25 and 0.5 miles from Manor Road.  
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In the Pre-Rumor and Construction stages the coefficients are relatively large and 
negative.  During the Rumor and Opening phases, the coefficients are significant 
and positive, though somewhat smaller.  After the airport re-location is finalized, 
the effect of being 0.25 to 0.5 miles away from Manor goes back to being 
negative.  These results appear to be at odds with the map in Figure 1.1 that shows 
a strong decrease in the value of houses along Manor Road in the absence of 
Mueller Airport.  The map in Figure 1.1 indication is that houses along Manor 
Road were worth considerably more when Mueller was open, not that Manor 
Road is, in general, an undesirable location. 
 
Table 1.9 Route Results for Models with a Separate Regression for Each Phase 
Variable Pre-
Rumor 





















Note.  The first number is the regression coefficient.  The t-statistics are in parentheses. 
 
Depending on which structural or neighborhood characteristic is 
evaluated, the assumption that the coefficients are constant over time can be either 
accepted or rejected.  The structural variables as a whole are fairly constant over 
the five stages, implying that a pooled model would not harm results.  However, 
the coefficients on the zip code variables that proxy for neighborhood effects do 
tend to vary widely, implying that a pooled model is not empirically supported. 
We now turn to the pooled model, which runs all years together and 
includes noise, distance, and route variables interacted with dummies that account 
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for each phase of the model.  When running the pooled model, the structural and 
neighborhood variables, as well as the year dummies, enter in a linear fashion as 
they are described in the data section of the model.  The results of the regression 
for the environmental variables are reported in Table 1.10.  Full regression results 
are in Table D.2 of Appendix D.  Again, as with the phase models, the F-statistic 
indicates that the regression as a whole is significantly different from zero.  The 
R-squared statistic is also comparable at 0.6650.   
The pooled regression estimates are more difficult to interpret than the 
phase regression estimates because a dummy interaction term (in this case the 
Pre-Rumor stage) is necessarily omitted.   In addition, terms to describe the 
relationship of the environmental variables in all stages of the model are included.  
The noise coefficients are all negative and significant for at least the Construction 
stage of the phase model.  In comparison, the coefficients on 65-decibel noise 
contour for later stages are never significantly different than the Pre-Rumor stage 
in the pooled model, implying that the noise effect does not change over time.  
This result is somewhat tempered by the fact that the 70 and 75 decibel contours 
are significant and negative at the Rumor and Construction stages of the pooled 
model. 
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Table 1.10.  Results for Environmental Variables in Pooled Regression 















































































































Note.  The first number is the regression coefficient.  The t-statistics are in parentheses. 
 
The coefficients on the distance variables are never significantly different 
from zero at less than a quarter mile from Mueller airport, or between one and 1.5 
miles.  At other distances, the coefficients tend to be positive and significant at the 
later stages only.  Once again, the coefficients on the distance variables change 
signs and significance at different distances and impact house prices separately 
from the noise variables. 
The route variables are slightly less difficult to interpret and have greater 
similarity to the phase model regressions. The Manor Rd coefficients are all 
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negative and significantly different from zero for the individual stages.  However, 
the coefficient on “All Stages” is positive. Since the basis of comparison is the 
Pre-Rumor stage, this implies that the positive effect of being located Manor Rd 
coefficients decrease with time. 
In comparison, the two types of models yield different results for noise.  
The phase model shows that homeowners react to the airport move only after the 
groundbreaking ceremony at the new airport.  The pooled model shows that 
homeowner reaction was strongest at the Rumor stage and continued through 
construction of the new airport.  The pooled model also implies that homeowners 
living in the 65-decibel contour never reacted to the airport relocation.  Both 
models yield varying positive and negative coefficients for the distance and route 
variables.  The model fit is also similar for the two types.  The constant 
coefficient assumption for structural characteristics does not appear overly 
restrictive, although the coefficients on the neighborhood characteristics do vary, 
sometimes significantly, over time in the phase model, implying that the pooled 
model is not empirically supported. 
 
1.6  REPEAT SALE MODEL 
As mentioned earlier, the decision to relocate the airport occurred over 
many years and information regimes.  In order to find the “true” event date(s) at 
which house buyers and sellers in Austin reacted to the re-location of the airport, 
five separate event dates are specified and described below in Table 1.11.  Once 




Table 1.11  Definition Repeat Sales Event Dates for Analysis 
Variable Year Event 
Vote 1987 Vote passes to move City airport to Manor location 
List 1991 Bergstrom Air Force Base placed on the possible 
closure list; City Council resolves to locate airport at 
Bergstrom location 
Close 1993 Vote passes to move City airport to Bergstrom; the 
Air Force Base officially closes; Base property 
reverts to City 
Build 1994 Groundbreaking ceremony held at Bergstrom 
location 
Open 1999 ABIA opens for passenger service; Mueller airport 
closes 
 
Before running regression analysis to investigate the marginal effects of 
different aspects of airports on nearby properties, rough difference-in-difference 
estimates are calculated.  Difference-in-difference calculations evaluated at the 
means give an estimate of the change in the average price of houses attributable to 
noise from Muller Airport, taking account of general market trends in Austin.  
Following Card (1990) and Hamermesh and Trejo (1997), the difference equation 
takes the form: 
 
1.3 QNevent PP ∆−∆=∆
2  
 
 [ ] [ ]{ }preQpostQpreNpostN PPPP ,,,, −−−=  
 
where P  is the average price of a house,  N  (noise) indicates the house is 
located in an area where average aircraft noise from Mueller Airport equals or 
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exceeds 65 decibels,  Q  (quiet) indicates the house is located in an area where 
average aircraft noise from Mueller Airport is indistinguishable from background 
noise,  post  indicates the house sold after the event, and  pre  indicates the house 
sold before the event (also includes the year the event occurred).  Because the 
event dates cut across twenty years of data, all prices are adjusted to constant 
2001 dollars using the Consumer Price Index before the differences are taken. 
The first difference,  NP∆ , is the average price difference before and after 
an event leading to the closure of Mueller Airport for all houses in “noisy” areas, 
that is houses located in 65 of higher decibel areas.  The second difference, QP∆
2
 , 
is the average price difference before and after the same event date for all houses 
in “quiet” areas.  Taking the differences between these two differences gives  ∆ , 
the change in house prices before and after each event that is attributable to 
Mueller Airport noise.  Table 1.12 reports the results of the difference-in-
difference calculations. 
These difference-in-difference calculations can be used to predict the sign 
and magnitude of the coefficients on noise in the repeat sale model.  They predict 
a small, positive coefficient on noise for the List event, with subsequently larger 
coefficients on noise for each later event.  Difference-in-difference calculations 
are a rough estimate of the changes in average house price due to changes in noise 
level, relative to average house prices city-wide, but a hedonic regression is 




Table 1.12  Difference in Difference Calculations 
 Vote List Close Build Open 
postNP ,  











preNP ,  











NP∆  19,145 41,236 53,513 57,197 66,484 
postQP ,∆  























QP∆  11,561 38,198 46,599 48,420 53,232 
2∆  $7,584 $3,038 $6,914 $8,777 $13,252 
%  ∆ 7.92% 3.86% 9.61% 12.13% 15.31% 
Total number of observations is 10,748; all repeat sale transactions, one observation per sale. 
All prices are CPI adjusted, 2001=1. 
 
Traditional hedonic models attempt to control for all structural, 
neighborhood, and environmental characteristics of a particular home in order to 
isolate the effect of a natural experiment.  However, it is impossible to control for 
all characteristics of any particular house and neighborhood.  In the case of this 
analysis, one neighborhood is particularly attractive to home buyers, even though 
it is a neighborhood that is within the noise contours of Mueller Airport.  Several 
new variables were designed to attempt to control for this, including investigating 
neighborhood associations and adding zip code variables, but a variable was never 
found that could capture the historic neighborhood with old shade trees and wide 
streets.   
A better model would be able to look at the same house before and after 
the airport moved.  In that case, all the qualities of a house or neighborhood that 
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make it particularly attractive (or unattractive) to home buyers are controlled for 
inherently.  The repeat sale model developed by Palmquist (1982) is a variant of 
the hedonic price model that does just that.  It uses houses that have sold more 
than once during the period in which the environment undergoes a change.  If the 
environmental change affects some houses and not others, then it is possible to 
use these repeat sales to estimate the effect of the change on property values, 
without controlling for static house characteristics. 
So, for any particular year, a hedonic price function can be estimated as 
described in equation 1.1.  If at least one environmental variable that varies across 
space also varies with time at some locations, then it is possible to subtract the 
earlier price equation from the later to isolate the effect of the environmental 
change from the effects of other characteristics of the house that are constant over 
time.  Given any two years 1 and 2, and variable  qj  that varies across space and 
time, the model becomes: 
 
1.4 P2i  - P1i  = f ( Si1,…,Sij , Ci1,…,Cik , Qi1,…,Qim, q2j )  
- f ( Si1,…,Sij , Ci1,…,Cik , Qi1,…,Qim, q1j ) 
      
If  f( )  is additively separable in  qj  , as would be the case of linear or 
linear in logs specifications, all terms involving characteristics other than the 
effect of  qj   cancel out.   
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1.5 If  f( S, C, Q, qj ) = g (S, C, Q) + h (qj) 
then,           P2i  - P1i  =  f( S, C, Q, qj2 ) - f( S, C, Q, qj1 )  
           =  h (qj2) – h(qj1). 
 
The advantages of repeat sale models come at certain costs.  The first cost 
is loss of observations in the model that either do not have a second sale or that do 
not have sale dates that straddle the event date (signifying a change in 
environmental variable of interest).  The second cost is the imposition of constant 
marginal contributions of all house characteristics that are “differenced-out” of 
the model.21  The following section of the paper attempts to evaluate the 
advantages and disadvantages by estimating a repeat-sale model and comparing 
the results with a standard hedonic model including interaction terms for the 
environmental variables.  The repeat sale analysis follows Poulos and Smith 
(2002). 
The five events designed to test for the “true” event date(s) are as 
described above in Table 1.11.  This model specification is similar to the phase 
model employed by Kolhase (1991) and Kiel and McClain (1995) but only repeat 
sales are used and the event date is always a single year.  These event dates are 
created as dummy variables and equal one if, for a given house, the first sale 
occurred before the event date and the second sale occurred after the event date; 
zero otherwise. 
                                                 
21 The characteristics do not change, but the model must assume that their coefficients do not 
change either.   
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The random error specified back in Equation 1.2 can be expressed as the 
sum of three separate errors: 
 
1.6      ittiit e++= νµε  
 
where µi represents the error due to time-invariant, property-specific 
unobservables, vt represents error due to the time-variant unobservables, and eit 
represents random variation across both properties and time.  When equation 1.2 
in one period is differenced for the same property in a second period, the  µi  error 
is eliminated along with the structural and neighborhood characteristics  X1i  and  
X2i .   
The new estimation equation is defined as: 
 
1.7   

















where all the structural and neighborhood variables of each house have been 
differenced out and what is left is the sum over the year dummies, an information 
effect ( idEvent⋅τ ) that is equal to one if the two sales of the same house straddle 
the environmental change and zero otherwise, and the information effect 
interacted with the dummy for each of the environmental variables.  The 
coefficient  θ  measures the double difference on noise described above.  If, in the 
difference-in-difference calculation the first set of houses are those within a 
specified distance of the airport rather than a noise contour, the coefficient  ϕ  
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would measure the double difference.  And it then follows that if the first set of 
houses are those within a specified distance to the main routes to the airport the 
coefficient  σ  would measure the double difference.  All prices are adjusted to 
constant 2001 dollars using the Consumer Price Index. 
As described in the data section, the year dummies are “effects coded”.  
They take on the value of –1 if a house sold for a first time in that year, +1 if it 
sold for a second time in that year, and zero otherwise.  Though the coding may 
initially seem cumbersome, it is actually a compact way to implement the 
subtraction of year dummies in the regression equation.  Suppose for simplicity 
that the hedonic equation in year  t+s  could be simplified to: 
 
1.8    ( ) ststst dYearP +++ +⋅= εβln  
 
and the hedonic equation in year  t could be simplified to: 
 
 
1.9    ( ) ttt dYearP εβ +⋅=ln . 
 
Then the repeat sale model would subtract one from the other to provide: 
 
 
1.10  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )tsttsttst dYeardYearPP εεβ −+−=− +++ lnln . 
 
So if house  i  sold for the first time in  t  the difference in the year 
dummies above would be (0 – 1) = -1.  If house  i  sold for the second time in year  
t+s  the difference in the year dummies would be (1 – 0) = +1.  And if  i  did not 
sell in either t or t+s  the difference would be (0 – 0) = 0. 
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The implementation of the model accounts for two other influences on the 
observations in the repeat sale analysis: selection effects and depreciation effects.  
Gatzlaff and Haurin (1994) indicate that the estimation of hedonic models may be 
substantially biased if the sample of houses in the model consist only of properties 
that sold.   For any house to sell in a general real estate market, the bid offered by 
a buyer must exceed the reservation price of the builder or current owner.   Even 
if one may argue that property owners in any given market randomly choose to 
sell their homes for reasons unrelated to the economy as a whole, Gatzlaff and 
Haurin point out that variations in economic conditions may still affect offer and 
reservation prices, so that a sample of only sold homes may change in a non-
random manner.  The correction for this self-sampling requires a joint estimation 
of the probability that a house will sell and the sale price.   
Gatzlaff and Haurin (1997) extend this reasoning to repeat sale analysis; 
for a house to sell twice within the time frame of the model, the bid price must 
exceed the reservation price twice in a relatively short number of years.  If the 
first set of sold houses is not randomly selected, then it is certainly possible that 
the second sale would suffer from a similar bias.  They argue that if this double, 
sequential selection effect is ignored, it leaves the repeat sale estimation 
substantially biased.  Again, the correction for this self-sampling requires a joint 
estimation with two selection rules defined by the fact that both rules are observed 
only when the offer price from the first sale exceeds the reservation price of the 
first sale and the offer price of the second sale exceeds the reservation price of the 
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second sale.  The authors use Tunali’s (1986) generalization to the Heckman 
(1979) two-step correction for sample selection effects. 
Unfortunately, since the data in this model consist only of houses that sold 
at least once, it is not possible to use Heckman’s procedure to correct for houses 
that first self-selected to sell.  However, since the data include both houses that 
sold only once and others that sold twice, it is possible to correct for self-selected 
repeat sale houses using the houses that sold only once as part of the Heckman 
two-step correction.  The first step is to run a probit model with a dummy for 
whether the house is a repeat or single sale as the dependent variable and the age 
difference between sales, the environmental variables, and the year dummies as 
explanatory variables.  From the regression results, it is possible to compute the 
associated inverse Mills ratios.  The second step is to add the inverse Mills ratios 
to the regression equation: 
 
1.11   













The error term  ui  now implicitly incorporates the fact that selection effect terms 
used to estimate the model are separately estimated inverse Mills ratios. 
The implementation of the model accounts for two other influences on the 
observations in the repeat sale analysis: selection effects and depreciation effects.  
Gatzlaff and Haurin (1994) indicate that the estimation of hedonic models may be 
substantially biased if the sample of houses in the model consist only of properties 
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that sold.   For any house to sell in a general real estate market, the bid offered by 
a buyer must exceed the reservation price of the builder or current owner.   Even 
if one may argue that property owners in any given market randomly choose to 
sell their homes for reasons unrelated to the economy as a whole, Gatzlaff and 
Haurin point out that variations in economic conditions may still affect offer and 
reservation prices, so that a sample of only sold homes may change in a non-
random manner.  The correction for this self-sampling requires a joint estimation 
of the probability that a house will sell and the sale price.   
Gatzlaff and Haurin (1997) extend this reasoning to repeat sale analysis; 
for a house to sell twice within the time frame of the model, the bid price must 
exceed the reservation price twice in a relatively short number of years.  If the 
first set of sold houses is not randomly selected, then it is certainly possible that 
the second sale would suffer from a similar bias.  They argue that if this double, 
sequential selection effect is ignored, it leaves the repeat sale estimation 
substantially biased.  Again, the correction for this self-sampling requires a joint 
estimation with two selection rules defined by the fact that both rules are observed 
only when the offer price from the first sale exceeds the reservation price of the 
first sale and the offer price of the second sale exceeds the reservation price of the 
second sale.  The authors use Tunali’s (1986) generalization to the Heckman 
(1979) two-step correction for sample selection effects. 
Unfortunately, since the data in this model consist only of houses that sold 
at least once, it is not possible to use Heckman’s procedure to correct for houses 
that first self-selected to sell.  However, since the data include both houses that 
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sold only once and others that sold twice, it is possible to correct for self-selected 
repeat sale houses using the houses that sold only once as part of the Heckman 
two-step correction.  The first step is to run a probit model with a dummy for 
whether the house is a repeat or single sale as the dependent variable and the age 
difference between sales, the environmental variables, and the year dummies as 
explanatory variables.  From the regression results, it is possible to compute the 
associated inverse Mills ratios.  The second step is to add the inverse Mills ratios 
to the regression equation: 
 
1.12  













The error term  ui  now implicitly incorporates the fact that selection effect terms 
used to estimate the model are separately estimated inverse Mills ratios. 
Table E.1 of Appendix E lists the number of residential sales and the mean 
sale price by year for all houses in the sample, and broken down into repeat and 
single sales.  Simply looking at the table it is difficult to determine how the repeat 
sales differ from the single sales, or if they do so systematically.  Therefore, Chart 
E.2 of Appendix E plots Mean Sale Price by selected years within the dataset for 
the three sub-samples of the model: all sales, single sales, and repeat sales.  Sale 
prices before 1992 were left off of the chart due to the low number of 
observations, particularly in single sales, for those years.  The trendline for repeat 
sales is roughly at or above that that of single sales up until 1999 when the mean 
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repeat sale price falls below the single sale price, and remains below for the 
duration of the model.  However, it should be noted that the rather extreme drop 
in mean sale price in 1998 is likely due to the very small number of observations. 
Chart E.3 of Appendix E plots Mean Noise Level in decibels for the same 
years.22  Except for the years 1993 and 1994, the mean noise level is higher for 
single sales than repeat sales. Again, the jump in levels in 1998 is more likely due 
to the lack of observations than a change in the real estate market.  Judging from 
these plots, it appears that twice sold houses are slightly less expensive on average 
and less likely to be in a Mueller Airport noise contour.  However, the mean noise 
level for repeat and single sales seems to be converging at the tail end of the data 
set, while the mean prices are diverging.23  One possible hypothesis for this 
behavior is that homeowners who bought a home near the airport before noise 
was an important determinate of sale price were reluctant to sell their homes until 
Mueller Airport closed.24  This reluctance to sell could be the real or perceived 
effects of noise or stigma that would cause a local housing market depression 
until the airport closed. 
Depreciation effects are the second influence on the observations in the 
repeat sale analysis that the model adjusts for before implementation.  Poulos and 
Smith (2002) follow Palmquist (1980) and adjust the dependent variable price 
                                                 
22 Chart F.3 looks like actual “noise level” is rising and falling.  In reality, the number of houses 
located in Mueller Airport noise contours rises and falls, affecting the mean noise level. 
23 Again, this result may be driven by a small sample.  In this case, few houses that sold for a 
second time had a first sale in 2001. 
24 While Mueller Airport first opened in 1930, aircraft noise did not become a large problem until 
the 1970s and 1980s when the Austin area saw rapid growth.  The annual number of passengers 
using Mueller increased by 215% from 1979 to 1989.  The number of commercial jets operating at 
Mueller (and presumably noise levels) peaked in 1987. 
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differential for depreciation based on a separate estimate of this effect, and then 
take the natural log.25  Because the dataset used in this study provided both the 
years of sale as well as the year each house is built, two different depreciation 
measures are used.  First, in the manner of Palmquist (1980), a standard hedonic 
property price regression is used to determine the coefficient on age (-0.00261).  
This depreciation rate is multiplied by the number of years between the two sales 
of the house.  The resulting factor is then used to adjust the second sale price in a 
linear fashion before the natural log of the price ratio is taken.  A second measure 
of depreciation, which takes full advantage of the dataset, is to compute the age of 
the house at the times of both sales and then use the difference as an independent 
variable in the repeat sale regression.  The two sets of regression results are 
reported in Table F.1 of Appendix F.   
In the second specification, the coefficient on the age difference is always 
significant at the 99% confidence level, and varies across the events from –0.183 
to –0.212.  This implies that a marginal increase in the age difference between 
sales causes a decrease in the price differential.  This is what is expected; as the 
time between the two sales increases, the age of the house at the second sale 
increases, which, all else equal, should decrease the selling price of the house.  
For the environmental variables, the sign and magnitude of the coefficients, as 
well as the t-statistics, are very close and, in some cases, identical.  The event 
dummy variables are of similar sign and significance, though the magnitude is 
                                                 
25 Poulos and Smith (2002) estimate the depreciation effect using a hedonic property value model 
for all residential sales in the model county as a semi-log with fixed effects for year, age, square 
feet of living space, and lot size as independent variables.  They found the estimated annual 
depreciation rate to be -0.2.  Palmquist (1980) also used a coefficient on age from a standard 
hedonic property model to adjust the price ratio.  His estimated rate of depreciation is 0.0081. 
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larger in the depreciation-adjusted models.  Since the estimates for the 
environmental variables are similar, the rest of the repeat-sale analysis follows 
Palmquist (1980) and Poulos and Smith (2002) and uses depreciation- adjusted 
log house differentials.   
The full statistical output from the five separate regressions26 is reported in 
Table F.2 of Appendix F.  The coefficients for the environmental variables are 
reported in Table 1.13.  As stated above, the dependent variable is the 
depreciation-adjusted percent change in house price.  The coefficient on the 
“Event Dummy” reports the change in all house prices in the regression that sold 
once before and once after the event date.  It is significant for all events except 
Close.  The Vote, List, and Build periods are positive and significant at the 90% 
confidence level.  This implies that houses that sold after these event dates sold at 
a higher price than before the events.27  The coefficient for the final event, Open, 
is negative and significant, implying that houses that sold after the airport closed 
down sold at a lower price than before. 
                                                 
26 For a closer comparison to the difference-in-difference calculation, the repeat-sale regression 
was also run with a single noise term variable combining houses in all three noise contours.  The 
results do not change in sign or relative significance; see Table G.3 of the Appendix. 
27 These results are somewhat difficult to interpret because the regression inherently controls for 
house depreciation over time, the year of sale, and general inflation effects.  This coefficient 
captures the difference in house prices before and after each event, not related to the airport 
closure, the year of sale, inflation, or depreciation. 
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Table 1.13. Repeat Sale Model: Event Dates 
Variable Vote List Close Build Open 
Event Dummy* 0.139 0.186 -0.096 0.126 -0.186 
 (1.54) (2.10) (-0.19) (1.41) (-4.46) 
N6570** -0.014 0.025 0.064 0.078 0.075 
 (-0.07) (0.19) (0.56) (0.78) (0.79) 
NGT70 -0.147 0.013 0.296 0.272 0.114 
 (-0.46) (0.06) (1.89) (1.82) (0.66) 
MAdist1 0.107 0.134 0.268 0.233 0.293 
 (0.56) (0.92) (2.23) (2.17) (2.60) 
MAdist2 0.226 0.244 0.288 0.256 0.229 
 (1.59) (2.43) (3.60) (3.49) (3.21) 
MAdist3 0.120 0.240 0.296 0.321 0.308 
 (0.58) (2.14) (3.50) (4.21) (4.16) 
MAdist4 0.409 0.282 0.227 0.187 0.077 
 (2.74) (2.63) (2.44) (2.38) (1.00) 
MAdist5 0.216 0.271 0.252 0.212 0.255 
 (1.63) (2.78) (3.69) (3.57) (4.20) 
MAdist6 -0.025 0.080 0.181 0.174 0.273 
 (-0.20) (1.07) (3.42) (3.71) (5.80) 
ManorRd2 -0.468 -0.246 -0.257 -0.152 0.014 
 (-2.36) (-1.68) (-1.93) (-1.30) (0.11) 
ManorRd3 -0.264 -0.178 -0.168 -0.147 0.166 
 (-1.46) (-1.23) (-1.45) (-1.38) (1.57) 
Note.  The first number is the regression coefficient.  The t-statistics are in parentheses. 
*The “Event Dummy” is the coefficient for the event dummy listed at the head of the respective columns. 
**The environmental dummies listed represent that environmental dummy interacted with the event dummy listed at the 
head of the column. 
All of the environmental dummy variables in the table represent the 
interaction of the dummy variable listed with the event date.  That is, N6570 in 
the Vote specification represents the percent change in prices only for houses 
within the Mueller Airport 65-to-70 decibels noise contour that sold once before 
and once after the 1987 vote, relative to the price change in all houses during this 
time period given by the coefficient on “Event Dummy” in the Vote regression.  
Since aircraft noise had been a problem for residents near Mueller Airport since 
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the late 1970s, the interaction terms for noise and event date should be positive 
and significant for any event that convinced homeowners that Mueller Airport 
was going to close.  This would imply that beyond the trend of all house prices in 
Austin before and after that event (given by the Event Dummy variables), house 
prices in noise contours increase an additional amount. 
For the 65-to-70 decibels noise contour, the coefficients on the interaction 
of the noise dummy with the event dummies are not significantly different from 
zero at the 90% confidence level.  The last two specifications, representing the 
construction and opening of ABIA and the end of noise in the Mueller airport 
neighborhood, has a positive coefficient on noise that is significant at the 75% 
confidence level.  This implies that houses in the 65-decibel noise contour sold for 
7% more after construction began and after ABIA opened, in addition to the 
overall changes in house prices in Austin.  Judging from this criterion only, the 
housing market adjusts twice; the correct event dates are both the construction and 
opening of the new airport. 
The coefficient on the louder noise contours interacted with the Close and 
Build event dummy variables are positive and significant at the 95% confidence 
level.  This implies that houses in the loudest noise contour sold for almost a third 
more after the Air Force Base closed and construction began on the new airport, 
relative to the price changes for all houses in Austin.28   Altogether, it appears that 
home prices in the Mueller Airport noise contours, which had already adjusted to 
the general noise level by 1980 when the data begins, did not react to early 
                                                 
28 Halverson and Palmquist (1981) show that the correct interpretation of dummy variables in 
semilogarithmic equations is the percent change resulting from taking the inverse log of the 
estimated coefficient and subtracting one. 
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announcements of the airport closure.  In the areas most affected by noise, home 
buyers and sellers waited until the outcome was more certain -- when BAFB 
closed and building at the new site began.  Houses in the loudest contours had 
almost fully adjusted to this change by 1999 when ABIA opened.  House prices in 
the quieter contours had a much more modest adjustment after each event leading 
to the airport closure, implying that noise had a smaller negative effect from 
which to recover. 
At this point, it is possible to compare the repeat-sale model with the 
difference-in-difference calculation at the means.  The difference-in-difference 
predicted that the change in sale prices for houses in any noise contour would be 
higher than changes elsewhere for all event dates. In addition, the double-
difference predicted that this effect would be smallest after the List event and 
largest after the Open event.  The results of the repeat-sale analysis, which is able 
to more effectively control for other aspects of the airport move than simply 
noise, finds no additional change for houses in Mueller contours after Vote or 
List, but additional increases relative to other locations for all later events: Close, 
Build, and Open.  For the quieter contours, the largest effects come after Build 
and Open, but these are considerably smaller than the effects after Close and 
Build in the noisiest contours.   
The coefficients on the Mueller airport distance variables interacted with 
event dummies are positive and significant for all distance rings in the later 
periods.  These coefficients imply that houses near Mueller Airport sold at 
subsequently higher prices after each of the event dates relative to other house 
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prices as Mueller prepared for closure and finally closed.  The vote to move the 
airport did not have an effect significantly different from zero in three out of the 
six distance rings of the Mueller airport, relative to other houses.  For these 
houses that were not affected by aircraft noise but were affected by stigma related 
to proximity to the airport, the initial vote to move the airport was not a 
convincing policy change, but all later events that led to the airport closure 
positively and significantly impacted the housing market. 
The coefficients on the interaction between the first four event dates and 
the distance to Manor Road variables are all negative and significantly different 
from zero.  These coefficients imply that for houses on Manor Rd, each event date 
moving toward the airport closure reduced the price of the house, relative to all 
other house sales in Austin.  The same is true for houses within a half-mile of 
Manor Road.  This result is consistent both with the findings in Map 2 and with 
planners’ expectations that traffic along Manor Road would sharply decrease with 
the movement of the airport, causing the land to be less attractive for commercial 
development.  The last period reverses this trend; the coefficients for houses on 
Manor Rd are not significantly different from zero and the coefficients on houses 
within a half-mile are significant and positive.  Thus, by the time the old airport 
closed and the new airport opened, the market for housing on the route to the old 
airport had fully adjusted. 
This repeat-sale analysis reveals that no one event leading to the airport 
relocation caused the housing market in Austin to adjust to the policy change.  
The houses along the route to the airport were impacted first, losing value after 
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the vote to move the airport first passed, with losses continuing through the Build 
period.  The houses in the distance contours were impacted at almost every period 
of the model, though only about half of the distance contours reacted to the first 
vote.  The houses within the noise contours were the slowest to react to the airport 
relocation.  For these houses, the early periods of the model showed no significant 
changes, though once the Air Force Base closed, the gains for these houses were 
among the largest in the model.  With the exception of houses located within just 
one-quarter mile of the route to the airport, the housing market was still adjusting 
to the airport re-location in the final period of the model. 
In addition to the environmental variables, the coefficients on the Mills 
ratios are always significant at the 99% confidence level.  This warrants the 
adjustment made for sample selection bias.  The fixed effects for the years 
bracketing the event dates are also highly significant.  These dummy variables 
take account of time varying influences in the Austin area aside from the changes 
in the location of the airport. 
The repeat-sale model has the significant advantages of eliminating 
random error due to property-specific heterogeneity over time and of greatly 
reducing the structural and neighborhood data requirements for model estimation.  
However, as mentioned above, the advantages come at some cost.  The first of 
these costs is the loss of observations, both for those houses that did not sell a 
second time within the sample period and those that sold twice within the same 
year.   
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In order to see how the loss of these observations affects the results, the 
full data set is again used to regress the log price of a house on its structural, 
neighborhood, and environmental characteristics.  To simulate the repeat sales 
model, the five event date dummies are interacted with the environmental 
variables in the models, but all other explanatory structural and neighborhood 
variables enter in a linear fashion.  Full results are reported in Table F.4 of 
Appendix F.  The environmental results are below. 
In contrast to the repeat sale model where a positive coefficient on the 
event dummies and interaction terms implies an increase in house price from the 
first to the second sale, here a negative coefficient on the event dummy variables 
and interaction terms implies a positive impact on house price.  This is because 
the left-hand variable is no longer a percent change in price over two sales, but 
simply the log price of one sale.  The interaction dummy “turns on” for houses 
that sold before the event, so the coefficient is now the impact on log price of 
selling before an event relative to selling after.  Therefore, a negative coefficient 
says house prices increased after the event occurred. 
The coefficients on the “Event Dummy” variables report the effect on all 
house prices of being sold before the event occurred.  So, for the first event, Vote, 
the coefficient is positive and significant, implying that houses that sold before 
1987 (in constant 2001 dollars) sold at a premium to later houses.  This is 
consistent with the chart in Figure 1.4 that shows the average house price in 
Austin initially peaked in 1987, then fell the following year and remained below 
the average 1987 price for over five years.  For all other event dates, the 
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coefficients are negative and significant, implying that in constant dollar terms, 
house prices continuously rose over time.  The large negative coefficient on Open 
implies that houses that sold after 1999 sold at a considerable premium, which is 
also consistent with chart in Figure1 that shows a sharp increase in average house 
prices after 1999. 
 
Table 1.14  All Sales: Event Date Regressions                                                                                           
Variable Vote List Close Build Open 
Event 
Dummy 
0.2871 -0.1209 -0.1931 -0.1204 -0.6584 
 (5.28) (-2.68) (-7.50) (-2.68) (-28.29) 
N6570 -0.0321 0.0306 -0.0450 -0.0952 -0.0167 
 (-0.24) (0.35) (-0.62) (-1.46) (-0.49) 
NGT70 0.1649 -0.0323 -0.1649 -0.1305 -0.1032 
 (0.80) (-0.24) (-1.48) (-1.33) (-1.96) 
MAdist1 0.0913 -0.0210 -0.0193 -0.0230 -0.0759 
 (0.64) (-0.21) (-0.23) (-0.28) (-1.69) 
MAdist2 -0.1501 -0.1969 -0.1541 -0.1152 -0.0460 
 (-1.42) (-2.68) (-2.53) (-2.06) (-1.47) 
MAdist3 -0.1031 -0.1967 -0.1242 -0.1242 -0.1038 
 (-0.74) (-2.53) (-2.00) (-2.30) (-3.33) 
MAdist4 -0.2446 -0.1602 -0.1168 -0.1117 -0.1341 
 (-2.26) (-2.13) (-1.90) (-1.98) (-4.45) 
MAdist5 -0.2232 -0.1630 -0.1038 -0.1126 -0.0994 
 (-2.40) (-2.72) (-2.31) (-2.74) (-4.11) 
MAdist6 0.0569 -0.0384 -0.0564 -0.0510 0.0342 
 (0.74) (-0.85) (-1.66) (-1.67) (1.92) 
ManorRd2 0.3502 0.2730 0.1512 0.1107 -0.0493 
 (2.65) (2.75) (1.75) (1.38) (-1.16) 
ManorRd3 0.2359 0.1887 0.1196 0.0932 0.0252 
 (2.41) (2.83) (2.19) (1.88) (0.90) 
Note.  The first number is the regression coefficient.  The t-statistics are in parentheses. 
*The “Event Dummy” is the coefficient for the event dummy listed at the head of the respective columns. 
**The environmental dummies listed represent that environmental dummy interacted with the event dummy listed at the 
head of the column. 
 
The coefficients for the noise variables interacted with the event dummies 
report the effect of being sold before the various events occurred on houses within 
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the Mueller Airport noise contours, relative to the price changes for the city as a 
whole.  For the quieter contour, house prices did not react to early events (Vote, 
List, or Close).  However, after 1994, when the City of Austin broke ground on a 
new airport, house prices saw a significant increase in this contour relative to all 
other areas.  By the time ABIA opened in 1999, the coefficient on houses in the 
Mueller 65-decibel contour returned to zero, implying that the housing market 
fully adjusted before the noise actually ended.  For houses in louder contours the 
largest increase in house prices relative to Austin as a whole, occur after the 
closure of Bergstrom Air Force Base.  House prices increased again after 
groundbreaking at Bergstrom, relative to the city-wide effects, and once again 
after the new airport opened.  While it is not unreasonable for house prices in the 
very loudest contours to not fully adjust until the noise ceased, the magnitude of 
the change decreases with each event after the Base closed.   
These results are very similar to the repeat-sale model; house prices in the 
noise contours did not react to early announcements relative to other houses in 
Austin, and the changes are both larger in magnitude and more significant for the 
house in the loudest contours.  Once again, the most important event for houses in 
the quieter contour is the BAFB closure, and the most important for the loudest 
contours is the groundbreaking of the new airport.     
Several of the coefficients for houses in the closest distance contour lost 
significance in the intermediate periods, compared to the repeat sale model.  The 
all house sales model finds that houses closest to the airport did not react to the 
announcements and events leading to the airport closure, but that prices began to 
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rebound in the last period after the airport closed.  For the houses that are still 
within three miles of the old airport, but not bordering it, the increases in house 
values started after the first vote to move the airport passed.  Similarly to the noise 
variables, the more directly the airport is related to the house, the more time it 
took for the house values to increase.   
The coefficients on the distance from Manor Road variables interacted 
with event dummy variables are positive and significant at early events, but 
decrease in size and significance with time, until at the Open event when they are 
no longer significant at the 90% confidence level.  This implies that when Mueller 
was open and residents were more likely to believe it would stay open, living on 
the main route to the airport was an amenity relative to other locations.  For all 
events that led to the closure, the before prices were higher than the after prices, 
but the difference becomes smaller as time passes until the in the last period the 
difference between the before and after is no longer significant.  This agrees with 
the repeat-sale model where each significant event toward the airport closure 
reduced the price of the house relative to all houses in Austin.   
Allowing all the house price sales, rather than only the repeat sales, into 
the model adds more detail to the last period of the model because many of the 
houses that sold only once were those that sold in the later years of the data set.  
Not surprisingly then, most of the differences in the estimated coefficients 
between the repeat sales and the all sales models occur in the last period.  In two 
cases, the fourth distance contour and the closest proximity to Manor Road, the 
coefficients are significant for the all sales model when they are not in the repeat 
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sales model.  In three cases, the Open event dummy, the farthest distance contour, 
and the farthest route contour, the coefficients in the last period actually change 
sign between the two models.  These changes do not change the outcome of the 
model; the noise and first four distance contours are not affected, and the changes 
in the Manor Rd variables are more consistent with the results for earlier stages of 
the repeat sales model.  
The second cost of the repeat sale model is constraining the coefficients on 
the structural and community characteristics to be constant over time.29  
Therefore, a final regression is used to test the validity of this assumption by 
comparing the results of the above hedonic regression, where only the 
environmental variables are interacted with the event dummies, to another full 
sample specification in which the event dummies are interacted with all variables 
in the model (not including the year fixed-effect dummies).  The full regression 
results for the second specification are reported in Table F.5 of Appendix F.  The 
goodness of fit and significance statistics for both models are reported below in 
Table 1.15. 
For all the model specifications the F-statistic is large enough to reject the 
null hypothesis that the regression is not significantly different from zero.  The 
goodness of fit criterion (the R2 statistic) is significantly better for the models 
without interaction terms for the structural and neighborhood variables.  Looking 
at the actual regression coefficients, the coefficients across the two specifications 
are remarkably similar for the structural characteristics.  The neighborhood 
                                                 
29 This constraint is implied by not explicitly including the structural and community 
characteristics in the regression. 
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characteristics do not fare as well.  Many of the coefficients on the demographic 
characteristics fail to be significantly different from zero in the unconstrained 
model.   The coefficients on the zip code variables differ significantly across the 
two specifications and across the event dates within the specifications.  This 
implies that a possible improvement to the repeat sale model would be to include 
interaction terms with the neighborhood as well as the environmental 
characteristics, thus allowing the value of various neighborhoods to change over 
time. 
 
Table 1.15  All Sales: Event Date Regression Comparison 
Specification Event 
Dummy 
F-stat Prob F > 0 R2 
Vote 18.4 0.00 0.07 
List 28.54 0.00 0.11 
Close 40.15 0.00 0.15 




Open 165.79 0.00 0.42 
Vote 427.52 0.00 0.66 
List 428.71 0.00 0.66 
Close 429.23 0.00 0.66 





Event Dummy Open 429.82 0.00 0.66 
 
1.7  CONCLUSIONS 
The contributions of this model are at least three-fold.  First, this model 
adds to the hedonic pricing literature on airport sitings by comparing the 
differences in noise and distance variables and adds a new element to the model: 
development along routes to the airports.  Espey and Lopez (2000) find that not 
only is noise a disamenity associated with airports, but that airport proximity also 
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decreases the value of a house.  Tomkins, et al (1998) find the opposite to be true: 
not only is proximity an amenity, but that the benefits of travel access and 
increased infrastructure outweigh the costs of noise.  Lipscomb (2003) finds that 
noise at the margin is not a determinate of house prices and proximity is an 
amenity.  This study finds that these findings can potentially be reconciled by 
adding more flexibility to the distance measurements and providing a separable 
measure for access to the airport.  When looking at across time, this study finds 
that noise is a disamenity that is separately measurable from distance to the 
airport.  In the repeat sales and all sales event date models, distance is an amenity 
with houses in the closest distance contours seeing substantial gains in value when 
the old airport prepared to and finally closed.   
Adding route-to-the-airport variables to the siting stage models is not very 
informative.  In general, these models find that the effects of living on these major 
roadways did not vary with changing events.  However, in the repeat sale and the 
comparable hedonic model, the route variables behave exactly as predicted.  
These models find that in the early stages when Mueller was expected to remain 
the City’s airport, living on a route to Mueller was an amenity.  In later stages 
when it was apparent the airport was moving to Bergstrom, living on a route to 
Mueller was a disamenity. 
The second contribution to the literature involves the timing of noxious 
sitings.  This paper actually uses five different estimations of when home buyers 
and sellers in Austin reacted to the movement of the airport.  The phase model 
finds that the housing market reacted when construction began at the new airport, 
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indicating that homeowners waited until the probably of not moving the airport to 
Bergstrom was zero, but before the noise actually ceased.  The pooled model 
finds that homeowners reacted sooner, showing signs of increased house values at 
both the rumor and construction phases.  The simple difference-in-difference 
calculation indicates that average house prices in Mueller Airport noise contours 
increased, relative to other house prices, by the highest percentage after the new 
airport opened.  The repeat sales analysis finds that property values near the old 
airport did not react to early events in the movement of the airport, and somewhat 
surprisingly, reacted more strongly when the Air Force Base closed than when 
either construction began, or the new airport opened.  However, jumps in house 
prices near Mueller relative to elsewhere, occurred at these events as well.  The 
standard hedonic estimate finds the same basic result. 
Finally, the third contribution is to the hedonic literature by comparing 
several different methodologies.  The siting stage hedonic models are both 
cumbersome to implement and, particularly in the case of pooled models, difficult 
to interpret.  In some cases, they also produce some unintuitive results.  Two 
particularly strange results are first, that, controlling for other factors, house prices 
in the 65-decibel contour never changed with the events leading up to, or the 
actual closure of, Mueller Airport, and second, the strongest reaction for houses in 
the 75-decibel contour occurred at the rumor stage.  This first result is at odds 
with the original mapping of results on pages five and six.  Further, even though 
the models are largely the same and use the same dataset, the phase model and the 
pooled model do not always produce the same, or even similar, results. 
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Siting stage models require the imposition of “stages” within the data that 
correspond to the author’s insight into homeowners’ beliefs about the certainty of 
the noxious siting’s occurrence.  A more straightforward way of judging when the 
housing market reacts to a noxious siting is to divide the data around publicly 
known events.  Here, both a repeat-sale and standard hedonic model divide the 
data around five major events in five separate regressions.  These two models 
produce similar results that are more consistent with expectations than the siting 
stage models.  The repeat-sale model has the definite advantage of requiring less 
data on each house in the sample and yet eliminates all error due to property-
specific heterogeneity.  On the other hand, repeat-sale analysis requires more 
corrections and modifications before the model is run.  The standard hedonic 
model requires far more data to attempt to control for all characteristics of a 
property and thus is subject to both collinearity problems and left-out variable 
error.  However, the implementation of the model and the interpretation of the 
results are both simpler.  Based on these results, the choice of the “correct” 
specification depends more on the data available than the inherent abilities of the 
models. 
Several refinements to the repeat sales analysis would improve the 
reliability of the results.  First, a record of all building permits in the City of 
Austin have already been acquired, the next step is to eliminate addresses with 
significant improvements to them.  Second, it would be useful to obtain records of 
the characteristics of all houses in the Austin area, not just the ones that sold, so 
that a correction for sample selection among the first sales could be added.  Third, 
 87
additional neighborhood variables, such as distance to the major city interstates, 
number of parks, and crime statistics may provide a sharper estimation of the 
variables of interest.  These variables could also be collected with the aid of 
Geographic Information Systems maps.   
A second direction for future work is use this data set to expand research 
on airport siting decisions in Austin.  A second paper, already in progress, repeats 
much of the analysis for the new airport and tests whether the effects of building a 
new airport in a new neighborhood are similar in sign and magnitude to the 
effects of removing an old airport.  A third paper is planned to look at the 
environmental justice issues involved in making the actual siting decision.  
Finally, the Mueller airport property has not yet been developed.  Once these 
planning developments have been finalized, a similar event date analysis could be 
performed to test the timing and significance of the redevelopment plans. 
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Figure 1.1  Map of the Effects of Mueller Airport on Property Values 
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Figure 1.2  Neighborhood Focus of Effects of Mueller Airport on Property Values 
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Figure 1.3 Map of Mueller Airport’s Noise Contours 
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Figure 1.4  Austin MLS Residential Housing Sales 
 
*Average house prices are not CPI-adjusted. 
 
This data is provided by the Real Estate Center at Texas A & M University, 
http://recenter.tamu.edu/data/hs/hs140a.htm 
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Chapter Two: Capitalized Gains and Losses from an Airport 
Relocation 
2.1  INTRODUCTION 
To support urban lifestyles, modern cities need amenities such as parks 
and schools, but also ‘noxious facilities’ like waste incinerators, prisons, and 
airports.  While most people would like to live near employment, or a park, few 
want to live under the flight paths of commercial jets.  Furthermore, while 
everyone in the city benefits from access to air travel, the costs of noise, pollution, 
congestion, and safety concerns concentrate on the few who live beneath a flight 
path or within a few miles of the facility.  Planners need the best available 
information before deciding where to put an airport, including not only costs and 
benefits, but also estimates of who bears those costs and who gets the benefits. 
The City of Austin provides a distinctive opportunity to study the costs 
and benefits of noxious facility location because it recently closed a major airport 
and opened a new one.  This study combines several data sources, including 
Geographic Information System (GIS) maps and census data, on a variety of 
structural, neighborhood, and environmental variables over a twenty-year period.  
The data on 21,386 home sales span the time of five separate “events” that may 
have been important to prices of houses around both the old and new airports.  
The data are divided into six periods corresponding to the timing of the events, 
and hedonic regressions are run to determine the impacts on house price from 
noise, distance, and access to airports.  Due to the variety and length of the data 
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set, hedonic pricing models can determine not only how an airport impacts house 
prices, but which houses and when.   
Airports make an interesting study for noxious facilities because they 
contain both amenity and disamenity aspects.  Earlier research on this topic found 
aircraft noise to be a disamenity, but proximity to the airport causes both house 
price increases and decreases, depending on the time period and the relative 
distance to the airport.30  While distance has been used as a proxy for access to the 
airport, in many cases it seems to pick up visual, safety, or traffic impacts as 
opposed to convenience.  This chapter, in combination with the previous chapter, 
develops a new measure of access to an airport based on locations near the main 
route to an airport. This new measure is designed to pick up the effects of 
infrastructure development, shorter commute times for airport and airline 
employees, as well as business development to support the airport or resulting 
from the increase in vehicle traffic along the route.  This new variable seeks to 
explain why recent research has disagreed on the effects of distance to an airport 
on house prices (Lipscomb, 2003; Espey & Lopez, 2000; and Tomkins et al., 
1998).   
Chapter one uses the same basic data set used here to measure whether an 
airport is an amenity or a disamenity to the neighborhoods surrounding it.  It is a 
case study of the neighborhoods near a single airport, over time, using 
information on houses in the rest of Austin as a control group.  The earlier chapter 
focuses on several different empirical methods for determining the amenity and 
                                                 
30 See Nelson (1980) for a review of airport literature, Penningtom, Topham, and Ward (1990), 
Levesque (1994), Tomkins et al (1998), Espey & Lopez (2000), and Lipscomb (2003) for more 
recent work. 
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disamenity values based on aircraft noise, distance from the airport, and 
accessibility to the airport for the old airport only.  It finds that noise, distance, 
and access attributes are separately identifiable, with noise and often distance 
being disamenities, but access the facility a boost for house prices.  The current 
work builds on the first chapter by looking at not only the effects around an old 
airport being taken out of a community, but also looking at the effects around a 
new airport being located elsewhere. Coefficients for noise, distance, and location 
on the route to an airport are found using similar empirical methods from the 
earlier research but then applied to the exact houses and communities impacted.   
In addition this chapter discusses hysteresis for airport facilities.  The 
concept of hysteresis is taken from the study of physics, the history dependence of 
physical systems. In the words of a scientist at the Laboratory of Atomic and 
Solid State Physics at Cornell University, “If you push on something, it will yield: 
when you release, does it spring back completely? If it doesn't, it is exhibiting 
hysteresis, in some broad sense.”31  Economists have borrowed the term to 
explain several kinds of phenomena: persistent and high levels of unemployment 
(Blanchard and Summers, 1986), the value of international operations in 
multinational corporations (Christophe, 1997), and projecting history into the 
present using dynamic economic modeling (Katzner 1999).   
Here, the hysteresis question is taken from Barham, Chavas, and Coomes 
(1998).  They define hysteresis quite generally as “situations of irreversibility 
where particular outcomes persist even after the conditions giving rise to their 
                                                 
31 http://www.lassp.cornell.edu/sethna/hysteresis/WhatIsHysteresis.html 
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occurrence are removed” (429).  Hysteresis in this sense is similar to the literature 
in environmental economics that looks at stigma effects and price rebounds after 
noxious sitings.  Kiel (1995) uses a six-period model to find the impact of the 
discovery and cleaning of Superfund sites near Boston.  She does not find house 
price recovery even after the Superfund sites were fully cleaned.  Kiel and 
McClain (1996) use a five-period model to evaluate a failed noxious siting.  They 
find that while proposing an undesirable facility does decrease house prices in the 
area, the failure of such a siting does not permanently stigmatize the location.  
Finally, Dale et al (1999) use a five-period model to find whether property values 
in Dallas recover from the stigma of a lead smelter after the plant is closed and the 
land restored.  They find that house prices near the smelter rebounded both when 
the facility closed and when the clean-up was completed.   
This chapter analyzes the housing market in Austin near the old airport at 
three stages, equilibrium, clean-up (when the new airport is being built), and 
recovery (after the new airport opens) over six time periods.  To answer hysteresis 
questions, the original equilibrium prices are compared with the post-airport 
closure recovery prices to see if the areas around the old airport rebound from the 
former airport siting.  Bergstrom Air Force Base (BAFB) also goes through the 
same three stages during the model period, equilibrium, clean-up, and recovery.   
In contrast to the old municipal airport facility, which during the model period 
was not renovated for a new use, the recovery period for former Air Force base 
includes the rehabilitation of the facility into the new municipal airport.  The 
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hysteresis section briefly discusses the impact that rehabilitation has on an airport 
closure. 
In the context of Austin’s airports, hysteresis can also be defined as the 
question of whether adding an airport has the exact opposite effect of removing an 
airport.  To answer this hysteretic question, the double-difference estimated 
coefficients are used to calculate the potential efficiency gain from the airport re-
location by comparing the numbers of gainers and losers and the magnitude of the 
house price changes from the public policy decision. This section measures 
whether the decision to move the airport lessened the overall burden to 
homeowners near both airports in aggregate.  Because airports contain some 
disamenity aspects, a Pareto improvement is not possible here.  However, a 
potentially efficient improvement is still possible if the gains near the old airport 
outweigh the loss near the new airport, or if the amenity aspects of airports 
outweigh the disamenity aspects.   
The decision to move the airport was quite likely made for reasons other 
than increasing or decreasing property values.32  However, it turns out that only 
about half as many houses lie either within the first three miles, in a noise 
contour, or on the route to the new airport as lie within the same designations for 
the old airport.  Also, the airport move was significantly driven by the 
homeowners near the old airport.  Therefore, moving the location of the airport 
                                                 
32 It was widely believed that Austin had outgrown the old airport and a larger facility with 
international flights was necessary.  The new location was chosen after years of deliberation and 
voting.  In addition, outside of neighborhood concerns and development coalitions, the new site 
was chosen based on land costs and the pre-existence of runways.  For the city as a whole, I 
assume that since the vote to move the airport passed, at least a majority of citizens believed the 
overall benefits of the new airport would compensate for the additional costs. 
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addressed the disamenity problem only if a net gain was realized by homeowners 
near the airports, without taking into account the costs and benefits to the city as a 
whole. If the burden to homeowners increases with the airport move, then 
building a new airport simply transferred the disamenity from one area to another 
without reducing it, leaving the City open to the same civil and legal turmoil as 
occurred before the move.  Implicitly, then, this calculation compares the impact 
of being near an airport going in to the impact of being near an airport going out.   
The overall negative impact is expected to lessen due to the strategic location of 
the new facility.33 
Unlike other airport location studies, this paper uses three different 
estimates of each environmental variable: a single-difference (within-period) 
estimate, a time-invariant estimate, and a double-difference estimate to measure 
the burden on homeowners near both airports in Austin.  First, an empirical model 
similar to those used in the first chapter for the old airport is expanded to include 
distance and accessibility variables for the newly built airport.  The new airport 
was built on the site of a closed Air Force base in an area of low population 
density.  Due to the small number of houses and the use of the former Air Force 
runways, no houses in the data set are affected by aircraft noise above 65 decibels 
(the level FAA and HUD designate as incompatible with residential housing use).  
This is a limitation of the data, but also a reflection of how few houses are 
actually located near the new airport.  Second, because the data set includes at 
least some houses near both airports over time, it is still possible to isolate the 
                                                 
33 When the old airport was first built in the 1930s it was also, presumably, in an area of low 
population density and the city grew in around the facility, creating more of a nuisance than was 
initially anticipated. The same may become true of the new airport over a similar long time frame. 
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relative effects on the neighborhoods near the airports compared to the rest of 
Austin, as well as the effects of moving the airport over time. A difference-in-
differences model is used to compare the estimated coefficients both within the 
model and across time periods. 
However, rather than comparing these types of estimates to each other, 
this paper uses the combination of results to draw a clearer picture of what 
actually happen to house prices as a result of the airport relocation.  The single-
difference estimates give the effect that different airport characteristics have on 
selling a house in any given time period.  This estimate is useful for determining 
how the airport affects the selling price of a house holding everything else equal.  
The time-invariant estimate gives the effect of a policy over its lifetime, rather 
than focusing on any given period when the house sells.  These time-invariant 
estimates are often zero and can be quite deceptive.  A policy that has large 
positive impacts in one period but large negative impacts in the next can give a 
zero net impact without realizing the gains and losses to homeowners who buy or 
sell homes in between.  Finally, the double-difference estimate takes account of 
both of the previous elements and highlights the true effect of airports on housing 
values across time. 
The results of this investigation indicate the following.  The single-
difference models with independent regressions for each period finds that 
previous to breaking ground at the new airport, no significant difference in price 
of houses under the noise contours existed, compared to the rest of Austin.  
During the time it took to build the new airport while the old facility was still 
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operating, house prices in the noise contours were lower than other prices in 
Austin.  Once the new airport opened and noise ceased at the old facility, houses 
in previous noise contours at the old airport sold at a premium.  When this model 
is extended to a difference-in-differences model, noise at the old airport caused 
temporary declines in house prices compared to the rest of Austin, in reaction to 
the announcements of the impending airport re-location.  Even controlling for 
aircraft noise, a house located in an old airport neighborhood sold for less, all else 
equal.  Except for the closest distance ring, however, these negative distance 
impacts lessen over time.  Access to the old airport was clearly an amenity; 
houses along the route to the old airport suffered permanent value losses when the 
old airport closed. 
Looking at the new airport, noise is not nearly the factor as it was for the 
old airport because of its location around a former Air Force Base.  Fewer houses 
simply exist within the noise contours.  This is also a factor for close proximity to 
the new airport, although enough houses sold to determine that the houses in the 
closest distance contour sold for lower prices than elsewhere in the city.  The 
double-difference coefficients show that this disamenity effect lessens over time 
in anticipation of the airport opening, but it wanes again during initial flight 
operations.  Again, access to the airport is an amenity.  Despite negative single 
difference coefficients on route, the double-difference coefficients show a 
significant increase in the houses on the route to the new airport after construction 
begins compared to the pre-list period and compared to other locations. 
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The hystersis analysis finds that airports do have persistent effects on 
house prices in the surrounding communities, even after the facility is abandoned.  
As would be expected from the different impacts that noise, distance, and route 
have on communities surrounding functioning airports, the hysteretic effects are 
both positive and negative and depend on the number and value of houses located 
in the community.  The history dependence of an airport on the community is 
influenced by redevelopment at the former facility.  The results of converting the 
former Air Force Base into a new municipal airport suggest that while it is not 
advantageous to live very near any airport facility, building a new airport on the 
old grounds significantly reduced the negative impacts on the surrounding 
community that appeared when the Base closed. 
The net gain calculation that incorporates all houses in Austin impacted by 
the airport move (115,927 total houses) finds that moving the airport from 
Austin’s city center to a more remote location caused a potential gain of $1.5 
billion to all homeowners over the fourteen years after the vote to move the 
airport passed.  This gain is developed from the over $78 million that was realized 
through more than 10,000 houses in the data set that sold during this time period 
and weighted by the total number of houses.  Houses near both airports gain value 
in net, though gains at the new airport are almost twice those at the old airport, 
driven mostly by gains to houses along the route to the new airport.  
The next section summarizes the background of Austin’s airport history.  
Then the data are described in Section 2.3, and Section 2.4 briefly reviews 
hedonic models and Section 2.5 introduces the single-difference model 
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estimation.  Section 2.6 expands the model into a difference-in-differences 
analysis.  Section 2.7 develops a measurement of net gain from moving Austin’s 
airport.  Finally, Section 2.8 concludes, and it previews areas for future work. 
 
2.2  BACKGROUND34 
As with most policies, the decision to re-locate Austin’s municipal airport 
developed over many years and information regimes.  As early as 1970, talk 
began of either finding a new site to replace Robert Mueller Municipal Airport 
(Mueller), or working out a joint-use facility with the federal government at 
Bergstrom Air Force Base (BAFB).  By 1980, however, Air Force officials had 
twice denied requests for a joint-use facility.  For a few years, the City focused its 
attention on expanding the current airport, but widespread public disapproval, 
driven by a multi-neighborhood organization “Move-It” campaign, caused the 
City Council to vote down this proposal unanimously.  After failing once in 1985, 
a voter referendum in 1987 finally passed to build a new airport at a site east of 
the nearby town of Manor.35  Aircraft noise levels and the number of commercial 
jets operating yearly out of Mueller airport reached their peaks that same year. 
                                                 
34I compiled an extensive background to understand the information regime for homeowners in 
Austin through the airport re-location process, see Background.  The main source of information is 
articles in Austin’s main daily newspaper, the Austin-American Statesman, as well as in the 
weekly paper, the Austin Chronicle.  I also used the website for the new Austin-Bergstrom 
International Airport.  In addition, unique perspectives are provided by (1) planners at the City of 
Austin Transportation, Planning, and Sustainability Department, (2) a local Austin journalist, 
Mike Clark-Madison, and (3) the president of the Mueller Neighborhood Coalition, Jim Walker, in 
a Community and Regional Planning seminar at the University of Texas at Austin.   
35 On November 3, 1987, voters rejected the idea of expanding Mueller, 88% to 12%.  The 
referendum to build the new airport at Manor passed with a less impressive margin, 56% to 44%. 
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Although the City began to purchase land at the Manor location in 1989, it 
was simultaneously involved in an expansion project at Mueller to add a new 
terminal.  Then, early in 1990, to complicate matters further, the rumor spread 
that BAFB was slated for closure by the U.S. government.  In June 1991, BAFB 
actually appeared on a closure list.  The City Council passed a resolution just two 
months later indicating Bergstrom was the preferred location for the new airport 
and voted to abandon the Manor project. 
In May 1993, Austin voters approved a referendum to re-locate the airport 
to Bergstrom when the Base closed.  In September, BAFB officially closed, and 
the next month the property reverted to the City of Austin.  Approximately one 
year later, the City Council approved the name “Austin-Bergstrom International 
Airport” (ABIA), and on November 19, 1994, the City celebrated the 
groundbreaking.  Finally, on the night of May 22, 1999, all flight operations were 
halted at Mueller Airport, and the following day Austin-Bergstrom Airport 
opened for passenger service. 
 
2.3  DATA 
The data for this study were compiled by First American Real Estate 
Solutions from individual sales of single-family residences in Travis County, 
Texas.  The data include information about houses sold in thirty-three zip codes in 
the Austin Metropolitan Area. The total sample consists of 21,386 homes sold 
between January 1980 and June 2001.  Each observation includes the property’s 
address, the sale price, the sale date, certain house characteristics, and the census 
tract location.   
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The data set is built from 9,728 single sales and 5,829 repeat sales.  
Therefore, the full sample contains 21,386 observations.  Summary statistics are 
shown in Tables A.1 through A.3 of Appendix A. These data include all available 
houses from First American that were sold in the thirty-three zip codes for the 
entire twenty-year period, so they avoid sample selection problems except those 
arising from the self-selection of houses to be sold.36  These are not panel data, 
since they do not show the prices of the same houses each year for twenty years, 
but they do have the significant advantage of covering all relevant neighborhoods 
for all relevant years.37  Thus, they can be used to show both time-series effects of 
relocating the airport and cross-section effects of one neighborhood compared to 
another.   
 The structural variables in these data include the total living area in 
square feet, the total lot size in square feet, the age of house,38 the number of 
bathrooms,39 the existence of a pool or in-house spa, the existence of a fireplace, 
the existence of a garage or carport, and whether the house is constructed of 
wood, a wood and brick combination, masonry, or is a manufactured home.  To 
                                                 
36 It should be stressed that these are all houses available from First American, but not all houses 
that sold in Austin during the twenty-year period.  Many attempts were made to acquire all house 
sales in the Multiple Listing Service (MLS) from the Austin Board of Realtors, with no success.  
Therefore, a sample selection problem may arise with the house sales information First American 
had available for purchase. 
37 See Maps B.2 – B.7 in the Appendix to see the distribution of observations across the city. 
38 Several specifications of age are tested, with slight variations in the results.  Including only a 
single term for age produces the smallest coefficient (-0.00261) and the lowest adjusted R2 
(0.6501).  Adding a quadratic term increases the coefficient on age (-0.0128), produces a positive 
coefficient for the squared term (0.000161), and increases the adjusted R2 (0.6549).  Adding a 
cubed term reduces the size of the coefficient (-0.00011) and decreases the adjusted R2 (0.6503).  
All of these coefficients are significantly different from zero at a 99% confidence level in all 
models. 
39 The number of bathrooms is listed as an integer in the original data set.  I assume that half 
bathrooms are rounded up and listed as the next full integer. 
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allow for a non-constant marginal value of a bathroom, the number of bathrooms 
variable is broken into a series of dummy variables.  Summary statistics are 
shown in Table 2.1.  The number of bedrooms is not available in the data set, but 
the total living area is included.  While bedrooms are an important determinate of 
house price, Brookshire et al. (1982) finds collinearity between the number of 
bedrooms and the total living area and thus use living area as the only measure of 
house size.   
 
Table 2.1. Summary Statistics for Structural Variables 
Variable Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
Price* $171,102.80 153,115.3 1,129 8,807,557 
Gross Living Area (sq ft) 1,731.49 763.74 298 8,900 
Total Land Area (sq ft) 11,570.83 16,048.06 660 679,971.6 
Age 23.85 18.05 0 101 
Bath1** 0.1861 0.3892 0 1 
Bath2 0.5274 .49993 0 1 
Bath3 0.2864 .4521 0 1 
Fireplace 0.6832 0.4653 0 1 
Pool 0.0603 0.2380 0 1 
Spa 0.0187 0.1355 0 1 
Garage 0.8207 0.3836 0 1 
Carport 0.0884 0.2839 0 1 
Manufactured Home 0.0001 0.0118 0 1 
Masonry Construction 0.0042 0.0647 0 1 
Wood Construction 0.6810 0.4661 0 1 
Wood/Brick Construction 0.3147 0.4644 0 1 
The total number of observations is 21,386 
*All prices are CPI adjusted, 2001=1 
**Bath1 indicates a house has one bathroom, Bath2 has either one and a half or two bathrooms.  Bath3 has more than two 
bathrooms. Less than 5% of houses in the sample have more than three bathrooms. 
 
The neighborhood, or community, characteristics for each house are 
matched from the 1990 U.S. Census of Population and Housing, and from GIS 
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maps.  These variables include distance from the Austin central business district 
(CBD), distance to the University of Texas (UT, a major employment center as 
well as a common destination for over 50,000 students), the percentage of the 
population in the census tract who graduated from high school, a four-year 
college, and graduate school, the racial breakdown of the census tract, the 
percentage of vacant lots in the tract, and the percentage of homes that are owner-
occupied.  Summary statistics are shown in Table 2.2. 40  
 
Table 2.2  Summary Statistics for Community Variables 
Variable Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
CBD1* 0.0038 0.0614 0 1 
CBD2 0.0476 0.2129 0 1 
CBD3 0.0771 0.2668 0 1 
UT1 0.0056 0.0747 0 1 
UT2 0.0631 0.2431 0 1 
UT3 0.0832 0.2762 0 1 
% HS Graduates 0.1177 0.0445 0.01 0.23 
% 4-year College Grads 0.1605 0.0696 0 0.39 
% Graduate School Grads 0.0893 0.0632 0 0.25 
% Foreign Born 0.0641 0.0374 0 0.33 
% White 0.7882 0.1731 0.04 0.98 
% Black 0.0859 0.1295 0 0.90 
% Native American 0.0023 0.0045 0 0.02 
% Asia – Pacific 0.0265 0.0243 0 0.25 
% Other 0.0972 0.0929 0 0.72 
% Vacant Lots 0.0904 0.0436 0.03 0.45 
% Owner Occupied 0.4727 0.1896 0 0.80 
*CBD1 indicates a house is located less than one mile from the Austin central business district, CBD2 indicates between 
one and two miles, and CBD3 indicates between two and three miles.  UT1 indicates a house is located less than one mile 
from the University of Texas, UT2, between one and two miles, UT3, between two and three miles. 
 
                                                 
40 Map B.2 shows the distribution of houses around the CBD and UT and their locations relative 
to the airports. 
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  It is a fairly common practice to include both the median household 
income in the census tract and the percent of the census tract that is unemployed 
as proxies for community quality.  As pointed out by Butler (1982), however, “it 
is impossible to separate the function of, for example, income as a neighborhood 
quality proxy from its role as a characteristic of demanders in the neighborhood.”   
Furthermore, “the income coefficient will reflect both the effect of income on 
households’ bids and the rationing effect of prices in allocating households of 
different income to different types of housing”  (Butler, 1982, 96-97). 
The school district of a particular house is another common regressor that 
is left out of this model.  School district information is available in GIS format, 
but after analysis, it was omitted for two reasons.  First, almost 83% of the 
housing sample is in the same school district, Austin Independent School District 
(AISD).  Second, the school district dummies are highly correlated with the series 
of zip code dummy variables added as community proxies.41  The zip code 
variables are included rather than the school district variables because zip codes 
reveal greater community detail: thirty-three zip codes make up the sample, 
compared to only six school districts.  Summary Statistics for zip code dummies 
are shown in Table A.4 and plotted in Map B.1 of the Appendix.42    The zip code 
dummies are also highly collinear with dummies for the three cities encompassed 
by the sample: Austin, Manor, and Del Valle.  All of the houses in Manor are in 
                                                 
41 For example, of the 1,231 houses in the Eanes Independent School District (5.8% of the 
sample), all but nine of them are in the zip code 78746. 
42 Mueller Airport is contained in zip code 78723, but the noise contours extend into 78751 and 
78756 on the northwest, 78722 on the southwest, 78724 on the northeast, 78721 on the southeast.  
The mailing address for Austin-Bergstrom International Airport is 78719, though the eastern 
runway is largely located in 78617.  The noise contours extend to the west into 78744 and to 
78742 on the north. 
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the zip code 78653, and all the houses in Del Valle are in the zip code 78617.  
Thus, dummy variables for individual cities are omitted from the analysis.  
The environmental characteristics are developed from the GIS and the 
Noise Exposure Maps furnished by the City of Austin Transportation, Planning, 
and Sustainability Department.  Three variable groups are included: Noise, 
Distance, and Route.  The Noise variables are a series of dummy variables that 
capture the noise contours: average noise level greater than 75 decibels (dB), 70-
75dB, 65-70dB, and “undistinguishable from background noise”.  The FAA, as 
well as HUD, defines areas exposed to average sound levels of 65dB or over as 
incompatible with residential housing use.  See noise contours in Map C.3 and 
C.4.  These noise contours were developed by the City of Austin for both airports 
and are provided in “Part 150 Noise Study” reports.  The evaluation of the noise 
contours was conducted using the Integrated Noise Model (INM) developed by 
the FAA, the method most commonly used to predict contours.43  Summary 
statistics are reported in Table 2.3.  Due to the small number of houses within 
noise contours greater than 70 decibels, the noise contours for average noise 
greater than 75 decibels are combined with noise levels between 70 and 75 
decibels (NGT70). 
 
                                                 
43 The INM determines aircraft noise level on an average-daily basis using a ‘Day Night Average 
Sound Level’ metric.  This metric is a 24-hour average sound level weighted with a 10-decibel 
penalty for nighttime noise events. 
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Table 2.3  Summary Statistics for Mueller Airport Noise Variables 
Dummy Variable Mean Std. 
Dev 
Min Max
N6570:  Noise level 65-70 dBs 0.0176 0.1316 0 1 
NGT70: Noise level greater than 70 dBs 0.0067 0.0815 0 1 
 
Aircraft noise levels at the new airport exceed 65 decibels for only a single 
house in the entire dataset. Not having houses in the data set that are within the 
new airport noise contours prevents a full-scale comparison of the old airport with 
the new, assuming that houses at the new airport do suffer from noise, but that the 
data sample is not representative.  However, it was by design that the new airport 
would cause less noise pollution.  The longer runways allow planes to achieve a 
higher elevation before flying over residential areas, causing less overall noise.  
Less noise combined with low housing density makes it likely that few houses are 
impacted by noise.  Thus, the lack of noise at the new airport is both a data 
limitation and a valid component of the model to be figured into the cost and 
benefits of the airport location decision. 
The Distances from each airport are also represented by series of dummy 
variables.  The summary statistics are provided in Tables 2.4 and 2.5.  For the old 
airport, Distance is measured in six, one-half mile concentric circles around the 
main terminal.  The neighborhoods around the old airport are in a relatively dense 
urban area (Map B.4).  For the new airport, variables for the distance from the 
airport are measured in five one-mile concentric circles around the main terminal 
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(Map B.7).44  The neighborhoods around the new airport are still relatively 
sparsely populated, with fewer roadways and traffic intersections than are around 
the old airport.  In addition, the neighborhoods around the old airport change 
character after only a mile or two (near downtown, the University, the Colorado 
River).  On the other hand, the neighborhoods around the new airport remain 
relatively unchanged for several miles.   
 
Table 2.4  Summary Statistics for Distance from Old Airport Variables 
Dummy Variable Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
MAdist1: Less than ½ mile 0.0115 0.1066 0 1 
MAdist2: Between ½ and 1 mile 0.0353 0.1846 0 1 
MAdist3: Between 1 and 1 ½ mile  0.0250 0.1562 0 1 
MAdist4: Between 1 ½ and 2 miles 0.0240 0.1532 0 1 
MAdist5: Between 2 and 2 ½ miles 0.0311 0.1736 0 1 
MAdist6: Between 2 ½ and 3 miles 0.0496 0.2170 0 1 
 
Table 2.5  Summary Statistics for Distance from New Airport Variables 
Dummy Variable Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
ABIAdist1: Less than 1 mile 0.0004 0.0193 0 1 
ABIAdist2: Between 1 and 2 miles 0.0029 0.0538 0 1 
ABIAdist3: Between 2 and 3 miles  0.0064 0.0795 0 1 
ABIAdist4: Between 3 and 4 miles 0.0398 0.1956 0 1 
ABIAdist5: Between 4 and 5 miles 0.0602 0.2378 0 1 
 
Often, in the noxious siting and hedonic literature, Distance is instead 
measured as a continuous variable and enters into the equation as a natural log.  
With the log specification, the negative effect of living near the noxious facility 
                                                 
44 I conjecture that traveling a half-mile from the old airport would take approximately the same 
time as traveling a full mile from the new airport.   
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decreases at a decreasing rate, but more distance from the site is always 
advantageous.  In the case of airports, however, proximity to the site may indeed 
be an amenity (controlling for noise). Dummy variables allow for a non-constant 
marginal value of distance from the airport that may change sign.    
The map in Figure 2.1 at the end of this chapter combines the airport noise 
contours with a one-mile distance ring for reference. This map shows that at 
Mueller Airport, the noise contours are elongated at a diagonal across the 
interstate highway (IH-35), whereas the distance rings form concentric circles 
around the old airport building perimeter.  Thus, as shown in Table 2.6, for 
Mueller Airport the correlation terms between the noise and distance variables are 
relatively low.  At the highest, noise level in the 65-70 decibel contour and the 0.5 
to 1.0 mile distance ring have a correlation of 0.2574, below the threshold that 
determines multicollinearity.  Therefore, these environmental variables can help 
determine the separate impacts of airport noise and proximity to the airport.  The 
Noise variables are expected to pick up the effects of actual noise on residents 
under the flight path, while the Distance variables pick up other effects of 
proximity.    Since Noise at ABIA is not a factor for any houses in the data set, a 
similar correlation matrix is not necessary for the new airport. 
 
Table 2.6.  Correlation Between Noise and Distance Variables for Mueller Airport 
 MAdist1 MAdist2 MAdist3 MAdist4 MAdist5 MAdist6 
N6570 0.1422 0.2574 0.1856 0.1599 0.0047 -0.0306 
NGT70 0.2171 0.1988 0.1044 -0.0129 -0.0147 -0.0187 
  *See variable definitions in Tables 2.3 and 2.4 
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The construction of the “Route” variables is unique to this study.  They are 
designed to pick up the effects of expectations about future land development 
related to the change in transportation through the region as the airport changes 
location.  It is expected that properties bordering the main routes to the new 
airport will become valuable for commercial use, thus raising their prices.  In 
contrast, those properties near, but not bordering, the access routes may suffer 
from increased congestion, noise and pollution, thus reducing their prices. 
Map B.5 in Appendix B plots the various routes to each airport.  These 
routes are developed from the City of Austin, “Map to the Airport” directions.45  
The ABIA Planning Committee projected 36,000 auto trips per day to the new 
airport, about 7,000 more than were recorded when it was an Air Force Base.  
Mueller Airport was directly accessed from the city’s major interstate highway 
(IH-35) from both the north and the south via Manor Road.  ABIA is accessible 
from two major highways, Texas 71 (Hwy 71) and US 183 (Hwy 183).46   From 
central areas of Austin, however, it was forecast that many commuters would 
instead choose city streets, mainly Riverside Drive, East 7th Street, and Airport 
Boulevard.  Planners projected that the already heavily used IH-35 would not be 
impacted by the change in airport location, but that Riverside, East 7th St, Airport 
Blvd, Hwy 183, and Hwy 71 would all see an increase in traffic flows.  Manor Rd 
was predicted to lose much of its vehicle traffic. 
                                                 
45 http://www.ci.austin.tx.us/austinairport/. 
46 On November 8, 1989 the Austin-American Statesman ran an article stating that these highways 
were both “ill-prepared” for the projected increase in traffic. 
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The Route variables, therefore, are divided into two sets: Manor Rd 
dummies for the old airport and ABIA route dummies for the new airport.  The 
Manor dummies are: one-quarter mile buffer from Manor Road, one-half mile, 
and greater than a half mile.  The ABIA route variables are: one-quarter mile 
buffers of Hwy 71, Hwy 183, Airport Blvd, East 7th St, and Riverside Dr, one-half 
mile buffers, and greater than a half mile.  Because the purpose of the Route 
variables is to pick up development effects and not to determine which routes are 
used most, the buffers for all roads in the ABIA route dummies are combined into 
one measure. 
The final set of variables is year dummies to control for the general market 
trend in Austin.  Each year dummy takes on the value of one if the house sold in 
that year, zero otherwise.  The chart in Figure 2.2 at the end of this chapter shows 
the residential housing activity in Austin for all house sales.47  From this chart, all 
else equal, it is expected that house prices in constant dollars will be lowest for 
the years 1990 and 1991.  Therefore, when possible in the hedonic regressions, 
the dummy variable for 1990 is left out to serve as the baseline.  This convenient 
notation implies that the dummy for 1991 is expected to be relatively 
insignificant, but all other years will be significant and positive. 
2.4  HEDONIC MODEL 
The theoretical framework for most hedonic models relies on the hedonic 
price method developed by Rosen (1974).  The sale price of a house in a 
                                                 
47 This data is provided by the Real Estate Center at Texas A & M University, 
http://recenter.tamu.edu/data/hs/hs140a.htm, although they are unable to provide individual house 
sales. 
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competitive market depends on its characteristics, all else equal.  Because home 
buyers prefer a quiet location to being under the flight path of a jet, the market 
price of a house in a quiet location will be greater than the market price of a house 
in a noisy location.  The general hedonic price of housing is estimated as: 
 
2.1 Pi  =  f ( Si, Ci, Qi, dyeari ) 
 
where, for house i, P is the house price, S = Si1…Sij is a vector of j structural 
characteristics, C = Ci1…Cik is a vector of k local community characteristics, Q = 
Qi1…Qim is a vector of m environmental quality characteristics, and dyear is the 
dummy variable for year of sale.  This estimation provides the marginal implicit 
price of each of the characteristics.  For example, if Qi1 is the noise level, and ∂Pi 
/∂Qi1 < 0,  then an incremental increase in noise reduces the price of a house. 
No theoretical justification defines the correct functional form for hedonic 
models, and previous studies have estimated a variety of forms including log-
linear, semi-log, linear, and Box-Cox.  In many cases, researchers have ‘let the 
data determine the functional form’ based on goodness of fit.  However, this 
method has come under scrutiny of various forms.48  As a result, this model 
adopts the most common form, semi-logarithmic, where the natural log of the 
housing price is a linear function of its characteristics, without empirically testing 
for functional form. 
                                                 
48 Griliches (1971) points out that in cases where form is determined empirically, most researchers 
settle on a semi-logarithmic relationship.  Butler (1982) adds that researchers who made these 
empirical comparisons, “by and large found little basis for choosing one form over another”.   
Cassell and Mendelsohn (1985) have three additional criticisms of the method.  First, the best-
fitting criterion does not necessarily lead to more accurate estimates of characteristic prices.  
Second, the transformations required by Box-Cox result in complex estimates of slopes and 
elasticities that make policy analysis difficult (Palmquist, 1991 noted this as well).  Third, the 
best-fit functional form may be inappropriate for the model’s predictions. 
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Based on the general hedonic equation described in equation (1), the 
empirical models in this paper take the following form: 
 
2.2 , ( ) itik
k






where  i  indexes the house,  Sit  is a vector of structural characteristics,  Cit  is a 
vector of local community characteristics, and Qit , the environmental quality 
variable, is subdivided into three variables relevant to this study (Nit, Dit, and Rit), 
where Nit  is a vector of noise level dummies,  Dit  is a vector of distance ring 
dummies,  Rit  is a vector of dummies for distance from the major routes to the 
airport.  The dummy variable for the year of house sale, dYeark, controls for 
annual variations in overall real house prices.  All prices,  Pi  , are adjusted to 
constant 2001 dollars using the Consumer Price Index.  The time subscript, t  
refers not to the year that the house sold, but to the six time periods in the model, 
defined below. 
In line with the change in focus from the measurement of the impact of an 
airport on the surrounding community to a comparison of two airport 
communities, one with an airport being located and another with an airport 
closing down, several important differences exist from the first chapter.   First, as 
mentioned earlier, chapter one included variables for Noise, Distance, and Route 
for a single airport, the old airport.  This model extends that by adding Distance 
and Route to the new airport variables.  As mentioned earlier, adding Noise 
variables for the new airport is not necessary, as aircraft noise levels exceed 65 
decibels for only a single house in the entire dataset. Second, the “Event” dummy 
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variables now divide the data into six time periods based on the postulated 
significant events toward airport relocation that may influence Austin homebuyers 
and sellers.  Also, as a refinement to the earlier model, the time periods are broken 
up by month, when appropriate, the better to capture the events.  A summary of 
the Event dummy variables is given in Table 2.7. 
 
Table 2.7 Explanation of Event Dummy Variables 
Variable Dates Definition Number 
of Obs 
preVote Jan 1980 – Nov 
1987 
House sold before vote passed to move 
airport to Manor location 
787 
preList Dec 1987 – Jun 
1991 
House sold after Vote, but before 
BAFB was placed on the possible 
closure list; during this time City 
Council resolved to locate airport at 
Bergstrom location 
977 
preClose Jul 1991 – Sept 
1993 
House sold after List, but before BAFB 
officially closed; during this time Base 
property reverted to City 
1,361 
preBuild Oct 1993 – Nov 
1994 
House sold after Close, but before the 
groundbreaking ceremony held at 
Bergstrom location 
805 
preOpen Dec 1994 – May 
1999 
House sold after Build, but before 
ABIA opened for passenger service 
and Mueller airport closed 
7,107 
Final Jun 1999 – Jun 
2001 
House sold after airport re-location was 
complete 
10,349 
The first time period dummy, preVote, indicates that the house was sold 
before the November 1987 vote to re-locate the airport to the Manor location 
passed.  During this time noise pollution from the old airport had existed for 
several decades; however, despite the efforts of neighborhood groups, a vote had 
not been passed to move the airport out of the city center.   Because noise level 
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and the number of aircraft using Mueller airport peaked in 1987, it was likely a 
turning point for the surrounding community.  The passage of the vote may 
signify the noise level difference between a unique community characteristic and 
a true nuisance.49 This time period serves as the pre-location decision equilibrium 
to which the other events can be compared, and, ultimately, is the basis for 
determining hysteresis.     
The second time period dummy, preList, indicates that the house was sold 
after the vote to move the airport passed, but before Bergstrom Air Force Base 
was placed on the possible closure list.  At this time, I assume that most residents 
believed the new airport was going to be built to the northeast of the city and not 
at its ultimate location on the former Base.50  The third time period, preClose, 
indicates that the house sold after BAFB was placed on the possible closure list, 
but before it officially closed.  During this time period, as mentioned in the 
Background section, a great deal of confusion and uncertainty existed as to the 
final location of the airport.  The old airport continued to expand locally and land 
was being purchased at the Manor location, but most believed that if the Base 
closed, the airport would be re-located there.   
The fourth time period, preBuild, indicates that a house sold after BAFB 
was placed on the official closure list, but before actual construction of the new 
airport began.  During this time period most of the uncertainties resolved 
                                                 
49 The neighborhood most affected by noise, but separated visually by the interstate highway, 
enjoyed a certain notoriety from the aircraft flying overhead.  The ‘Flight Path Café’ is an example 
of a coffee house that capitalized on the neighborhood’s unique characteristic. 
50 However, the rumor that the Air Force Base would be placed on the possible closure list had 
been circulating for some time.  Even if those concerned with the Base could already foresee its 
closure, it was largely unpublicized. 
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themselves.  A vote passed to abandon the Manor location once and for all.  In 
addition, a vote had previously passed to move the airport to the Bergstrom 
location if and when it did close.   
The event preOpen indicates that a house sold after the groundbreaking 
ceremony at the former Air Force Base, but before the new airport opened.  This 
is an interesting period, because while the question of the new airport location 
was resolved, aircraft noise still existed near the old airport.  Therefore, if people 
have rational expectations, then anticipated noise around Bergstrom should reduce 
house prices there and the anticipated removal of noise around Mueller should 
raise house prices under the old noise contours, especially the noisiest areas.51  In 
actuality, the housing market may not react quite so determinedly.  Rational 
expectations about noise may well drive down house prices at the new airport 
location once the groundbreaking occurs, but the situation at the old airport is not 
as clear.  In this period, not only are the residents still suffering from noise, but 
the fate of the old airport facility had not yet been determined.  This uncertainty 
about what would replace the airport, including the uncertainty whether the noise 
would actually cease may cause mix reactions, or no reaction at all, in the housing 
market.52 In practice, the rational expectation effects may be dampened if home 
buyers and sellers do not trust the City’s airport relocation program to take effect 
as intended, or if they believe that the new use of the old airport facility will be 
worse than the noise nuisance was.   
                                                 
51 Both airports see development and infrastructure effects, though they should work in opposite 
directions: positive impacts at the new airport and negative impacts at the old airport. 
52 One option considered for the old facility was to keep it open as a second airport, similar to 
Love Field in Dallas. 
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 The sixth and final time period, Final, indicates that the house sold after 
the new airport opened and the old airport closed.  This period is the rebound 
period for the old airport, not in the rational expectations sense, but in the 
hysteretic sense.  If the housing market fully and correctly anticipates all the 
changes near the old airport, then prices should rebound in the periods before its 
final closure.  In the hysteretic sense, however, this Final period is the comparison 
state to the change in policy imposed on the old airport neighborhood.  In the 
initial period the community house prices had adjusted to an equilibrium given the 
airport noise.  In the following periods, the local government ‘pushed’ the system 
by imposing a series of policies to close the airport and open one in a new 
location.  In this Final period, the effects of these policies ‘release’ and it is time 
to see if the house price system ‘springs back completely’ to the preVote 
equilibrium, or if the government policies have caused a permanent change.  
Negative impacts at the old airport this period of the model imply the presence of 
stigma - persistent negative effects from perceived negative environmental 
consequences, regardless of whether they actually exist. 
 
2.5  SINGLE-DIFFERENCE MODEL 
In this section, two forms of the single-difference model are run, a pooled 
model where only the environmental variables are interacted with the event 
dummies, and a six-equation model that allows the valuation of all house price 
determinants to vary over time.    When using the semi-log form, the coefficient 
on a continuous variable is interpreted as the percentage impact on house price for 
an incremental change in the independent variable.  However, the interpretation 
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for the coefficient on a dummy variable is not as straightforward.  As pointed-out 
by Halvorsen and Palmquist (1980) and Kennedy (1981), the percentage impact 
of a dummy variable on the dependent variable is measured by taking the inverse 
natural logarithm of the dummy coefficient and subtracting one. 
  The first issue to address is whether the house characteristics that are 
unrelated to the airport relocation remain constant over the six time periods in the 
model.  The marginal value of a second bathroom or square foot of living space, 
adjusted for inflation, is not expected to vary greatly over a period of twenty 
years.  However, the marginal value of living in a specific community may.  
Entirely unrelated to the location of the airport, certain communities grow in 
popularity while others fall into disrepair.  The pooled data are used to test the 
hypothesis that the values of the structural and community variables do not 
change over time.  If a pooled model is not subject to aggregation bias, then it can 
be used for estimation over all time periods with interaction terms for the 
environmental variables and the event dummies.   
An F-test is defined to test whether all coefficients in equation (2.2) are 
equal across time (except the intercept, the environmental variables and the year 
dummies).  The null hypothesis for the coefficients on the structural variables in 
equation (2.2) is: 
  
6543210 : ββββββ =====H . 
 
In accordance with equation (2.2), the beta indicates the coefficients for 
the vector of all structural variables and the subscript indicates the time period.  
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This hypothesis is tested jointly with the null hypothesis on the community 
variables: 
 
6543210 : γγγγγγ =====H  
 
where the gamma indicates the coefficients for the vector of all community 
variables and the subscript indicates the time period. 
The F-test compares the residual sum of squares from the pooled model to 
the residual sum of squares from the six individual period equations estimated 
separately.  The F-statistic value of 5.75 (81 restrictions, 21,206 degrees of 
freedom) indicates rejection of the null hypothesis that all structural and 
community coefficients were constant over the six time periods.  Therefore, it is 
appropriate to use either six individual equations, one for each time period, or, 
since ample degrees of freedom exist, a full-interaction model that allows all 
coefficients to vary over time.  The regression output for the pooled model is 
available upon request. 
The regression diagnostics for the model are listed in Table 2.8.  The R2 
statistics show goodness of fit and imply that between 60-75 percent of the 
variation in home sale price is explained by variations in the independent variable 
set.  The F-statistics show that every regression as a whole is significantly 





Table 2.8  Diagnostic Statistics for Single Difference Models 
 preVote preList preClose preBuild preOpen Final 
Adj R2 0.6914 0.7500 0.6025 0.6284 0.7153 0.6364 
F-stat 23.29 39.52 28.12 19.63 216.86 227.44 
Prob F>0 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
The full regression output for the six individual equations is available in 
Table G.1 in Appendix G.  Taking the inverse natural log of the intercept for each 
time period gives the average price of a one-bathroom house with wood 
construction and located in zip code 78759, well outside of either airport location.  
The omitted year dummy depends on the time period; 1983 in the first, 1990 in 
the second, 1991 in the third, 1993 in the fourth, 1999 in the fifth, and 2000 in the 
last.  The majority of the structural variables are significantly different from zero 
at the 10% level or better and show the expected sign.  The value of a house rises 
with increases in the gross building area, additions of a second or third bathroom, 
fireplace, garage, pool, or in-house spa.  The coefficients are negative on age, 
manufactured home, and percent of the census track listing “black” as ethnicity.   
The regression results for the Noise variables are shown here in Table 2.9.  
Recall that the first noise dummy, N6570, indicates a house is located in the 65-70 
dB noise contour of the old (Mueller) airport and the second noise dummy, 
NGT70, indicates that a house is located in a noise contour exceeding 70 dBs.  
Previous to breaking ground at the new airport, no significant differences exist 
between the price of houses at distant locations compared to those in a noise 
contour of the old airport.  For the period of time it took to build the new airport, 
while the old was still functioning, house prices for properties in noise contours of 
the old airport are lower than other prices in Austin.  However, once the new 
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airport opened and noise ceased at the old airport, houses in a previous noise 
contour sold at a premium to other homes in Austin. 
 
Table 2.9  Noise Results for Single Difference Model  

























Note.  The first number is the regression coefficient.  The t-statistics are in parentheses; an absolute value of at least 1.28 
indicates significance at the 10% level. 
 
The regression results for the Distance variables are shown in Table 2.10.  
The previous chapter found Distance to be neither strictly an amenity nor a 
disamenity, but its coefficient varied with different events and for different areas.  
Here again, distance from the old airport is important in that it is separately 
measurable from noise and may work either to increase or to decrease the 
negative impact that noise has on housing values in the area.    
However, a clearer pattern appears when looking at the results for the new 
(ABIA) airport.  These results show either no impact or a weakly negative impact 
of distance to the new airport on house values before the Air Force Base officially 
closed.  Then, for the brief period when the Base was closed but building on the 
airport had not yet begun, the Distance coefficients were positive and significant.  
This rebound from the Base closure disappeared by the time the groundbreaking 
ceremony was held for the new airport, and the negative impact returned for the 
rest of the model period.  This result implies that proximity to the new airport is a 
disamenity – one that was foreseen when building began and that persisted after 
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the new airport was in full operation.  This unexpected result sides with Espey 
and Lopez (2000) in the airport and hedonics literature and against Lipscomb 
(2330) and Tomkins, et al. (1988). 53 
 
Table 2.10  Distance Results for Single Difference Model 

























































































































Note.  The first number is the regression coefficient.  The t-statistics are in parentheses; an absolute value of at least 1.28 
indicates significance at the 10% level. 
 
The regression results for the Route variables are shown in Table 2.11.  
The first thing that stands out is that the coefficients for the old airport (ManorRd) 
                                                 
53 Espey and Lopez (2000) find that noise is a disamenity, but even controlling for it, proximity to 
the airport also decreases the value of a house.  Tomkins et al (1998) find the opposite; not only is 
proximity an amenity, but that the benefits of travel access and increased infrastructure outweigh 
the costs of noise. 
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and the new airport (ABIAroute) are opposite in sign.   Second, the valuation of 
being on the route to an airport changes from a disamenity to an amenity.  For 
Mueller Airport, the coefficients on Route are initially negative but after the vote 
passed to close the facility, these house values are higher in comparison to others 
in Austin.  This indicates a negative impact on real estate bordering the route to 
the old airport in the early periods.54  In the intervening years when much 
confusion existed, no significant difference is detected from being on the route to 
the old airport.  Once it became certain that Mueller Airport would close, 
however, the Route coefficients for this airport are significant and negative, 
indicating home owners see no advantage, and in fact are being hurt, from being 
on the route to a vacated facility.  
For Bergstrom, initially when the Air Force Base was operating, being on 
the route to this facility is an amenity.  This advantage disappears even before 
BAFB was placed on the possible closure list.  Similar to the old airport 
communities, home owners on the route to Bergstom see no impact on house 
values in the intervening years, but once construction began, the coefficients are 
significant and positive. 
 
 
                                                 
54 The negative and significant coefficients on Route to the old airport  in the pre-period are 
inconsistent with the other Route results in this model, but are robust to various specifications and 
time delineations in the model form.  A correlation coefficient matrix among the environmental 
variables in the preVote period found no statistically significant multicollinearity, though the 
correlation coefficients between the second distance ring and both ManorRd variables are 
relatively high (0.4713 and 0.3939).  Because the preVote period occurs at least 15 years before 
this model was run, it is quite likely that some quality particular to the houses along Manor Road 
in this time period is simply not included in the model (for example construction or crime). 
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Table 2.11  Route Results for Single-Difference Model 

















































Note.  The first number is the regression coefficient.  The t-statistics are in parentheses; an 
absolute value of at least 1.28 indicates significance at the 10% level. 
 
2.6  DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCES MODEL 
The benefit to running the hedonic model as six independent equations is 
that without having to include any dummy interaction terms, all variables to 
describe house prices are able to vary across time.  This specification is 
parsimonious in terms of model size and, hence, computational time and ease.  
However, the difficulty that arises with independent regressions is in comparing 
the coefficients across time, because the coefficients for each period are 
independent from the other periods. It is impossible to look just at the coefficients 
and know if they are significantly different from each other, since they were 
produced from different regressions using different data.  When the model is run 
with a separate equation for each of the six time periods, in each period a house in 
a noise contour is compared only to a house that is not in a noisy area, and not to 
the same house in every period (single-difference).  
The implication from the first three independent regressions is that houses 
under noise contours sell for the same prices as houses in quiet locations, all else 
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equal, but this does not necessarily mean that noise has no impact because it fails 
to capture any differences across time.  In fact, the sharp increase in house prices 
under the old airport’s noise contours in the Final period imply that houses 
affected by low-level noise have another characteristic that makes them worth 
more than other houses in that time period. Therefore, the difference-in-
differences model isolates the effects of Noise by comparing the difference for 
houses in noise contours from the first period to the last period to the difference 
for all houses in Austin from the first to the last periods.  In this way it is possible 
to see if the houses in the former noise contours increase more than similar houses 
elsewhere. 
 
2.6.1  Empirical Model 
The underlying model of the difference-in-differences approach used here 
is based on Meyer (1995).  The variables are separated into three groups: 
treatment, control, and event groups.  Variables in the treatment groups indicate 
that a house is affected by noise, distance, or route during the airport relocation.  
Variables in the control group indicate the set of houses that are away from both 
airports.  Variables in the event groups indicate the six time periods.  Therefore, 
the estimated coefficients on the treatment variables captures the time-invariant 
difference in the overall means between the houses affected by the airport 
relocation and the rest of Austin, and the coefficients on the event groups captures 
the way the treatment variables are influenced by time.  The control group is 
implicitly represented by the intercept.  When the treatment and event groups are 
interacted, the estimated coefficient gives the true causal price effect of selling 
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during a given time period for a house in a noise contour, distance contour, or 
along the route to an airport.  Equation (2.3) extends Equation (2.2) to include the 
six Event dummy variables and the interaction terms between the Event and 
treatment (Noise, Distance, Route) variables. 
 


































In the estimation results, the coefficients θ ,ϕ , and σ  are the time-
invariant single difference effects of Noise, Distance, Route, and ρ ,υ , and ω  are 
the double-difference effects of each environmental variable for the time period 
specified.  Because these double-difference variables are dummies, one of the 
group must be left-out to avoid over-specification and to act as the comparison 
time period for the double-difference effect.  In the case of the old airport, the 
left-out dummy variables are the interaction terms with the preVote period.  This 
means that all the double-difference comparisons are of houses in the specified 
later time period with the initial period (when no official plans to re-locate the 
airport existed).   
The vote to move the airport away from the Mueller location is not 
particularly meaningful for the new airport, because at that time Bergstrom Air 
Force Base (BAFB) was still an active military base and the anticipated location 
of the new airport was the Manor location.  The preList period is more 
meaningful for the new airport because this is the time period right before BAFB 
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was placed on the closure list, which signaled the change in policy.  Therefore, for 
the new airport, the left-out dummy variables are the interaction terms with the 
preList period. 
 
2.6.2  Results 
The regression results for the treatment and event variables in difference-
in-differences model are given in Tables 2.12 and 2.13.  The other structural, 
community, and year of sale variables turned out as would be predicted based on 
other hedonic studies; the estimated coefficients are listed in Table G.2.  Gross 
building area, total land area, second and third bathrooms, pools, spas, garages all 
have a significant and positive effect on house prices.  Manufactured homes have 
significant and large in magnitude negative impact on house price, whereas brick 
and masonry have significant positive effects compared to the left-out wood and 
brick home.  The education and racial community characteristics are significant, 
with houses in neighborhoods that are predominantly white and neighborhoods 
with highly educated residents selling at higher prices.  Almost all of the 
community classifications by zip code are significant and both positive and 
negative, showing variation across Austin neighborhoods.  The year dummy 
variables also turn out as expected as well.  Compared to the left-out year, 1990, 
which is the slowest year for house prices and house sales according to MLS data, 
most other years have significant positive coefficients, with the exception of some 
non-significant differences in the early 1990s.  As would be predicted by the high-
tech housing boom, the years 1999 through 2001 have large, positive, and 
significant coefficients.  The R2 statistic implies that two-thirds of the variation in 
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home sale price is explained by variations in the independent variable set.  The F-
statistics show that the regression as a whole is significantly different from zero at 
very high confidence percentiles. 
 
Table 2.12  Double-Difference Estimates for Old Airport Variables 



























































































































Note.  The first number is the regression coefficient.  The t-statistics are in parentheses; an absolute value of at least 1.28 
indicates significance at the 10% level. 
 
Greater precision in describing the impact of re-locating Austin’s airport is 
derived from combining these double-difference results with those from the six 
independent regressions.  The six independent regressions are single-difference 
estimates because they look at the differences between the treatment and control 
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variables within a single time period.  The “Single” coefficients from the 
difference-in-differences estimations in this section are time-invariant single-
difference estimates because they look at the difference between the treatment and 
control groups as if the entire model consisted of only one time period.  The 
double-difference estimates, on the other hand, look at the difference between the 
treatment and control groups while controlling for house prices changes in each 
time period for Austin as a whole. 
Table 2.13.  Double-Difference Estimates for New Airport Variables 














































































Note.  The first number is the regression coefficient.  The t-statistics are in parentheses; an absolute value of at least 1.28 
indicates significance at the 10% level. 
 
 
2.6.3  Hysteresis 
As stated in the introduction, hysteresis is first used as a measure of 
whether the impacts of an airport on house prices disappear after the airport is 
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removed, or if the house values continue to reflect the old regime.  The empirical 
tests for hystersis are implicitly calculated in the difference-in-differences 
estimates.  A statistically insignificant coefficient on the Final double-difference 
implies that no hysteresis exists.  Either a positive or a negative statistically 
significant coefficient implies that some permanent change is imposed by the 
policy. 
Looking at hysteresis this way, the question can be explored at both 
airport locations.  For Mueller, house values before the vote to relocate the airport 
ever passed are compared to house values after the facility closed.  But an airport 
also closed at Bergstrom.  In the first two periods the Air Force Base was 
operating military jet flights, but in the third period residents knew that the Base 
was going to be closed. 55  In the following period, the military facility was 
actually closed down.  Unlike the Mueller airport, which had yet to be converted 
to a new use in the model period, Bergstrom was converted to a private facility in 
the last periods.   This section explores the effects of airport closure under two 
different regimes, when one is left vacant and another is rehabilitated into a new 
facility. 
 
                                                 
55 In August 1990 (still in the preList period), an article in the local paper ran that argued that 
closed military bases could be economic assets to their communities.  The article stated that of the 
one hundred bases closed by the Pentagon between 1961 and 1986, forty-two had become 
municipal airports.  Ray Reece, the coordinator of the “Move it to Bergstrom” organization, was 
quoted as saying that, in Austin moving the airport to Bergstrom would both save money and have 
a beneficial effect on the former Base’s neighbors due to the reduction in noise from the military 
jets.  He went on to say that communities near Bergstrom would “realize enormous economic 
development benefits” from “increased property values in the vicinity of a Bergstrom airport and 




The double-difference coefficients for the old airport Noise variables finds 
that the vote to move the airport had no significant impact on houses prices, 
relative to other houses, but that the market reacted to the intermediate 
announcements of the closure with significant price drops. In the end, the Final 
period estimate reveals that once the old airport closed, the prices for houses 
under the noise contours returned to their initial preVote levels, controlling for 
house price changes in Austin as whole.  Not surprisingly then, the time-invariant 
single-difference coefficients for Noise are not significantly different from zero.  
Altogether these estimates show that the price jump in the Final period of the 
within-period single-difference model is due to the recovery of the houses in noise 
contours from the intermediate drops, and not from the initial condition. 
Therefore, even though house prices within the old airport noise contours 
did not increase relative to all other houses when the old airport closed, at least no 
permanent stigma effect remained either.  All the negative effects on house price 
resulting from the policy change disappear in the Final period.  This is not to say 
that re-locating the urban airport did not have costs to those people who lived 
beneath the noise contours.  Indeed, those who owned homes in noise contours of 
the old airport who sold at depressed values starting in 1991, potentially lost up to 
40% of the house value that could have been recovered by selling eight to ten 
years later. 
Several of the double-difference coefficients for the old airport Distance 
contours are positive and significantly different from zero in the Final period.  
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This implies that after the airport relocated, these houses very close to the airport 
not only rebounded from the policy developments that may have depressed their 
values, but also potentially rebounded from the original negative impacts of the 
airport on the surrounding community.  The Distance variables often have 
significant, but negative single-difference coefficients.  This implies that the time-
invariant effects of Distance are negative in this model.  Looking, however, at the 
independent regression model, the Distance variables in the Final period are only 
significantly different from zero in the first two rings.  For the closest one-half 
mile, the rebound effects in the Final period went back to their preVote levels, but 
houses in that ring still sell at lower prices than the rest of Austin.  The next 
closest one-half mile fares much better.  The single-difference coefficient implies 
that this Distance ring experiences a negative time-invariant impact, but the 
independent regression finds house prices almost 7% above those in the rest of 
Austin.  Therefore, the 28% increase in house price implied by the double-
difference coefficient in the Final period reflects both the rebound from the 
intermediate decreases and the preVote depressed prices.  Distances further out 
show a similar pattern from preVote to Final, but do not have price premiums 
compared to similar houses elsewhere.   
While the impacts of Noise appear to have no permanent effects on house 
price after the old airport closed and the impacts of Distance rebound in the Final 
period, in the end, the impacts of Route to a now-vacated facility reflect a loss to 
nearby homeowners.  The single difference, time-invariant, effects of being on the 
Route to the old airport are positive and significant, but the independent single 
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period models reveal that the driving force behind this positive impact are the 
large positive coefficients in the preList and preClose periods.  By the last two 
periods, the single-period estimates are negative and significant.  The double-
difference coefficients reveal this negative impact is not only significant within 
the period, but also significantly lower than the prices in the pre-period before the 
re-location policy began to take effect.  
Therefore, in the case of an airport closing without a new use for the 
facility established, hysteresis exists, though whether this final effect is positive or 
negative will depend on the number and value of houses in the Distance contours 
as opposed to the Route contours.  This is explored further in Section 2.7. 
 
Bergstrom 
The hysteresis effects at Bergstrom Air Force Base are subtler because the 
effects of interest are in the intervening years between the municipal airport re-
location.  When Bergstrom was operating as a military airport, all the houses 
affected by Noise were owned by the Base and therefore not captured in the 
housing sales data.  Many of the houses in the closest Distance contour were also 
government property, though these homes were auctioned off when the land 
reverted back to the City of Austin, and may subsequently be part of the data set 
in post-Close periods.  Similar to Noise, the Route variables are not as relevant to 
the Air Force Base as the Distance variables.  This is because before 1999, the 
vehicle traffic was much lighter due to the significantly smaller population who 
used the Base, compared to its use as the municipal airport. Therefore, the initial 
equilibrium period for BAFB is preList, the period before the Base was put on the 
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government list of military base closures.  The clean-up period includes preClose 
and preBuild, the periods after it was clear that the Base would be closed, but 
before any new construction had begun.  Finally, the rebound period is preOpen, 
when the plans for the new airport were final and the conversion to a civilian 
facility were begun. 
The double-difference coefficients for the Distance contours comparing 
the initial period with the clean-up period are either unable to be estimated 
because of the absence of houses sold, or significant and negative.  In fact, the 
negative double-difference coefficients are the largest, in absolute value, of any 
coefficients in the model, implying that the closure of the Air Force Base is a 
significant disamenity for the houses closest to the facility, compared to the 
period when the Base was still operating.  However, after construction began on 
renovating the facility for a new use, the coefficients on the closest contours are 
no longer significant.  Thus, building the new airport may partially compensate 
for the removal of the Air Force Base.  In the Final period, the double-difference 
coefficients for Distance are significant and negative, reflecting the new airport 
disamenity effects.  However, these disamenity effects are much smaller than the 
disamenity effects associated with uncertain period after the Base closed and 
before the new airport was built. 
The time-invariant comparisons of houses on the Route to the new airport 
to all others in Austin are significant and negative or not significantly different 
from zero.  The double-difference coefficients show that in the early periods, 
before BAFB was officially closed, no significant difference exists for houses 
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along the route to the hypothetical new airport from the initial period.  Once the 
Base closed and it appeared that it would be the site of the new airport in Austin, 
being on the route to this airport has a positive, significant effect on house prices, 
in every subsequent period, above what it was in the preList period.   
Not surprisingly, the double-difference coefficients for the preVote period 
are not significantly different from zero for all but one Route variable at the new 
airport.  For the new airport the preVote and preList periods together make up the 
initial period: before a government policy, the listing of BAFB for closure, was 
announced.  Therefore, in the absence of any policy change between these two 
periods and controlling for other yearly fluctuations in house prices, no price 
changes for houses on the route to the new airport or in a distance ring would be 
expected. 
These results show that the values of single-family homes are dependent 
on the current use and characteristics of the surrounding areas, and also depend 
upon the former uses of the land.  The housing market in Austin reveals that the 
absence of a former amenity (in this case, easy access to airline travel) causes a 
depression in house values that could potentially be lessened if another perceived 
amenity takes its place. 
 
2.7  MEASUREMENTS OF HOME VALUES NET GAIN 
In most noxious facility siting decisions, some neighborhoods bear the 
burden of the facility enjoyed by all.  In the case of Austin’s airport re-location, 
the previous sections found that removing the old facility causes a rebound in 
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house prices at the closest distances, but also causes large decreases for houses 
that used to have easy access to the airport but are now on the route to a vacant 
site.  Building the new airport also had both amenity and disamenity effects – 
houses very near the new facility lost value compared to the pre-period, but those 
on the route to the airport gained quite significantly.  Given these diverse 
reactions, the hysteresis question here is whether the closing of the old airport had 
the equal and opposite effect of building the new airport to homeowners near the 
facilities. To answer this question, a measure of net gain was developed to sum 
the gains and losses in house values near both airports, including all time periods 
after the policy was proposed.  Including all time periods measures both the 
winners and the losers in the airport relocation, as well as those who may have 
ended up exactly even by holding onto their property for the entire time period. 
The measure of house value net gain employs the estimated treatment 
variable coefficients that are significant at a 10% level or better from the double-
difference model.  These coefficients are manipulated to provide the percent 
change on a house price, and then multiplied by the value of each house that was 
impacted.  These changes in house prices are summed over each environmental 
variable, and then the old airport sum is compared to the new airport sum.  Once 
the measure of net gain is developed for the houses in the data set, the sample is 
weighted to account for the fact that 115,927 total houses are impacted by the 
airport move, but the data sample only contains the 10,107 that sold.  Equation 
(2.4) describes this model for each airport: 
 
2.4 Gain = sum (%∆N) x (value of houseN) + sum(%∆D) x (value of houseD)  
+ sum (%∆R) x (value of houseR) 
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where N indicates a house is under an aircraft noise contour, D indicates a house 
is within one of the distance rings of an airport, and R indicates a house located on 
the route to an airport. The results of the internal summations are reported in 
Table 2.14 for the old airport and in Table 2.15 for the new. 
 
Table 2.14  Dollar Value of Environmental Impacts at Old Airport 
 preList preClose preBuild preOpen Final 
N6570 0 0 -246,620 0 0 
NGT70 0 -134,016 0 -550,211 0 
Madist1 -93,269 0 -78,743 -1,181,686 0 
Madist2 0 0 0 3,387,677 18,026,075 
Madist3 -168,538 0 0 0 0 
Madist4 0 515,091 166,118 0 11,658,072 
Madist5 0 804,826 502,207 3,972,012 23,512,431 
MAdist6 -618,670 -1,278,327 -639,113 0 0 
ManorRd2 0 -102,616 -62,265 -1,857,143 -5,985,595 
ManorRd3 0 -649,613 -388,605 -5,101,586 -15,491,769 
Total -$880,477 -$844,653 -$747,020 -$1,330,936 $31,719,214 
 
Table 2.15  Dollar Value of Environmental Impacts at New Airport 
 preVote preClose PreBuild preOpen Final 
ABIAdist1 - -13,472 - - -153,270 
ABIAdist2 - -22,475 - -385,232 -883,636 
ABIAdist3 0 0 -16,064 0 0 
ABIAroute2 0 0 722,436 0 0 
ABIAroute3 0 0 625,302 9,273,713 40,844,002 
Total $0 -$35,947 $1,331,674 $9,025,025 $39,807,096
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Again, these tables include values only for houses that sold after the vote 
to move the airport passed, signaling the imposition of the new policy to move the 
airport.  The measure of net gain for the houses in the sample impacted by the old 
airport is $27,916,129; therefore, the rebound effects for the Distance variables in 
the last period outweighed the negative impacts from the Noise and Route 
variables in the periods after the airport closure was passed.  The measure of net 
gain for houses in the sample impacted by the new airport is $50,127,849; 
therefore, the amenity effects for houses that now have easy access to the new 
airport outweighed the depression of house prices located very near the new 
facility.  Together, the realized net effect of relocating the airport to homeowners 
near the two airports is $78,043,978.  Adding the normal distributions of the error 
terms for each of the environmental variables gives a 95% confidence interval 
between $25,150,569 and $141,561,449. 
What this measure does not take into account is that the gain or loss of 
moving the airport affects more than just the houses that sold during the period, it 
affects all houses existing in the airport neighborhoods.  The capital gain or loss 
does not need to be realized to be a gain or a loss.   Not all houses in Austin are 
included in the study. In fact, in the least well-represented neighborhood, only 
0.5% of the houses that exist actual sold during the time period and ended up in 
the data set.  Therefore, the approximate the net gain for all houses is found by 
multiplying the estimated coefficient for each environmental variable times the 
average value of the houses sold in each environmental category, times the total 
number of houses that actually exist in each category.  The house address for all 
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single-family residences in Austin was downloaded from the City of Austin and 
geo-mapped onto the same reference map as the environmental variables.  From 
this map, it is possible to calculate how many houses are within each noise 
contour at Mueller Airport, how many within each of the distance rings of both 
airports, and how many are within the quarter and half mile delineations of the 
routes to both airports.  Table 2.16 gives the number of houses that sold and that 
exist in each category. 
To get the average price of houses to multiply by the number of houses, 
the data were subdivided into categories first by time period and then by 
environmental variable.  Within these categories, the average house price was 
found and applied to the net gain calculation.  The new net gain calculations 
adjusted to capture more accurately the capital gains and losses to all houses in 
Austin are shown in Tables 2.17 and 2.18. 
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    Table 2.16  Number of Houses Sold vs Number of Houses Existing in Austin  
Environmental  
Variable 
Number of houses 
sold 
Number of houses 
existing 
Percent of houses 
in data set 
NLT65 377 4,178 9.0% 
NGT70 143 1,841 7.8% 
MAdist1 247 2,450 10.1% 
MAdist2 755 7,150 10.6% 
MAdist3 535 7,250 7.4% 
MAdist4 514 7,720 6.7% 
MAdist5 665 9,568 7.0% 
MAdist6 1,060 10,727 9.9% 
ManorRd2 238 2,950 8.1% 
ManorRd3 863 3,024 28.5% 
ABIAroute2 503 9,412 5.3% 
ABIAroute3 1,862 10,283 18.1% 
ABIAdist1 8 1,678 0.5% 
ABIAdist2 62 3,455 1.8% 
ABIAdist3 136 3,323 4.1% 
ABIAdist4 852 12,306 6.9% 
ABIAdist5 1,287 18,612 6.9% 
 
Table 2.17  Dollar Value of Environmental Impacts at Old Airport – Weighted for 
Sample Size 
 preList preClose preBuild preOpen Final 
N6570 0 0 -55,705,707 0 0 
NGT70 0 -41,120,335 0 -32,026,448 0 
MAdist1 -45,702,033 0 -38,584,020 -39,123,469 0 
MAdist2 0 0 0 111,109,737 294,261,723 
MAdist3 -83,982,305 0 0 0 0 
MAdist4 0 220,915,720 116,584,708 0 9,389,450 
MAdist5 0 192,514,734 228,814,605 170,422,124 650,192,397 
MAdist6 -218,885,401 -201,656,270 -167,212,752 0 0 
ManorRd2 0 -60,543,740 -79,456,671 -88,815,951 -151,603,652
ManorRd3 0 -56,126,786 -58,171,038 -50,510,727 -109,648,545
Total -$348,569,739 $53,983,322 -$53,730,874 $71,055,266 $972,591,374
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Table 2.18  Dollar Value of Environmental Impacts at New Airport – Weighted 
for Sample Size 
 preVote preClose preBuild preOpen Final 
ABIAdist1 - -22,606,022 - - -51,437,628 
ABIAdist2 - -38,828,139 -55,500,432 -57,868,443 -87,227,306 
ABIAdist3 0 0 0 0 0 
ABIAroute2 0 0 399,975,705 0 0 
ABIAroute3 0 0 121,320,108 173,070,074 393,256,517 
Total $0 -$61,434,061 $521,295,813 $115,201,631 $254,591,583
 
The adjusted measure of net gain for the houses impacted by the old 
airport is $695,329,350.  The adjusted measure of net gain for houses impacted by 
the new airport is $829,654,966.  Therefore, the net effect of relocating the airport 
to homeowners near the two airports is just over $1.5 billion.  Adding the normal 
distributions of the error terms, the 95% confidence interval is between negative 
$539,367,290 and positive $3,454,220,189. These new values account for the fact 
that 115,927 total houses are impacted by the airport move, but the data sample 
only contains the 10,107 that sold. They reflect the fact only about half as many 
houses lie either within the first three miles or on the route to the new airport than 
live within the first three miles, or on a noise contour, or on the route to the old 
airport (56,858 for MA and 27,943 for ABIA).  However, the impact is larger at 
the new airport because very few houses lie within the first two miles of the new 
airport where house prices tumbled the most and many houses lie in the route to 
the new airport where house prices climbed the most.  The confidence interval in 
this estimation is quite wide and even encompasses zero, whereas the calculation 
of net gain for the houses that actually sold remained positive.  This is because the 
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scarcity of houses near the new airport produced very noisy estimates of the 
effects of proximity to the new airport on house values; hence the largest 
variances in the estimated coefficients are also the largest negative coefficients.  
These noisy estimates widen the confidence intervals substantially, but in reality 
are unlikely to be the driving influence in the airport costs and benefits because of 
the very small number of houses affected. 
This calculation of net gain does not reflect a full cost-benefit analysis of 
changing the airport’s location; it is an illustrative example of the costs and 
benefits of the airport that are capitalized into house values.  Specifically, it does 
not include a measure for benefits from having services of a new, larger airport, or 
the change in costs from the changes in travel time to the new airport, or the 
construction and relocation costs to the city, or even a calculation of the number 
of jobs lost or gained in the city. In addition, this calculation is specific to 
privately owned residential property and does not include the gains and losses to 
owners of vacant and commercial land.56  Instead, this calculation looks at the 
imposition on private homes that bear the burden or enjoy the benefit of a public 
good enjoyed by the entire city.  Because the City as a whole passed a vote to 
build a larger airport in a new location, it is assumed that the majority of 
Austinites believed the construction and development costs of building the new 
airport would be outweighed by having access to the new facility. 57  This 
                                                 
56 Because the dummy variables for properties that border the routes to the airports and those that 
are within a half-mile to the routes move together, it is likely that these coefficients would be 
similar to estimates for vacant and commercial property.  The extension of the noise and distance 
coefficients to vacant and commercial property is not as clear. 
57 The ABIA website does not state outright the costs for the airport relocation and new facility 
construction.  It does list the construction budget, approximately $585 million, and states the about 
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calculation does reflect that the estimated benefits of moving the airport 
outweighed the estimated costs to homeowners near both airports, and in net, 
lessened the overall burden homeowners bear for air travel in Austin. 
 
2.8  CONCLUSIONS 
In the case of Austin, the placement of an airport downtown gave rise to 
both positive and negative aspects.  Aircraft noise is a disamenity that caused 
house price fluctuations around the policy announcements but did not 
permanently stigmatize neighborhoods.  Proximity to the airport also causes 
house price decreases, possibly due to visual, safety, or traffic impacts, though 
these decreases disappeared when the airport relocated.  On the other hand, access 
to an airport, as measured by location of a house within one-half mile of a major 
route to an airport, is an amenity.  However, this amenity does not remain after 
the airport closed, implying that the development effects relied on the airport and 
are not sustainable in the face of uncertain future uses of the facility. 
Previous literature finds similar effects from noise on residential property 
values, particularly Tomkins et al. (1998) who find that noise has a negative 
impact on house price, but the impact does not outweigh the other benefits of 
airports (and is sensitive to the way in which noise values are measured).  
However, Tomkins et al. also find that proximity to the airport was an amenity, 
which this study does not.  In this regard, the results are more similar to Espey 
and Lopez (2000) who find that proximity is a disamenity, even after controlling 
                                                                                                                                     
one-quarter of this was funded by the FAA.  www.ci.austin.tx.us/austinairport/projsumnr.htm  
This additional construction cost information reduces the net gain to under $1 billion. 
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for noise.  Neither of these papers have a separate control variable for access to 
the airport, which may explain the difference in their findings.  This analysis 
found that access to the airport is a significant determinate of house prices around 
airports.  Proximity to the airport can be a proxy for access, but if physical 
distance does not approximate travel time, proximity can also be a proxy for how 
closely associated a neighborhood is with the noxious facility nature of airports.  
This study makes the distinction between being close to the airport (Distance) and 
short travel times (Route), which may explain the results that adopt some 
characteristics from each of these previous studies.   
This study also found that house prices depend on the history of 
community, instead of relying only on the current characteristics of the 
neighborhood.  This implies that local government policy has implications beyond 
the current agenda.  The benefits from projects designed to attract business and 
development may only last as long as the project lasts, and will transfer to the 
next ‘hot spot’ when policies change.   On the other hand, this model shows that 
noxious facility sitings do not always permanently stigmatize a neighborhood.  
The housing market failed to have perfectly rational expectations throughout the 
airport move, giving rise to both windfall gains and losses to buyers and sellers 
over the twenty-year model period.  Homeowners who sold property near the old 
airport or in a noise contour in the intermediate periods lost the most even though 
these prices rebounded by the final period.  This has implications for local 
governments and planners as well.  As noted by Kiel and McClain (1996), 
“keeping the period of uncertainty short is clearly advantageous, since the shorter 
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the time period, the smaller the social costs become relative to the development 
costs” (1357). 
The geo-mapping capabilities used in this research provide for more 
accurate classifications of houses into environmental categories, which in turn 
provides more accurate estimates of the differing impacts a government policy 
can have.  The next step in this research is to use the geo-mapping capabilities 
that match Census data to the house that sold in order to determine if the gains 
and losses associated with the airport re-location are evenly distributed among 
demographic groups. 
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Figure 2.2  Austin MLS Residential Housing Sales 
 
*Average house prices are not CPI-adjusted. 
 




Chapter Three:  House Price Gains and Losses: An illustration of 
environmental justice in a noxious facility relocation decision 
3.1  INTRODUCTION 
When the City of Austin relocated the municipal airport from its 
downtown location to a new facility on the outskirts of town environmental 
justice concerns were raised because both neighborhoods were home to large 
minority and lower income populations.  At the outset of the move it was unclear 
whether the airport served as an amenity or a disamenity and whether the overall 
benefits from building a new facility would benefit a different group than those 
who would bear the burden.  This study, in combination with earlier hedonic 
analysis on the Austin airport move, shows that overall the movement of the 
airport caused gains to homeowners in the surrounding communities.  This is true 
for both the new and the old airport communities and generally true across 
income and ethnic groups. While lower-income and racial minority groups bore 
larger variance in house price fluctuations over model period, they also saw the 
largest positive percent changes in average house prices.  In general, it can be said 
that the same groups that bear the burden also received the benefits and that the 
benefits outweighed the losses. 
The U.S. EPA defines environmental justice as “the fair treatment and 
meaningful involvement of all people regardless of race, color, national origin, or 
income with respect to the development, implementation, and enforcement of 
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environmental laws, regulations, and policies.”58   In this paper, the focus is on 
the first half of the definition, measuring the extent of fair treatment in a local 
government policy decision, evaluating whether a small group of people, 
including a racial, ethnic, or a socioeconomic group, bears a disproportionate 
share of the negative environmental consequences resulting from the relocation of 
a municipal airport. 
For years, the City of Austin had been outgrowing Mueller Airport, its 
municipal airport located near downtown since the 1930s.  By 1987 the decision 
was made to move it to a new location where flight operations could be expanded 
without causing undue hardship on the surrounding communities, while still 
providing convenient access to air travel.  The most favorable option was to create 
a joint-use facility with then-active Bergstrom Air Force Base (BAFB), an option 
rejected by the Air Force on at least two occasions.   Therefore, in the years that 
followed, finding such a location proved difficult and the project fell victim to 
several delays. 
On April 20, 1990, seventeen Mueller Airport area homeowners, claiming 
that airport noise and pollution harmed their health and reduced the value of their 
property, filed a lawsuit against the City of Austin.  Their lawyer said residents 
did not want the airport moved to the soon-to-be-former Air Force base because it 
would cause further delay to removing Mueller airport and because it would cause 
southeast Austin residents the same problem the Mueller neighborhood residents 
were currently facing.  To complicate the issue, the neighborhoods surrounding 
                                                 
58 U.S. Environmental Protections Agency website, 
http://www.epa.gov/compliance/environmentaljustice/.   
 151
the former Air Force base were predominantly lower income than the rest of 
Austin and contained higher proportions of minority populations.  In May, the 
Austin-American Statesman ran a newspaper article stating that “Black officials 
call Bergstrom airport racist.”  In addition, many believed the Bergstrom airport 
neighborhood already bore more than its fair share of municipal noxious facilities.  
A newspaper article in the summer of 1990 reminded the city that the 
neighborhood closest to BAFB already contained several noxious sitings, 
including two sewage treatment plants, a jail, and a landfill.  Residents of this 
neighborhood were split on the airport location decisions: some thought that an 
airport would be the answer to economic growth after the closure of the Air Force 
Base took away several thousand civilian jobs; others saw an airport as yet 
another noxious siting, bringing with it noise and pollution problems. 
Chapter one uses several different types of empirical models to determine 
if the original airport was an amenity or disamenity to the local community in 
which it was situated.  It finds that there is no simple answer to that question; the 
airport exhibited both positive and negative effects on house values in different 
nearby locations.  Positive impacts are associated with easy access to the facility 
and infrastructure improvements that occur along the route to an airport.  
Negative impacts are associated with living close to an airport, measured in 
concentric circles from the terminal building and, under certain conditions, with 
living under a noise contour.   
Chapter two then builds upon the data and the hedonic models developed 
in the first paper and adds information on the new airport in order to explore 
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questions of potential efficiency gains from re-locating the airport to a new 
community.  It uses a difference-in-difference model to isolate the relative effects 
on the neighborhoods near the airports compared to the rest of Austin as well as 
the effects of moving the airport over time.  Many of these results confirm the 
findings from the first paper, that airports contain both amenities from 
infrastructure development, but also disamenities from noise, pollution, and safety 
factors, even if these effects are more perception than reality.59  In net, over time 
and over the two facilities, the second chapter finds that moving the airport from 
Austin’s city center to a more remote location caused a potential gain to the 
homeowners in the fourteen years after the vote to move the airport first passed. 
In this third chapter, Geographic Information System (GIS) maps are used 
to match house sale price information to the physical locations of the houses to 
determine whether or not a house is impacted by one or both airports, and to 
match it to its 1990 census tract characteristics.  Since it is possible to determine 
which houses received benefits and which houses suffered losses, the question 
here is whether houses that received benefits or suffered losses are significantly 
different from the population as a whole in Austin.  If one or more ethnic or 
income groups suffered more losses than others, it could be an indicator of 
environmental inequity – where one group disproportionately bears the burden of 
a public good enjoyed by all. 
                                                 
59 Review of crash data suggests the majority of aviation crashes occur in vicinity an airport, 
which implies that people who live near an airport are at greater risk, with risk declining rapidly 
outside the first two miles around an airport.  While the risk of a groudling fatality is greater near 
an airport, it is still an unlikely event, with an annual risk of 1 in 130 million.  Thompson, 
Rabouw, and Cooke (2001). 
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The 1990 census data are used (as opposed to the 1980 or 2000 census 
reports that also cover relevant years included in the model) because, as 
highlighted above, 1990 was a critical year in the decision whether to relocate the 
airport, and if so, where it would be.  This captures another aspect of the 
environmental justice literature, whether it is relevant to evaluate the demographic 
characteristics of the neighborhoods around a noxious siting using current 
population data or the data from the time of the siting.  As part of a historical 
overview of waste siting in Chicago, Baden and Coursey (2002) define and 
explore two types of potential environmental injustice: injustice in intent and 
injustice in outcome.  Injustice in intent is an ex ante siting decision that targets 
subpopulations.  It is not well studied because of the lack of data on socio-
economic characteristics around sites as they are being chosen, though it is 
becoming more of a focus.  Been and Gupta (1997) use census tract information 
for 1970 through 1990 to estimate factors that influence the siting of RCRA 
facilities.  On the other hand, injustice in outcome is an ex post siting decision that 
finds an over-representation of subpopulations near existing facilities.  This has 
been the focus of many environmental justice studies, including the landmarks 
GAO (1983) and UCC (1987).  Lambert and Boerner (1995) discuss “white 
flight” in reference to noxious facility location.  While injustice in outcome does 
not seem necessarily discriminatory in nature, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act 
only requires proof of differential racial impact, not discriminatory intent 
(Schwartz, 1997).60 
                                                 
60 Title VI of the Civil Rights Act prohibits racial and ethnic discrimination in federally funded 
programs. 
 154
The 1990 population Census captures both of these concepts. At the old 
airport, 1990 captures the population who moved in around an established facility, 
likely because of lower house prices.  At the new airport, 1990 captures the 
population at a proposed location before the decision was made to site a new 
facility.  An interesting result of being able to look simultaneously at both an 
established site and a proposed site, is that the demographic characteristics of the 
airport neighborhoods are similar to each other, yet significantly different from 
the rest of Austin.  This paper avoids the debate over the concepts of injustice in 
intent and injustice in outcome because the discussion cannot accurately capture 
the reasons behind the voluntary decision to purchase a home near a noxious 
facility.  Instead, the focus is to find the effects of an exogenous shock on 
different socio-economic groups without labeling these effects as inherently “fair” 
or “unfair.” 
Two landmark studies in the 1980s found that minority populations 
shoulder the majority of the environmental burden in hazardous waste landfills, 
sparking national attention and changes in EPA’s policy for siting noxious 
facilities.  The first study by the GAO in 1983 found that three out of the four 
hazardous waste landfills they studied were located in predominantly black 
communities.  The second study, conducted by the United Church of Christ’s 
Commission for Racial Justice in 1987, found that race was the most significant 
of all the variables they tested for predicting the location of commercial hazardous 
waste facilities on a national level UCC, 1987).    
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Since those early studies, the evidence for environmental justice has been 
mixed.  Mohai and Brandt (1992) studied the racial and socioeconomic 
distribution of communities that host commercial hazardous waste facilities in 
Detroit, and found that higher percentages of minority populations live within one 
mile of a waste facility than white populations.  However, Anderton et al. (1994) 
looking at the national distribution of RCRA facilities at the census tract level; 
Bowen et al.(1995) looking at facilities on EPA’s Toxic Release Index; and 
Jerrett et al. (1997) looking at the income distribution of pollution in Ontario, 
Canada, all found no association, or negative associations, between racial 
minorities and low-income households and environmental hazards.  More studies 
have found mixed results, including Zimmerman (1993), Goldman and Fitton 
(1994), Been and Gupta (1997), and Boer et al. (1997).  Baden and Coursey 
(2002) find that using data from the 1960s, more minority and low-income 
communities host CERCLIS facilities than other communities in Chicago, but the 
same framework using data from the 1990s finds no income or minority variables 
to be significant predictors of RCRA sites. 
The early studies into environmental justice tend to compare the means of 
the demographic characteristics of the communities surrounding noxious facilities 
to the means of the demographic characteristics in other communities.  This 
“with-without” comparison of the means gives a reasonable description of the 
distribution of people and noxious facilities, but it does not control for 
multivariate effects.  Historically, a strong correlation exists between minority 
groups and low-income households.  Environmental justice is concerned with 
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specific groups that may bear a disproportionate share of the burdens of public 
goods; therefore, income levels and minority status should have separate controls 
to evaluate the independent effects within each group.  Logit models are used to 
separate out these multivariate effects, without assuming to know the causal 
structure of the location theory.61  Anderton et al. (1994) and Davidson and 
Anderton (2000) use logit models to separate the effects and find that employment 
in the manufacturing sector, more than socioeconomic characteristics of the 
community, determine the location of hazardous waste sites.  Baden and Coursey 
(2002) take this a step farther, combing logistic, linear probability, and Tobit 
regression results with historical record to separate out relationships within 
demographic groups and changes over time. 
While environmental justice continues to be a heated and important issue 
on a national scale, Baden and Coursey (2002) point out that the specific 
conditions, such as proximity to transportation and industrial infrastructure, 
within cities make some communities more appropriate for noxious facilities.  
Therefore, looking only at a national scope and blurring these compounding 
factors may, “risk creating more confusion than clarity” by overlooking important 
jurisdictional and physical relationships within the siting location choices.  
Further, Bowen and Haynes (2000) argue that concentration on a well specified 
urban area is less likely to produce improper judgments of statistical significance 
and bias due to spatial auto-correlation that arise when the studies are conducted 
at the state or national level.   
                                                 
61 Theory-based environmental justice literature does exist, including incorporating 
discrimination, compensation, and collective action motivations of minority and low-income 
groups into traditional firm location theory; see Hamilton (1995) and Kriesel et al. (1996). 
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The airport re-location in Austin brought up serious charges of 
environmental injustice by moving the facility to a neighborhood with a high 
minority and low-income population, which already contained several other 
noxious facilities. Aside from the demographics of the surrounding community, 
however, the site of the former Air Force Base seems a logical choice for the 
airport given the pre-existence of aircraft runways and the relatively sparse 
population density. To complicate matters, since airports have positive, as well as 
negative, impacts on the surrounding community, removing the airport from its 
original location could have adverse impacts on the minority and low-income 
community that surrounded the old airport.  A review of the environmental justice 
literature does not find any studies that look specifically at airports or that 
decipher any positive aspects out of perceived negative sitings. Thus, this study is 
important not only for local decision-making in Austin, but also as an example of 
a noxious siting that could potentially improve the house values of minority 
communities that surround it. 
This study finds that lower income and ethnic minority groups were 
disproportionately affected, both positively and negatively, by the airport 
locations in Austin, though the net effect of re-locating the airport results in 
increases in the average house values for many of these groups.  Income was 
consistently one of the largest predictors of airport impact on house values, and 
always had a negative correlation to a facility location.  Percent foreign-born and 
percent of the census tract that is black also are significant predictors of airport 
impact, but  in the opposite direction; if these percentages increased, the 
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likelihood of an airport impacting house values increased.  Surprisingly, percent 
Hispanic is negatively correlated to an airport location, and once income and 
other racial groups are controlled for, have relatively small impacts. 
The next section describes the various data sources for this analysis.  
Section 3.3 evaluates the summary statistics using a with-without comparison of 
the means and Section 3.4 implements an incidence analysis to control for the 
multivariate effects in order to draw general results within each income and racial 
group.  Section 3.5 concludes. 
 
3.2  DATA 
The data for this study come from three sources, individual sales of single-
family residences in Travis County, Texas, GIS maps, and the 1990 U.S. Census 
of Population and Housing.  These three data sources are used in the same 
equation as Chapter 2 to estimate difference-in-difference coefficients from a six-
period hedonic model, and then the estimated coefficients for the environmental 
variables (distance to both airports, noise contours around Mueller airport, and 
proximity to route to both airports) are used to estimate the price change of each 
house in the data set resulting from the local government policy change.  A full 
description of the data and the hedonic model can be found in the previous 
chapter.  A brief description of the hedonic model follows. 
The environmental characteristics are developed from the GIS and the 
Noise Exposure Maps furnished by the City of Austin Transportation, Planning, 
and Sustainability Department.  Three variable groups are included: Noise, 
Distance, and Route.  The Noise variables are a series of dummy variables that 
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capture the noise contours: average noise level greater than 70 decibels (dB), 65-
70dB, and “undistinguishable from background noise”.  The distances from each 
airport are also represented by series of dummy variables. For the old airport, 
Distance is measured in six, one-half mile concentric circles around the main 
terminal (variables: MAdist1 through MAdist6). For the new airport, variables for 
the distance from the airport are measured in five one-mile concentric circles 
around the main terminal (variables ABIAdist1 through ABIAdist5).62  The Route 
variables are divided into two sets: Manor Rd dummies for the old airport and 
ABIA route dummies for the new airport.  The Manor dummies are: one-quarter 
mile buffer from Manor Road (ManorRd2), one-half mile (ManorRd3), and 
greater than a half mile (left-out variable).  The ABIA Route variables are: one-
quarter mile buffers of Hwy 71, Hwy 183, Airport Blvd, East 7th St, and Riverside 
Dr (ABIAroute2), one-half mile buffers (ABIAroute3), and greater than a half 
mile (left out variable).  Because the purpose of the route variables is to pick up 
development effects and not to determine which routes are used most, the buffers 
for all roads in the ABIA route dummies are combined into one measure. 
The underlying model of the difference-in-differences approach used in 
Chapter 2 is based on Meyer (1995).  The variables are separated into three 
groups: treatment, control, and event groups.  Variables in the treatment groups 
indicate that a house is affected by Noise, Distance, or Route during the airport 
relocation.  Variables in the control group indicate the set of houses that are away 
from both airports.  Variables in the event groups indicate the six time periods.  
                                                 
62 I conjecture that traveling a half-mile from the old airport would take approximately the same 
time as traveling a full mile from the new airport.   
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Therefore, the estimated coefficients on the treatment variables captures the time-
invariant difference in the overall means between the houses affected by the 
airport relocation and the rest of Austin, and the coefficients on the event groups 
captures the way the treatment variables are influenced by time.  The control 
group is implicitly represented by the intercept.  When the treatment and event 
groups are interacted, the estimated coefficient gives the true causal price effect of 
selling during a given time period for a house in a noise contour, distance contour, 
or along the route to an airport.  Other structural and community characteristics 
are included in the model to capture housing heterogeneity, including: gross 
building area, total land area, second and third bathrooms, pools, spas, garages, 
building material, education and racial community dummy variables, and 
community classifications by zip code.  In addition, year dummy variables control 




































In the estimation results, the coefficients θ , ϕ , and σ  are the time-
invariant single difference effects of Noise, Distance, Route, and ρ , υ , and ω  
are the double-difference effects of each environmental variable for the time 
period specified.  Because these double-difference variables are interactions of 
dummy variables, one of the group must be left-out to avoid over-specification 
and to act as the comparison time period for the double-difference effect.  In the 
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case of the old airport, the omitted dummy variables are the interaction terms with 
the preVote period.  This means that all the double-difference comparisons are of 
houses in the time period specified with the initial period when no official plans to 
re-locate the airport existed.   
The vote to move the airport away from the Mueller location is not 
particularly meaningful for the new airport because at that time Bergstrom Air 
Force Base (BAFB) was still an active military base and the anticipated location 
of the new airport was the Manor location.63  The preList period is more 
meaningful for the new airport because this is the time period right before BAFB 
was placed on the closure list, which signaled the change in policy.  Therefore, for 
the new airport, the omitted dummy variables are the interaction terms with the 
preList period.    
For the discussion here, the relevant coefficients are the difference-in-
difference coefficients that give the change in house price from the initial period 
to the final period for houses affected by the airports’ amenity and disamenity 
factors, and controlling for house prices changes in all of Austin.  The regression 
results for variables in difference-in-difference model in chapter 2 are repeated 
here in Table 1 for convenience.  These estimates are used in Section 3.5 to 
perform the incidence analysis by income and minority group. 
                                                 
63 See the Background for more information. 
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Table 3.1  Double-Difference Estimates for Airport Variables 
Old Airport New Airport 
Noise 65-70dB 0.0105 
(0.08) 
  
Noise >70dB -0.0914 
(-0.43) 
  

































Note.  The first number is the regression coefficient.  The t-statistics are in parentheses;  
an absolute value of at least 1.28 indicates significance at the 10% level. 
 
Using only the coefficients in the last two columns of the Chapter 2 tables 
implies that the environmental justice questions examines the difference in 
housing prices after the siting decision is complete, and does not account for 
temporary adjustments during the siting years.  Using only the before and after the 
entire policy change double-difference coefficients, the houses that are in former 
Mueller Airport noise contours return to their pre-policy levels, houses in distance 
contours from the old airport rise in value, while those that are along the route to 
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the former airport decrease in value.  The overall policy change has the opposite 
effect at the new (ABIA) airport: houses in the distance contours decrease in 
value and houses on the route to the new facility increase in value. 
In addition to spatially defining the environmental variables, Noise, 
Distance, and Route, GIS maps are used to match all houses in the dataset to their 
1990 Census tract information.  It is then possible to group them into houses that 
have been impacted by each of the environmental variables (a “with” group) and 
those that have not (a “without” group) and compare how the demographics of the 
with and without groups differ.  While it would be ideal to have specific 
demographic information of every household in the model, these data are 
unavailable, and census tracts are considered good estimates for neighborhood 
qualities.  Anderton et al. (1994) argue for using tracts rather than zip code 
designations because, “tract boundaries are setup by local census tract committees 
with instructions to ‘reflect the structure of the metropolis as viewed by those 
most familiar with it’ and hence, are more likely to be drawn to reflect local ideas 
of homogeneous neighborhoods.”  Census tracts contain an average of 4,000 
people per track and a median land area of 0.74 miles. 
The environmental justice variables from the Census information include 
income and race categories that have been the focus of discrimination, and hence 
the previous literature. As described in Figure 3.1 at the end of this chapter the 
explanatory variables are: median household income, percent poverty, percent 
Hispanic, percent foreign-born, percent white, percent black, percent American 
Indian or Alaskan Native, percent Asian or Pacific Islander, and percent in 
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another category.  Hispanic and foreign-born categories are collected separately 
from the other race characteristics in the 1990 Census.  So, while the percentages 
for white, black, American Indian or Alaskan Native, and Asian or Pacific 
Islander sum to one, Hispanic and/or foreign-born can be selected in addition by 
the household.  The summary statistics for these variables are described in Table 
3.2. 
Income is measured separately from poverty to allow a non-constant 
marginal value of income on the siting decision for the very lowest income 
groups.  Hispanic and Foreign-Born are also added to the standard Census race 
categories because Hispanic is the largest minority group in Austin.  These 
categories probably overlap, but while Hispanics in Austin may also be foreign-
born, the second category captures the segment of the population least likely to be 
assimilated into mainstream culture, and potentially those with the least legal 
clout.   
 
Table 3.2  Summary Statistics for Environmental Justice Variables 
Variable Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
Income $37,458  $15,881 $5,155 $87,175 
% Poverty 0.1067   0.0965 0.01 0.70 
% Hispanic 0.1768 0.1281 0.02 0.91 
% Foreign-Born 0.0641 0.0374 0.00 0.33 
% White 0.7882 0.1731 0.04 0.98 
% Black 0.0859 0.1295 0.00 0.90 
% Native American 0.0023 0.0045 0.00 0.02 
% Asian Pacific 0.0265 0.0243 0.00 0.25 
% Other 0.0972 0.0929 0.00 0.72 
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Other recent environmental justice studies include the percent of the 
census tract that is employed in manufacturing and industry (Anderton et al., 
1994) or proximity to infrastructure (Baden and Coursey, 2002) and find these 
variables as important, or more important, than income and ethnic groups in 
predicting the location of the waste facilities.  The question here is not to 
determine the features that cause a facility to be located in one area over another, 
but whether the area where a facility is placed has significantly different 
demographic distribution than other areas in the city. 
The summary statistics imply that in 1990, Austin households were 
predominantly white, and on average, earned an income well above the poverty 
line. Therefore, if all census tracts in Austin were equally likely to be impacted by 
the old and new airports, then white, relatively affluent, neighborhoods would 
both bear the burden and receive the benefits of the airports.  A discrimination 
motive is not expected to change this likelihood; access to a large land area and a 
location convenient for travelers are more important criteria.  Airports are not 
traditional noxious sitings where one could envision planners trying to hide the 
public nuisance in a location that would not be exposed to tourists or politically 
powerful people within the local community.  Or in a more negative 
interpretation, trying to place a dangerous or ugly facility as far as feasible from 
yourself and close to your enemy.64  Airports are used by the entire city, and it is 
                                                 
64 Several studies look at political power and the siting of waste (Hamilton, 1993; Hamilton, 1995; 
Kim, 1997; and Been and Gupta, 1997).  This type of model could be appropriate here, especially 
since “Move It” campaign was so influential.  Initial searches for voter registration and turnout 
data at the census tract level found only information for the year 2000.  Further research could use 
2000 data, or perhaps build a new 1990 data set. 
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likely that higher income groups will use them more often than lower income 
groups. 
Unlike waste disposal sites, airports have both good and bad aspects on 
the nearby property values.  Once a location is chosen, which houses receive the 
good aspects and which houses receive the bad aspects is largely out of the local 
government’s control.  Although the positioning of runways is key to controlling 
noise dispersion, distance from the facility cannot exclude some neighborhoods 
just because they are wealthier or more politically active, and the roads leading to 
airport existed prior to the siting. 
 
3.3  WITH-WITHOUT COMPARISON OF THE MEANS 
The first step in the environmental justice analysis is to determine how 
census tracks that are affected by the various aspects of an airport differ from 
other census tracks in Austin.  Before running regression analysis, a raw look at 
the data using a with-without comparison of the means provides an overview of 
the demographics in Austin around both airports. Comparison of the means 
cannot control for multivariate effects in the model, but it does allows for basic 
comparisons to be made without placing any restrictions on the model form.  It is, 
therefore, a first glance at the socio-economic conditions around the airports, and 
also serves as a consistency check for the regression models.  Tables 3.3 – 3.5 
provide the variable means and the number of contributing cases for each of the 
nine demographic characteristics in the justice model for houses in airport 
distance contours, noise contours, and on the route to an airport, respectively, 
compared to the means and cases of other tracts in Austin that are not impacted by 
 167
an airport.  The tables also present the two-sample t-tests for a significant 
difference between the two means. 
 
3.3.1  Distance 
The means for the environmental justice variables are significantly 
different at the 99% confidence level, or higher, for houses within three miles of 
the new airport than those further away.  A significantly higher number of people 
live below the poverty line near the new airport than in the rest of the city, with 
the average income near the new airport under $25,000 compared to almost 
$40,000 for the rest of the city.  A significantly higher percentage of black, 
Hispanic, American Indian-Alaskan Native, and foreign-born people live near the 
new airport than the rest of the city.  The difference-in-difference coefficients 
from Chapter 2 are negative and significant for all distance contours around 
ABIA, implying that house values near the new airport are significantly lower 
than they were before the Air Force Base closed and the new airport was located 
there.  The means reflecting the difference from being located within these 
contours indicate that minority and economically disadvantaged households are 
more likely to have suffered these losses than predominantly white and higher 
income neighborhoods. 
Comparing the with-means for Distance from the old airport, the 
surrounding communities again tend to be lower income on average and have 
more than twice the percentage of people earning an income below the poverty 
line.  The communities within three miles of the old airport also have higher 
percentages of minority groups, including foreign-born, Hispanic, black, and 
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American Indian-Alaskan Native, than communities outside of these distance 
contours.  The difference between the two means of the with-and without groups 
are highly significant.   
 
Table 3.3  With-Without Comparison of Means for Houses in Airport Distance 
Contours 







































































































































“With” indicates a house was within three miles of the airport indicated. 
Number is the mean value; standard deviation is in parentheses 
* indicates significance at the 90% confidence level; *** indicates significance at the 99% confidence level 
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The difference between the two airports, however, is that at the old airport, 
the double-difference coefficients for distance from the facility showed either no, 
or a positive, change in house prices from the pre-period to the final period.  
Moving the airport away from that community helped the minority and 
economically disadvantaged groups.  Thus, the lower income and minority groups 
that are over-represented in the communities that took house value losses at 
distance close to the new airport are also the same groups that are over-
represented in the communities that had house value gains at distances close to 
the old airport after it ceased flight operations.  In some locations the airport move 
helped minority and low-income groups and in other locations it hurt them, 
through the value of what is probably their largest financial investment, their 
homes.  The net cost or benefit to these minority groups depends on the relative 
number of households living near the two airports and the amounts by which the 
house prices rose or fell. 
 
3.3.2  Noise 
Table 3.4 looks at the specific communities around Mueller airport where 
houses were affected by aircraft noise.  The double-difference coefficients reveal 
that these houses did not lose value as a result of the government policy change 
from the pre-period to the final period.65  Similar to the findings for communities 
in the airport distance contours, houses affected by aircraft noise are located in 
                                                 
65 However, at several stages in between the announcement of the policy change and the actual 
closure of the old airport, when aircraft noise was still a factor, these house values dropped, they 
rebounded after the airport closed. 
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communities with significantly higher percentages of ethnic and racial minorities 
and lower income groups.   
  
Table 3.4 With-Without Comparison of Means for Houses in Mueller Airport 
Noise Contours 
 Mueller 


























































“With” indicates a house was within 65 dB or louder noise contour of the old airport 
Number is the mean value; standard deviation is in parentheses 
* indicates significance at the 90% confidence level; *** indicates significance at the 99% confidence level 
 
The mean income is lower and the percent of households with incomes 
below the poverty line is higher for houses in Mueller airport noise contours than 
for any other group in the model.  In fact, the mean income for communities with 
houses in the noise contours is less than half of the mean income for the rest of 
Austin.  The percentage of the population identifying their race as black is more 
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than three times larger for communities with houses in the noise contours than in 
the rest of Austin.  Moving the airport to Bergstrom neither helped nor hurt house 
values in the long-run for these particular groups. 
 
3.3.3  Route 
Finally, Table 3.5 compares the with-without difference in means for 
houses on the Route to an airport. The difference-in-difference model found that 
being on the route to an operational airport was an amenity, but that the amenity 
characteristics disappeared when the airport ceased flight operations.  Therefore, 
houses on the route to the old airport lost value in the final period of the model 
compared to the initial period and houses on the route to the new airport either did 
not change in value, or increased in value compared to the initial period.  Again, 
the census variables for houses on the routes to both airports show income and 
ethnic differences from the rest of the Austin community.   
The demographic characteristics for houses on the route to the new airport 
are similar to the demographics for the other environmental variables: 
significantly lower incomes, but higher percentages of people below the poverty 
line and higher percentages of minorities.  While all of the race and ethnic groups 
have significantly different means in the with and without groups, except Asian-
Pacific, the largest difference is the percent of people identifying themselves as 
black, with almost three and one-half times the percentage of black people living 
on the route to the new airport than in the rest of Austin. 
While still significantly lower than the average income for the rest of 
Austin, the average incomes in the with - without groups for route to old airport 
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have the smallest discrepancy of any in the model.  Also different from the other 
environmental variables, the percentages of Hispanic, foreign-born, Asian-Pacific, 
American Indian-Alaskan Native, and “other” ethnic groups are all lower on the 
route to the old airport than in the rest of Austin.  In contrast, the percentage of 
the census tract households identifying themselves as black is over six times 
higher for houses on the route to the old airport than elsewhere in Austin. 
Similar to the Distance variables, the double-difference effect of living on 
the route to the new airport is almost exactly the opposite as living on the route to 
the old airport.  In both cases, the neighborhoods impacted by these house price 
changes have lower average incomes and significantly higher percentages of 
black people, though unlike the other environmental variables, significantly lower 





Table 3.5  With-Without Comparison of Means for Houses on Route to an Airport 



















































































































“With” indicates a house was within one-half mile of the airport indicated 
Number is the mean value; standard deviation is in parentheses 
* indicates significance at the 90% confidence level; *** indicates significance at the 99% confidence level 
 
3.4  INCIDENCE ANALYSIS 
The with-without comparison of means tables show how individual 
demographic characteristics for houses impacted by the airports differ from other 
houses in Austin, but these are summary statistics that do not take into account the 
relationships among the variables.  For example, because of the way the Census 
questions were structured in 1990, a person who classified their race as Hispanic 
also had to choose among the list of white, black, Asian-Pacific Islander, 
American Indian – Alaskan Native, or other.  Therefore, a multivariate analysis is 
required to control for these relationships.  It is possible that once the percent of 
 174
the population who classify themselves as Hispanic or Foreign-Born are 
controlled for, the significance of the other race variables may change.  It is also 
possible that interactions among the income and ethnic groups may lead to 
changes in the significance of any of these potentially overlapping categories.   
It is clear the old airport was sited in a low income community with 
significant minority populations, but it is not clear whether, in net, these 
populations were made better or worse off by the airport move since they were 
both positively and negatively affected.  The same is true for the new airport.  
Given that these neighborhoods both have significantly different compositions 
than the rest of Austin, whether the net effect of the airport move is positive or 
negative for these groups determines whether these groups shoulder a 
disproportionate burden.  
Logit regressions are traditionally used in the environmental justice 
literature to examine the relative strengths of the relationships between the 
demographic characteristics and the location of noxious facilities as well as to 
predict their location.  However, this paper does not attempt to model the 
decision-making involved in the location of the airport (or predict the location), it 
seeks to find the exogenous shock of the government policy on different socio-
economic groups.  And while logit regression can be used to determine the 
logistical odds for presence of an airport amenity or disamenity for a particular 
group, it cannot be used to calculate a net effect of the positive and negative 
aspects of the siting.  Therefore, logit models using dichotomous independent 
variables to indicate the Noise impact at the old airport and the Distance and 
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Route impacts at both airports are run to be consistent with the literature, but are 
not discussed here.  They can be found in Appendix H. 
Because the same patterns of ethnic minorities and economic groups exist 
around both the amenity and disamenity aspects of the airport siting a method is 
needed that is able to calculate both the positive and negative impacts on housing 
prices for all aspects of the siting by demographic group.  The method used here 
is an incidence analysis, similar to the tax incidence literature, which uses the 
siting coefficients from regression estimates to predict the change in house values 
for each of the demographic groups in the model.  The groups are then arranged 
from either lowest income to highest income, or highest percent minority to 
lowest percent minority, and the change in average house price is plotted.  This 
will provide a visual description of who gained, who lost, who was not impacted, 
and who had the greatest variance in gains and losses from the airport re-location. 
This chapter does not introduce a theoretically-specified model, nor one 
that represents the causal structure that accounts for the airport re-location 
decision.  The estimated coefficients are taken from the last period in the double-
difference model described in the Data section of the paper.  These coefficients 
represent the gain (or loss) above and beyond the gain (or loss) that would have 
been expected looking at other changes to similar neighborhoods away from the 
airports.  If the coefficient is significant at the 90% confidence level, then the 
coefficient is manipulated to give a percent change and multiplied by the dummy 
variable indicating whether each house is impacted by the environmental variable 
and by the sale price of the house.  These predicted changes in house prices 
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resulting from the policy change are averaged over each decile (for income 
groups) or quintile (for percent in poverty and racial groups) and plotted in charts 
in Figures 3.2 through 3.7 at the end of the chapter.  These charts show the net 
effect of the airport re-location from the initial period to the final period, using 
estimates from both the new and the old airport. 
Initially the price changes were plotted on the vertical axis with the 
demographic variables on the horizontal, one dot for each data point.  The 
resulting charts found that expensive home fluctuate in prices more, even though 
both the comparison of the means would have predicted the opposite.  This 
greater fluctuation is probably the result of the fact that the model is less able to 
capture house quality at the luxurious end of the spectrum (high ceilings, crown 
moldings, landscaped yards), and that when looking at expensive houses the 
numbers are larger to start with.  Looking back at Table 3.2, the first significant 
double-difference coefficient for the Final period is a 25% increase in house 
prices between one-half and one mile from the old airport.  This is a significant 
change for any house, but looking purely at the price change, 25% of a $300,000 
house appears to be a much greater amount than 25% of a $50,000 house. The 
data are not available to fix the first problem, but the second can be corrected by 
using the percent change in house prices.  Therefore, the charts that follow reflect 
percent change in house price. 
Since median household income differs so dramatically between airport 
and non-airport neighborhoods in the with-without comparison of the means, it is 
the first incidence analysis plotted here. This estimation finds an average change 
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in house price between –1% and 22%.  The largest gains went to the lowest 
income census tracts.  By the fourth decile, however, the average change in house 
price actually became very slightly negative.  Higher income deciles, those 
starting at around $35,000 through the highest income, had an average change in 
house prices of zero.  This is expected since the with-without comparison of the 
means found that higher income households were less likely to live near either 
airport.  This chart also reveals that the losses in house values also fell on the 
poor, even though average changes were positive.  The minimum numbers show 
that no households in a census tract with a median income above $35,000 lost 
value, while a few in less affluent tracts potentially lost over 50% of the value of 
their homes.  While these huge losses are outliers, even in the lowest income 
groups, such losses do no exist in higher income neighborhoods.  The most 
dramatic windfall gains in house prices as a result of the airport relocation also 
accrue to the very lowest income deciles.  Therefore, it is the lowest income 
groups that won the most and lost the most from the airport re-location, though in 
net, the change was more positive than negative, a relief of some of the airport 
burden. 
Figure 3.3 looks at the lowest income groups from Figure 3.2 by focusing 
on households whose reported income was below the poverty line.  Separating the 
data into five groups with approximately 4,000 households in each, I find that 
60% of the census tracts in Austin have a poverty level below 10%.  These census 
tracts had average house prices gains of one percent or less, but none of them had 
an average or minimum that was a loss.  The largest gains went to the census 
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tracts with the highest percentage in poverty; on average these tracts gained about 
15% of their house value.  Windfall gains impacted a few houses in this category.  
The largest losses also fell on census tracts with at least 8.8% of the population 
earning levels below the poverty line.  Once again, it is the poorest census tracts 
that saw the greatest variation from the policy change, and in net, the gains 
outweigh the losses. 
The chart in Figure 3.4 divides the data set into five more-or-less equal 
groups based on the percent of the census tract that is white.  This attempts to 
capture the effect of all minority groups together, by difference from the percent 
white, though it does not separate out those households who chose “white” as 
race, but also “Hispanic” or “Foreign-Born” as part of their ethnicity.  All of these 
quintiles have a positive average gain, though in the highest categories the 
average gain is between one and three percent.  Once again the losses fall only in 
census tracts with at least 8% minorities, and the largest losses only in census 
tracts with at least 20% minorities. The effects from looking at all non-white race 
groups together, reveals some evidence of differential burden between white and 
nonwhite communities, though the average changes are close across all quintiles. 
The next three charts break out the racial and ethnic groups that have been 
the focus of the majority of the environmental justice literature: percent black, 
percent Hispanic, and percent foreign-born.  In these charts, the grouping of 
quintiles is less equal.  Instead of focusing on allocating the same number of 
house sale data points into each category, the groups attempt to better represent 
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the concentration of the minority population.  Tables 3.6 through 3.8 show how 
the data is divided. 
 
Table 3.6. Percent Black Quintiles 
Quintile N % Black Average House Price 
1 4,418 Less than 1% $295,740 
2 4,983 2 – 4% $183,836 
3 4,774 5 – 7% $137,918 
4 5,195 8 – 20% $112,686 
5 2,015 20 – 90% $91,285 
 
Table 3.6 and Figure 3.5 describe the percent change in house prices by 
percent black quintiles.  Visually, the chart looks almost the exact opposite of the 
percent white chart, with the most dramatic losses in the last two quintiles, where 
more than 8% of the community is black.  The average percent changes in house 
prices are largest for the last quintile, greater than 20% black. The results from 
percent black show some evidence that the black population in Austin bears more 
of the burden of the airport re-location than other groups; however, the 
relationship between race and house value losses is less striking than the income 
groups. 
Table 3.7 and Figure 3.6 describe the percent change in house prices by 
percent Hispanic quintiles.  All quintiles saw a positive percent change in average 
house prices, though census tracts where more than half the population is 
Hispanic saw the largest increases.  Unlike the other income and race groups, all 
five quintiles had maximum changes above zero and minimum changes below 
zero, with some of the largest losses for the middle quintile, about 20% Hispanic.  
 180
Maximum gains were fairly evenly distributed, though the quintile with the 
largest losses also had the smallest gains (tracts with 17 – 21% Hispanic). 
The relatively even dispersion of maximum, average, and minimum 
changes in house prices found in the Hispanic incidence analysis is somewhat 
surprising.  The with-without comparison of the means found a significantly 
higher percentage of Hispanics in census tracts impacted by all the airport 
variables except the route to the old airport, which actually found significantly 
fewer.  This difference between the with-without variables and the incidence 
model potentially can be explained by controlling for multiple race categories in 
the incidence model, and implicitly controlling for income by using price as the 
independent variable. 
 
Table 3.7 Percent Hispanic Quintiles 
Quintile N % Hispanic Average House Price 
1 5,215 Less than 8% $286,804 
2 4,935 9 – 16% $152,124 
3 5,407 17 – 21% $138,834 
4 4,948 22 – 49% $103,551 
5 466 Greater than 50% $91,319 
 
However, the incidence analysis does not necessarily contradict the earlier 
findings.  The incidence analysis finds the largest average increase in house prices 
for the quintile with the highest percentage of Hispanics, but it finds large 
minimum and maximum gains for every quintile; the airport does affect Hispanic 
communities, but not more so than non-Hispanic communities.   
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The final race category, percent of the census tract that is foreign-born, 
potentially overlaps any of the race categories, but in Austin, it is most likely to 
overlap with the Hispanic groups due to Texas’ relative proximity to Mexico and 
Central American countries.66  However, in all but one of the logit models, the 
percent foreign-born acted in the opposite direction of percent Hispanic.  While 
increases in the percent Hispanic decreased the likelihood of being in an airport 
community, increases in the percent foreign-born increases the likelihood of being 
within three miles of the old airport, under a noise contour, or on the route to 
either of the airports.  So, rather than being simply a measure of non-white 
communities, foreign-born captures the segment of the minority community least 
assimilated into Austin culture and politics.  The net impacts on this particular 
community are important, because along with income, the percent foreign-born is 
one of the most influential demographics for the location variables distance to the 
new airport, old airport noise, and route to the old airport.67 
Table 3.8 and Figure 3.7 describe the percent change in house prices by 
percent foreign-born quintiles.  By far, the largest increases in average house 
prices accrued to the highest quintile, the group where at least 15% of the 
population was foreign-born. Similar to the Hispanic incidence analysis, all five 
quintiles have a positive maximum price change and a negative minimum, 
implying that the burden is better shared among foreign-born communities and 
                                                 
66 The logit regressions control for all racial and ethnic groups modeled here; they give the 
independent effect of Hispanic controlling for foreign-born and vice versa. 
67 American Indian – Native Alaskan is often one of the most influential determinates as well, but 
Austin has only a very small population of this group, 0.23%. 
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non-foreign-born communities, than for percent black and low income 
communities. 
 
Table 3.8 Percent Foreign-Born Quintiles 
Quintile N % Foreign-Born Average House Price 
1 6,249 Less than  4% $204,184 
2 5,228 5 % $157,622 
3 4,817 6 – 7% $182,075 
4 4,011 8 – 14% $126,574 
5 1,081 15 - 33% $153,436 
 
As would be predicted from the summary data, income and poverty levels 
have the most inequitable distribution of gains and losses from the re-location of 
the airport.  In addition, given the relatively low levels of black populations in 
Austin, there is some evidence that this group bears more than a proportionate 
share of the airport gains and losses.  In general, more affluent tracts with higher 
concentrations of white people see far less fluctuation in house prices due to this 
policy change, with no losses and some large gains.   
This model only captures the gains and losses of the airport move as 
capitalized into house prices.  If, for example, a large percentage of the houses in 
the areas that saw house value gains are not owner-occupied then the benefits to 
the income or ethnic group in that community could potentially be overstated 
depending on the ethnicity and income status of the owner.  The American 
Housing Survey, collected every six years by the Bureau of the Census for the 
Department of Housing and Urban Development, provides estimates of 
homeownership by ethnic groups.  Unfortunately, Austin is not one of the 47 
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selected Metropolitan Areas for which this data is collected and no data is 
collected on a state-level.  Therefore, the closest estimates for owner occupancy 
by ethnic groups are at the national level.  The national average of owner-
occupied housing in the United States is 68 percent.  The percent owner-occupied 
is highest for white populations, at about 73 percent, and lowest for groups 
identified as “other” at about 37 percent.  Owner occupancy is about 55 percent 
for Hispanic populations, 54 percent for Asian and Pacific Islander populations, 
49 percent for Native Americans, and 48 percent for black populations.  In the 
dataset used in this analysis, none of the census tracts show owner occupancy 
rates above 80 percent.  About half of the census tracts are between zero and 47 
percent owner-occupied and the other half are between 48 and 80 percent owner-
occupied.  Therefore, it is possible that around half of the house value gains in 
communities with ethnic minorities are actually accruing to people who do not 
live in those communities.  (National 2001 American Housing Survey) 
 
3.5  CONCLUSIONS 
At the time of the policy change, minority groups and residents near the 
old airport feared that low income and minority groups were going to bear the 
burden of the re-location of the airport.  As it turned out, this was a valid concern.  
Significantly higher percentages of lower income groups and ethnic minorities 
live in areas surrounding both airports.  However, other groups saw that the 
airport move was a chance to build-up the area around the closed Air Force base 
and potentially bring in jobs and improve the basic facilities, services, and 
installations needed for the functioning of the community.  These groups were 
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also partially correct.  Using house values as a proxy for general land 
development, houses on the route to the new airport saw significant increases in 
their value, even if homes very near the airport itself lost value. 
This analysis finds that indeed, the same income and ethnic groups that 
bear the burden receive the benefits from changes in house prices near both the 
old and the new airport.  In all cases, summing the gains and losses within each 
group found either a zero or positive net effect.  The variance between the 
maximum gains and the minimum losses are largest for the poorest and those with 
the highest concentrations of Native American, black, and foreign-born 
populations.  The highest income communities and those with the highest 
concentration of white residents received no house price gains on average, though 
some received substantial benefits.   
The zero or positive net effect from the airport re-location is consistent 
with the results found in Chapter 2.  The earlier chapter finds a net gain to 
homeowners near both airports as a result of the policy, but it does not take into 
account the demographic characteristics of these gains, or the smaller losses.  This 
analysis identifies which socio-economic groups live in the neighborhoods that 
saw the gains and losses in order to identify who in Austin bore the exogenous 
shock of the airport relocation. 
This analysis does not capture all costs and benefits of the model because 
only looks at how things ended up, and does not account for the changes that 
happened in the market while adjusting to the new airport location.  This may 
underestimate the impact on the very poorest communities in the model, those 
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that live under the former noise contours of Mueller airport.  Because the post-
period house prices are not significantly different from the pre-period prices, no 
loss to these homeowners is recorded here.  However, chapter 2 found the 
significant decreases in house prices in the intervening years, so real losses to 
these homeowners are directly tied to the local government policy. 
Much debate exists as to the correct size of the unit of demographic 
analysis.  Since this study is local in scope, the question of whether to aggregate 
to the city or county level is unnecessary.  However, in addition to census tracts, 
zip code information is available for each house in the data set. Aggregation to zip 
code level has been used in several environmental justice analyses, including the 
original United Church of Christ study (UCC, 1987) and may explain some of the 
different findings of environmental injustice.  Future work could compare the 
environmental justice results from zip code and census tract demographic 
aggregation.  If significant differences appear in the results, more local 
neighborhood history would be necessary to determine which more accurately 
captures the effects of the local siting decision. 
Given the suggestion that low income and minority groups are 
disproportionately affected by the airport change, future work should investigate 
the multiple other noxious sitings located around the new airport.  A 
concentration analysis could test whether the airport is latest in series of sitings 
that all fall on the same community, or whether they are evenly distributed 
throughout Austin.  This analysis could better capture whether some income and 
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ethnic groups bear more of all environmental burdens that keep the city 
functioning. 
 
Figure 3.1 Environmental Justice Variable Definitions 
Income:  the median income reported for each census tract 
 
Poverty: the percentage of all households in the census tract whose reported 
income was below the poverty line 
 
Hispanic: the percentage of all households in the census tract identifying their 
race as Hispanic 
 
Foreign-Born: the percentage of all households in the census tract who reported 
they were born in a foreign country 
 
White: the percentage of households in the census tract identifying their race as 
white 
 
Black: the percentage of households in the census track identifying their race as 
black 
 
Native American: the percentage of all households in the census tract identifying 
their race as American Indian or Alaskan Native 
 
Asian Pacific: the percentage of all households in the census tract identifying their 
race as Asian or Pacific Islanders 
 
Other: the percentage of all households in the census tract identifying their race as 













































































































































































Airports have traditionally been seen as noxious sitings: a community 
necessity, but an unwelcome next-door neighbor.  More recent literature, 
however, has found mixed results with some that find proximity to an airport 
could actually increase the selling price of a house.  This dissertation looks at the 
removal and simultaneous imposition of an airport to determine the costs and 
benefits as they are capitalized into the house prices in the surrounding 
community.  Given that airports are neither intrinsically a neighborhood ‘good’ or 
‘bad,’ this analysis measures all aspects, then determines the overall effect, and 
finally determines if the balance of good and bad aspects are evenly divided 
among the population that all gains access to air travel. 
The contributions of the first chapter are at least three-fold.  First, the 
model adds to the hedonic pricing literature on airport sitings by comparing the 
differences in noise and distance variables and adds a new element to the model: 
development along routes to the airports.  This study finds that previous 
contradictory studies can potentially be reconciled by adding more flexibility to 
the distance measurements and providing a separable measure for access to the 
airport.  When looking at across time, this study finds that noise is a disamenity 
that is separately measurable from distance to the airport.  In the repeat sales and 
all sales event date models, distance is an amenity with houses in the closest 
distance contours seeing substantial gains in value when the old airport prepared 
to and finally closed.   
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The second contribution to the literature involves the timing of noxious 
sitings.  This paper uses five different estimations of when home buyers and 
sellers in Austin reacted to the movement of the airport.  Though the timing of 
house prices changes varied somewhat under different specifications, in all 
models there were house price gains in losses in the year the City of Austin broke 
ground on the new airport.  This is a significant finding because it indicates that 
homeowners are not necessarily perfectly rational; they waited through more than 
ten years of the City talking of moving the airport before house price changes 
actually occurred.  As to be expected however, most of the market fluctuations 
were complete by the time the new airport opened and the old airport closed.  
Finally, the third contribution is to the hedonic literature by comparing several 
different methodologies. Siting stage models require assumptions about certainty 
across years that is not empirically supported.  Repeat sale models requires less 
data, but additional corrections to the model itself. Traditional hedonic models do 
not require constant coefficient assumption, are reasonable simple to estimate, but 
require large sets of explanatory house characteristics.  Based on these results, the 
choice of the “correct” specification depends more on the data available than the 
inherent abilities of the models. 
The second chapter found that, in the case of Austin, the placement of an 
airport downtown gave rise to more positive than negative aspects.  Aircraft noise 
is a disamenity that caused house price fluctuations around the policy 
announcements but did not permanently stigmatize neighborhoods.  Proximity to 
the airport also causes house price decreases, possibly due to visual, safety, or 
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traffic impacts, though these decreases disappeared when the airport relocated.  
On the other hand, access to an airport, as measured by location of a house within 
one-half mile of a major route to an airport, is an amenity.  However, this amenity 
does not remain after the airport closed, implying that the development effects 
relied on the airport and are not sustainable in the face of uncertain future uses of 
the facility. 
This study also found that house prices depend on the history of 
community, instead of relying only on the current characteristics of the 
neighborhood.  This implies that local government policy has implications beyond 
the current agenda.  The benefits from projects designed to attract business and 
development may only last as long as the project lasts, and will transfer to the 
next ‘hot spot’ when policies change.   On the other hand, this model shows that 
noxious facility sitings do not always permanently stigmatize a neighborhood.  
The housing market failed to have perfectly rational expectations throughout the 
airport move, giving rise to both windfall gains and losses to buyers and sellers 
over the twenty-year model period.  Homeowners who sold property near the old 
airport or in a noise contour in the intermediate periods lost the most even though 
these prices rebounded by the final period.  This has implications for local 
governments and planners as well.  As noted by Kiel and McClain (1996), 
“keeping the period of uncertainty short is clearly advantageous, since the shorter 
the time period, the smaller the social costs become relative to the development 
costs” (1357). 
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The geo-mapping capabilities used in this research provide for more 
accurate classifications of houses into environmental categories, which in turn 
provides more accurate estimates of the differing impacts a government policy 
can have. In net, lessened the overall burden homeowners bear for air travel in 
Austin.The realized net impact over all time periods for house near the old airport 
was $31.7 million, Driven by large gains for houses closest to old airport in Final 
period.  The realized net impact over all time periods for house near the new 
airport was $39.8 million, driven by large gains for houses on route to new 
airport.  Therefore, in net, moving the airport lessened the overall burden to 
homeowners near both airports and likely created an efficiency gain for the City 
of Austin. 
Landmark studies (1980s) found that minority populations shoulder the 
majority of the environmental burden.  Since then, evidence has been mixed.  The 
third chapter looked at Austin as a recent case study to determine whether even if 
homeowners in the City as whole enjoyed more benefits than costs from the 
airport relocation , some communities shouldered a disproportionate burden.  At 
the time of the policy change, minority groups and residents near the old airport 
feared that low income and minority groups were going to bear the burden of the 
re-location of the airport.  As it turned out, this was a valid concern.  Significantly 
higher percentages of lower income groups and ethnic minorities live in areas 
surrounding both airports.  However, other groups saw that the airport move was 
a chance to build-up the area around the closed Air Force base and potentially 
bring in jobs and improve the basic facilities, services, and installations needed 
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for the functioning of the community.  These groups were also partially correct.  
Using house values as a proxy for general land development, houses on the route 
to the new airport saw significant increases in their value, even if homes very near 
the airport itself lost value. 
This analysis finds that indeed, the same income and ethnic groups that 
bear the burden receive the benefits from changes in house prices near both the 
old and the new airport.  In all cases, summing the gains and losses within each 
group found either a zero or positive net effect.  The variance between the 
maximum gains and the minimum losses are largest for the poorest and those with 
the highest concentrations of Native American, black, and foreign-born 
populations.  The highest income communities and those with the highest 
concentration of white residents received no house price gains on average, though 
some received substantial benefits.   
The zero or positive net effect from the airport re-location is consistent 
with the results found in Chapter 2.  The earlier chapter finds a net gain to 
homeowners near both airports as a result of the policy, but it does not take into 
account the demographic characteristics of these gains, or the smaller losses.  This 
analysis identifies which socio-economic groups live in the neighborhoods that 
saw the gains and losses in order to identify who in Austin bore the exogenous 
shock of the airport relocation. 
This analysis does not capture all costs and benefits of the model because 
only looks at how things ended up, and does not account for the changes that 
happened in the market while adjusting to the new airport location.  This may 
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underestimate the impact on the very poorest communities in the model, those 
that live under the former noise contours of Mueller airport.  Because the post-
period house prices are not significantly different from the pre-period prices, no 
loss to these homeowners is recorded here.  However, Chapter 2 found the 
significant decreases in house prices in the intervening years, so real losses to 
these homeowners are directly tied to the local government policy. 
All the issues regarding the amenity and disamenity aspects of airport 
sitings are far from settled.  This dissertation finds, however, that careful 
measurement and planning for the imposition of the disamenity aspects can result 
in a placement of an airport that causes the least degradation to house prices while 






APPENDIX A: SUMMARY STATISTICS 
 
Table A.1 Summary Statistics of All Observations 
(by year of sale)      









Size Mean Age Mean Bath
1980 57 128353.4 1517.3 12877.1 9.9 2.1 
1981 62 114071.7 1445.4 10526.9 9.8 2.1 
1982 87 144156.8 1647.3 10592.7 11.6 2.1 
1983 56 173198.3 1701.7 10308.4 10.7 2.3 
1984 126 198944.4 1625.9 10485.1 11.3 2.2 
1985 188 162672.4 1551.4 9153.3 11.4 2.2 
1986 107 158473.0 1587.3 10108.6 18.2 2.0 
1987 108 158473.0 1587.3 10108.6 18.2 2.0 
1988 176 146848.8 1769.9 14532.3 14.4 2.3 
1989 266 141344.3 1843.1 12012.6 16.1 2.4 
1990 316 124618.4 1786.6 11862.9 15.2 2.3 
1991 473 119830.6 1768.2 11325.0 18.1 2.3 
1992 595 128601.7 1781.3 11123.0 18.3 2.2 
1993 689 139365.1 1809.3 12654.8 19.0 2.2 
1994 667 148758.9 1839.4 11871.3 18.9 2.3 
1995 2389 152758.6 1839.5 12306.8 20.9 2.2 
1996 3627 154041.2 1808.0 11594.6 20.6 2.2 
1997 701 103683.2 1561.1 8851.9 24.0 2.0 
1998 90 103683.2 1561.1 8851.9 24.0 2.0 
1999 1947 175735.7 1667.1 12008.3 27.4 2.1 
2000 6907 196884.0 1667.7 11174.4 28.3 2.1 
2001 1752 197580.1 1647.8 11355.9 28.9 2.1 
Total 21386      
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Table A.2  Summary Statistics of Single Sale Observations   
(by year of sale)      













1980 1 232121.0 2402.0 12838.0 2.0 4.0 
1981 4 102991.8 1275.8 7771.3 10.8 2.0 
1982 2 91374.5 1612.5 8416.0 23.5 1.5 
1983 3 78415.0 2532.3 9691.7 20.3 2.7 
1984 2 191673.5 2012.5 12580.0 25.0 2.0 
1985 1 195649.0 2431.0 13770.0 0.0 3.0 
1986 5 121352.4 1233.4 10374.4 14.6 1.8 
1987 1 210462.0 2150.0 10500.0 41.0 2.0 
1988 2 139823.5 1857.5 9921.0 15.5 2.5 
1989 8 145068.3 2127.6 16797.8 19.5 2.6 
1990 7 131203.7 1627.1 8958.4 18.0 2.3 
1991 4 121545.0 1795.8 8460.0 11.5 2.3 
1992 12 105419.6 1494.9 21501.7 28.3 1.9 
1993 11 133930.7 1648.6 8568.5 12.9 2.2 
1994 14 121169.8 1620.0 8401.4 21.5 1.9 
1995 1116 149181.4 1847.9 12879.3 20.4 2.2 
1996 1816 149692.2 1789.4 11760.3 21.8 2.2 
1997 361 164185.9 1817.7 12139.9 25.5 2.2 
1998 38 101463.6 1575.2 9213.2 25.0 1.9 
1999 1102 175523.3 1629.9 12133.4 29.5 2.0 
2000 4156 193405.1 1638.9 11267.2 29.0 2.1 
2001 1062 200316.6 1624.1 11812.8 30.4 2.0 




Table A.3  Summary Statistics of Repeat Sale Observations  
(by year of initial sale)     













1980 50 108876.1 1463.5 9346.7 10.8 1.9 
1981 56 111055.1 1424.4 9157.7 10.4 2.0 
1982 83 133581.7 1652.1 10524.7 11.2 2.1 
1983 48 163883.3 1678.4 9960.2 11.3 2.3 
1984 120 195656.5 1609.1 10057.1 11.4 2.2 
1985 179 159900.2 1600.5 9026.0 10.8 2.2 
1986 101 171429.6 1537.9 9701.5 13.1 2.2 
1987 100 159350.2 1649.9 10100.6 18.0 2.1 
1988 156 139913.1 1744.7 14553.2 14.8 2.3 
1989 241 132567.9 1791.7 11064.1 17.1 2.3 
1990 287 116498.0 1795.4 11296.8 15.4 2.3 
1991 430 115976.1 1787.2 11099.0 17.9 2.3 
1992 540 123841.5 1774.1 10142.6 18.5 2.2 
1993 613 138818.5 1823.4 12111.9 18.4 2.3 
1994 599 142742.2 1830.7 11634.1 19.1 2.3 
1995 623 144909.1 1829.8 11299.9 20.9 2.2 
1996 597 152827.3 1783.9 9613.5 18.7 2.2 
1997 79 158595.8 1839.3 12367.4 20.0 2.2 
1998 22 127217.2 1895.5 8990.6 21.9 2.1 
1999 177 148511.9 1558.2 10429.4 25.7 2.1 
2000 257 173869.3 1611.1 11035.0 31.7 1.9 
2001 16 87600.8 1255.3 12262.1 29.5 1.6 




Table A.4 Zip Code Dummy Variables 
 
Variable Mean* Standard Deviation 
d78617 0.000655 0.025578 
d78653 0.001122 0.033482 
d78701 0.000281 0.016748 
d78702 0.013373 0.11487 
d78703 0.039652 0.195145 
d78704 0.049659 0.217244 
d78705 0.005424 0.07345 
d78719 4.68E-05 0.006838 
d78721 0.007248 0.084827 
d78722 0.011643 0.107276 
d78723 0.037501 0.189991 
d78724 0.011737 0.107701 
d78725 0.000701 0.026475 
d78727 0.054615 0.227233 
d78731 0.055737 0.229419 
d78735 0.017722 0.131942 
d78739 0.02193 0.146459 
d78741 0.009025 0.094571 
d78742 0.000374 0.019338 
d78744 0.052885 0.223809 
d78745 0.104882 0.306408 
d78746 0.058403 0.234509 
d78747 0.007248 0.084827 
d78748 0.072057 0.258588 
d78749 0.086225 0.280702 
d78751 0.022725 0.149029 
d78752 0.01183 0.108124 
d78753 0.049518 0.216953 
d78754 0.005751 0.075622 
d78756 0.019078 0.136802 
d78757 0.047788 0.213323 
d78758 0.051249 0.220509 
0.071916 0.258355 
*Mean for zip code dummy variables gives the fraction of the full sample  
that are located in the zip code. 
d78759 
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 APPENDIX B: MAPS 
Map B.1 Zip Codes in Austin 
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Map B.3  Mueller Airport Noise Contours 
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Map B.4 Mueller Airport Distance Contours 
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Map B.5 Route to the Airports 
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Map B.6  ABIA Noise Contours 
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Map B.7  ABIA Distance Contours 
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Map B.8 Austin’s Airports Noise and Distance Contours 
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APPENDIX C: VARIABLE DEFINITIONS 
(for Appendices Tables) 
 
Variable Name Definition 
  (in order of appearance in following Tables) 
  
New for Table D.1 
  
lnprice natural log of house price; dependent variable 
gba gross building area, in square feet 
tla total lot area, in square feet 
age2 between 5 and 10 years old, dummy variable 
age3 between 10 and 20 years old, dummy variable 
age4 between 20 and 30 years old, dummy variable 
age5 between 30 and 50 years old 
age6 over 50 years old 
dbath2 between 1.5 and 2 bathrooms, dummy variable 
dbath3 more than 2 bathrooms, dummy variable 
dfire fireplace, dummy variable 
dpool3 swimming pool, dummy variable 
dspa spa, sauna, or hot tub, dummy variable 
dgarage garage, dummy variable 
dcarport carport, dummy variable 
dmanuf manufactured home, dummy variable 
dmasonry masonry construction, dummy variable 
dbrick brick construction, dummy variable 
pcthsgrad percent of census tract that has only a high school degree 
pctbchdeg percent of census tract that has a 4-year college degree 
pctgrddeg percent of census tract that has a graduate degree 
pctforbrn percent of census tract that is foreign born 
pctpopbl percent of census tract that is Black 
pctpopna percent of census tract that is native American 
pctpopap percent of census tract that is Asian Pacific 
pctpopoth percent of census tract categorized as “Other” 
pctvachs percent of lots in census tract that are vacant 
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Variable Name Definition 
  (in order of appearance in following Tables) 
  
pctownocc percent of houses in census tract that are owner-occupied 
d1980 house sold in 1980, dummy variable 
d1981 house sold in 1981, dummy variable 
d1982 house sold in 1982, dummy variable 
d1983 house sold in 1983, dummy variable 
d1984 house sold in 1984, dummy variable 
d1985 house sold in 1985, dummy variable 
d1986 house sold in 1986, dummy variable 
d1987 house sold in 1987, dummy variable 
d1988 house sold in 1988, dummy variable 
d1989 house sold in 1989, dummy variable 
d1990 house sold in 1990, dummy variable 
d1991 house sold in 1991, dummy variable 
d1992 house sold in 1992, dummy variable 
d1993 house sold in 1993, dummy variable 
d1994 house sold in 1994, dummy variable 
d1995 house sold in 1995, dummy variable 
d1996 house sold in 1996, dummy variable 
d1997 house sold in 1997, dummy variable 
d1998 house sold in 1998, dummy variable 
d1999 house sold in 1999, dummy variable 
d2000 house sold in 2000, dummy variable 
d2001 house sold in 2001, dummy variable 
d78617 house located in zip code 78617, dummy variable 
d78653 house located in zip code 78653, dummy variable 
d78701 house located in zip code 78701, dummy variable 
d78702 house located in zip code 78702, dummy variable 
d78703 house located in zip code 78703, dummy variable 
d78704 house located in zip code 78704, dummy variable 
d78705 house located in zip code 78705, dummy variable 
d78719 house located in zip code 78719, dummy variable 
d78721 house located in zip code 78721, dummy variable 
d78722 house located in zip code 78722, dummy variable 
d78723 house located in zip code 78723, dummy variable 
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Variable Name Definition 
  (in order of appearance in following Tables) 
  
d78724 house located in zip code 78724, dummy variable 
d78725 house located in zip code 78725, dummy variable 
d78727 house located in zip code 78727, dummy variable 
d78731 house located in zip code 78731, dummy variable 
d78735 house located in zip code 78735, dummy variable 
d78739 house located in zip code 78739, dummy variable 
d78741 house located in zip code 78741, dummy variable 
d78742 house located in zip code 78742, dummy variable 
d78744 house located in zip code 78744, dummy variable 
d78745 house located in zip code 78745, dummy variable 
d78746 house located in zip code 78746, dummy variable 
d78747 house located in zip code 78747, dummy variable 
d78748 house located in zip code 78748, dummy variable 
d78749 house located in zip code 78749, dummy variable 
d78751 house located in zip code 78751, dummy variable 
d78752 house located in zip code 78752, dummy variable 
d78753 house located in zip code 78753, dummy variable 
d78754 house located in zip code 78754, dummy variable 
d78756 house located in zip code 78756, dummy variable 
d78757 house located in zip code 78757, dummy variable 
d78758 house located in zip code 78758, dummy variable 
d78759 house located in zip code 78759, dummy variable 
manoise2 house located in any Mueller Airport noise contour, dummy variable 
manoise65 house located in 65-70 dB noise contour, dummy variable 
manoise70 house located in 70-75 dB noise contour, dummy variable 
manoise75 house located in greater than 75 dB noise contour, dummy variable 
madist1 house located within 1/2 mile of Mueller Airport, dummy variable 
madist2 house located between 1/2 and 1 mile of Mueller Airport, dummy variable 
madist3 house located between 1 and 1.5 miles of Mueller Airport, dummy variable 
madist4 house located between 1.5 and 2 miles of Mueller Airport, dummy variable 
madist5 house located between 2 and 2.5 miles of Mueller Airport, dummy variable 
madist6 houses located between 2.5 and 3 miles of Mueller Airport, dummy variable 
manorrd2 house located within 1/4 mile of Manor Rd, dummy variable 
manorrd3 house located between 1/4 and 1/2 mile of Manor Rd, dummy variable 
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Variable Name Definition 
  (in order of appearance in following Tables) 
  
abiaroute2 house located within 1/4 mile of route to ABIA, dummy variable 
abiaroute3 house located between 1/4 and 1/2 mile of route to ABIA, dummy variable 
dcbd1 house located within 1 mile of central business district, dummy variable 
dcbd2 house located between 1 and 2 miles of central business district, dummy variable 
dcbd3 house located between 2 and 3 miles of central business district, dummy variable 
dut1 house located within 1 mile of the University of Texas, dummy variable 
dut2 house located between 1 and 2 miles of the University of Texas, dummy variable 
dut3 house located between 2 and 3 miles of the University of Texas, dummy variable 
_cons constant 
  
New for Table D.2 
  
ma658793 interaction between manoise65 and dummy for stage2: sold between 1987 and 1993
ma708793 interaction between manoise70 and dummy for stage2: sold between 1987 and 1993
ma758793 interaction between manoise75 and dummy for stage2: sold between 1987 and 1993
ma659498 interaction between manoise65 and dummy for stage3: sold between 1994 and 1998
ma709498 interaction between manoise70 and dummy for stage3: sold between 1994 and 1998
ma759498 interaction between manoise75 and dummy for stage3: sold between 1994 and 1998
ma6599 interaction between manoise65 and dummy for stage4: sold in 1999 
ma7099 interaction between manoise70 and dummy for stage4: sold in 1999 
ma7599 interaction between manoise75 and dummy for stage4: sold in 1999 
ma650001 interaction between manoise65 and dummy for stage5: sold between 2000 and 2001
ma700001 interaction between manoise70 and dummy for stage5: sold between 2000 and 2001
ma750001 interaction between manoise75 and dummy for stage6: sold between 2000 and 2001
mad18793 interaction between madist1 and dummy for stage2: sold between 1987 and 1993 
mad28793 interaction between madist2 and dummy for stage2: sold between 1987 and 1993 
mad38793 interaction between madist3 and dummy for stage2: sold between 1987 and 1993 
mad48793 interaction between madist4 and dummy for stage2: sold between 1987 and 1993 
mad58793 interaction between madist5 and dummy for stage2: sold between 1987 and 1993 
mad68793 interaction between madist6 and dummy for stage2: sold between 1987 and 1993 
mad19498 interaction between madist1 and dummy for stage3: sold between 1994 and 1998 
mad29498 interaction between madist2 and dummy for stage3: sold between 1994 and 1998 
mad39498 interaction between madist3 and dummy for stage3: sold between 1994 and 1998 
mad49498 interaction between madist4 and dummy for stage3: sold between 1994 and 1998 
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Variable Name Definition 
  (in order of appearance in following Tables) 
  
mad59498 interaction between madist5 and dummy for stage3: sold between 1994 and 1998 
mad69498 interaction between madist6 and dummy for stage3: sold between 1994 and 1998 
mad199 interaction between madist1 and dummy for stage4: sold in 1999 
mad299 interaction between madist2 and dummy for stage4: sold in 1999 
mad399 interaction between madist3 and dummy for stage4: sold in 1999 
mad499 interaction between madist4 and dummy for stage4: sold in 1999 
mad599 interaction between madist5 and dummy for stage4: sold in 1999 
mad699 interaction between madist6 and dummy for stage4: sold in 1999 
mad10001 interaction between madist1 and dummy for stage5: sold between 2000 and 2001 
mad20001 interaction between madist2 and dummy for stage5: sold between 2000 and 2001 
mad30001 interaction between madist3 and dummy for stage5: sold between 2000 and 2001 
mad40001 interaction between madist4 and dummy for stage5: sold between 2000 and 2001 
mad50001 interaction between madist5 and dummy for stage5: sold between 2000 and 2001 
mad60001 interaction between madist6 and dummy for stage5: sold between 2000 and 2001 
manor28793 interaction between manorrd2 and dummy for stage2: sold between 1987 and 1993
manor38793 interaction between manorrd3 and dummy for stage2: sold between 1987 and 1993
route28793 interaction between abiaroute2 and dummy for stage2: sold between 1987 and 1993
route38793 interaction between abiaroute3 and dummy for stage2: sold between 1987 and 1993
manor29498 interaction between manorrd2 and dummy for stage3: sold between 1994 and 1998
manor39498 interaction between manorrd3 and dummy for stage3: sold between 1994 and 1998
route29498 interaction between abiaroute2 and dummy for stage3: sold between 1994 and 1998
route39498 interaction between abiaroute3 and dummy for stage3: sold between 1994 and 1998
manor299 interaction between manorrd2 and dummy for stage4: sold in 1999 
manor399 interaction between manorrd3 and dummy for stage4: sold in 1999 
route299 interaction between abiaroute2 and dummy for stage4: sold in 1999 
route399 interaction between abiaroute3 and dummy for stage4: sold in 1999 
manor20001 interaction between manorrd2 and dummy for stage5: sold between 2000 and 2001
manor30001 interaction between manorrd3 and dummy for stage5: sold between 2000 and 2001
route20001 interaction between abiaroute2 and dummy for stage5: sold between 2000 and 2001
route30001 interaction between abiaroute3 and dummy for stage5: sold between 2000 and 2001
  
New for Table F.1 
  
lndep_ratio natural log of house price ratio, depreciation adjusted; dependent variable 
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Variable Name Definition 
  (in order of appearance in following Tables) 
  
lnp_ratio natural log of house price ratio, NOT depreciation adjusted; dependent variable 
Age Difference difference in age of house between first and second sale 
Event Dummy dummy variable for one of five events: vote, list, close, build, or open 
manoise3 house located in greater than 70 dB noise contour, dummy variable 
mills Mills ratio, calculated from Probit model 
  
New for Table F.2 
  
age age of house, in years 




APPENDIX D: REGRESSION RESULTS FOR SITING STAGE MODELS 
 
Table D.1 Phase Model - Mueller Airport Analysis  
 
      
lnprice 1980-87 1987-93 1994-998 1999 2000-2001 
       
gba 2.62E-04 2.34E-04 0.0002542 0.0002881 0.0003329 
 (6.65) (11.64) (30.69) (13.4) (31.56) 
tla 2.70E-06 3.15E-07 1.44E-06 2.10E-06 3.57E-06 
 (1.03) (0.5) (5.21) (5.22) (10.74) 
age2 -0.10 -0.3427264 -0.4305665 -0.0608355 -0.0116655 
 (-2.82) (-13.2) (-27.06) (-1.39) (-0.57) 
age3 0.02 -0.2072449 -0.2051135 -0.203022 -0.1028777 
 (0.44) (-7.15) (-15.8) (-6.04) (-5.51) 
age4 -0.03 -0.1669155 -0.2011147 -0.2253302 -0.1179404 
 (-0.4) (-4.1) (-12.48) (-6.06) (-6.01) 
age5 -0.02 -0.2153791 -0.2266616 -0.2309923 -0.1129549 
 (0.2) (-4.31) (-11.21) (-5.35) (-4.99) 
age6 -0.04 -0.1149449 -0.2218095 -0.1717579 -0.1006376 
 (-0.25) (-1.7) (-8.15) (-3.13) (-3.57) 
dbath2 0.13 0.1366808 0.0982528 0.0475013 0.0126938 
 (2.4) (4.14) (7.00) (1.55) (0.86) 
dbath3 0.16 0.2523329 0.146175 0.0640401 0.0100552 
 (2.39) (6.1) (8.12) (1.57) (0.50) 
dfire 0.16 0.0919557 0.054505 0.0047007 0.0174147 
 (4.31) (3.43) (4.50) (0.18) (1.36) 
dpool3 0.07 0.1888004 0.1373202 0.1232929 0.0416263 
 (1.19) (5.61) (8.54) (3.20) (2.09) 
dspa 0.17 0.1452485 0.1180054 0.0934733 0.1083745 
 (1.77) (3.03) (4.46) (1.51) (3.01) 
dgarage 0.07 0.1156343 0.1258677 0.0717965 0.0887036 
 (1.35) (3.34) (8.35) (2.43) (5.68) 
-0.06 0.0939263 0.1368809 0.0528578 0.0911175 
 (-0.91) (2.08) (7.09) (1.41) (4.78) 
dmanuf -0.78  -0.6812037 -0.1565473  
 (-2.09)  (-2.14) (-0.42)  
dmasonry -0.45 -0.0611365 0.0709328 -0.2418429 0.0955626 




Table D.1 Phase Model - Mueller Airport Analysis  
 
      
lnprice 1980-87 1987-93 1994-998 1999 2000-2001 
dbrick 0.02 -0.0877029 0.026542 0.050249 0.0467728 
 (0.6) (-4.2) (2.72) (2.30) (4.20) 
0.29 -2.703401 -0.8442783 -0.382898 0.3297975 
 (0.33) (-4.62) (-3.29) (-0.72) (1.22) 
-0.63 -0.88692 0.244326 -0.5494313 0.1253069 
 (-0.77) (-1.84) (1.09) (-1.18) (0.52) 
2.55 0.5272484 2.024945 2.711018 1.426991 
(2.45) (0.88) (7.39) (4.50) (4.68) 
-0.58 3.214311 -1.324227 0.2875694 -0.1854989 
 (-0.48) (4.52) (-4.18) (0.45) (-0.56) 
pctpopbl 0.05 -0.965626 -0.4430848 -0.9568945 -0.4277038 
 (0.14) (-3.94) (-5.10) (-5.61) (-5.15) 
4.021718 0.2627046 -0.2831276 
 (-0.36) (1.6) (1.66) (0.11) (-0.24) 
pctpopap -0.87 -5.532417 1.047858 0.3298501 -0.1826978 
 (-0.56) (-6.52) (2.77) (0.42) (-0.46) 
pctpopoth -0.22 -1.654241 0.0456053 -0.032342 -0.2522085 
 (-0.47) (-5.64) (0.36) (-0.13) (-1.95) 
pctvachs 0.57 -0.5995145 0.3335536 0.5808418 0.0142593 
 (0.88) (-1.27) (1.72) (1.54) (0.07) 
pctownocc 0.00 0.24927 0.0096059 0.0933672 -0.0385073 
 (0.01) (2.77) (0.23) (1.05) (-0.84) 
d1981 -0.05     
 (-0.8)     
d1982 0.00     
 (-0.07)     
d1983 0.02     
 (0.35)     
d1984 0.24     
 (4.72)     
d1985 0.27     
 (5.53)     
d1986 0.25     
 (4.58)     
d1988   0.0451684    
   (1.22)    






pctpopna -1.26 1.859597 
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Table D.1 Phase Model - Mueller Airport Analysis  
 
      
lnprice 1980-87 1987-93 1994-998 1999 2000-2001 
   (-0.76)    
d1991   -0.1028731    
   (-3.71)    
d1992   -0.0385278    
   (-1.44)    
d1993   -0.01696    
   (-0.65)    
d1995    0.0322088   
    (2.31)   
d1996    0.0574888   
    (4.26)   
d1997    0.0601022   
    (3.48)   
d1998    -0.1206804   
    (-3.35)   
d2001      0.0633666 
      (6.17) 
d78617 -0.03  -0.7855064 -0.3796617 -0.5745608 
 (-0.1)  (-2.47) (-1.73) (-4.05) 
d78653   0.7873801 0.1810903 -0.006258 -0.6041786 
   (3.38) (1.30) (-0.03) (-4.33) 
d78701    0.8064896 -0.3977268 -0.2375128 
    (2.46) (-1.01) (-1.02) 
d78702 -0.10 -1.053571 -0.6211405 -0.5934237 -0.4535744 
 (-0.33) (-5.24) (-8.19) (-4.03) (-6.26) 
d78703 0.52 0.0228168 0.1510739 -0.0128569 0.2373821 
 (2.72) (0.22) (3.18) (-0.13) (4.69) 
d78704 0.05 -0.0214877 0.1217466 0.0011421 0.1641535 
 (0.39) (-0.26) (3.04) (0.01) (3.79) 
d78705 -2.20 -0.2020635 0.0814569 0.0435535 0.2566598 
 (0.44) (-1.09) (0.93) (0.27) (2.72) 
d78719      -0.4751076 
      (-1.24) 
d78721 -1.58 -0.8709959 -0.4034457 -0.1886498 -0.3234436 
 (-5.25) (-2.91) (-2.08) (-2.67) (-4.12) 
d78722 0.48 -0.2652457 0.0709865 -0.2860847 0.0124606 
 (1.21) (-1.15) (0.87) (-1.81) (0.16) 
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Table D.1 Phase Model - Mueller Airport Analysis  
 
      
lnprice 1980-87 1987-93 1994-998 1999 2000-2001 
d78723 -0.15 -0.2267731 -0.0570748 -0.1671292 -0.1099233 
 (-0.57) (-1.39) (-0.94) (-1.36) (-1.91) 
-0.22 0.0077492 0.2513388 -0.049523 -0.2540038 
 (0.31) (0.04) (4.13) (-0.39) (-3.74) 
d78725 -0.43 0.4289549 -0.3350374 -0.1244185 -0.2996376 
 (-1.00) (0.99) (-2.44) (-0.33) (-1.83) 
d78727 -0.14 -0.0328676 -0.0438047 -0.101194 -0.0904167 
 (-1.41) (-0.6) (-1.67) (-1.73) (-3.05) 
d78731 -0.07 0.0221564 -0.0166742 -0.0427733 0.1003241 
 (-0.64) (0.33) (-0.53) (-0.60) (2.75) 
d78735 -0.01 0.0222401 -0.2148127 -0.1460354 -0.0401561 
 (-0.06) (0.27) (-6.96) (-1.55) (-0.98) 
d78739 0.08 0.0141695 0.0684202 -0.1825838 -0.1088306 
 (0.52) (0.19) (2.16) (-2.56) (-2.92) 
d78741 -0.45 -0.0505509 -0.1811752 -0.486662 -0.2722828 
 (-1.76) (-0.37) (-3.40) (-4.31) (-4.69) 
d78742   -0.9596659 -0.33364 -0.5609631 -0.7016161 
   (-2.24) (-1.04) (-2.45) (-3.11) 
d78744 -0.24 -0.1234831 -0.2703164 -0.3961035 -0.3298018 
 (-2.16) (-1.66) (-7.91) (-5.43) (-8.89) 
d78745 -0.18 -0.1183966 -0.0768935 -0.2230949 -0.1900046 
 (-2.06) (-2.04) (-2.83) (-3.72) (-6.39) 
d78746 0.19 -0.048995 0.1106046 0.0774865 0.2270771 
 (1.76) (-0.8) (3.76) (1.13) (6.60) 
d78747 -0.39 0.1932657 0.2423391 -0.1680338 -0.0663494 
 (0.12) (1.92) (4.51) (-1.60) (-1.21) 
d78748 -0.15 -0.3176521 -0.0138854 -0.1573359 -0.1634756 
 (-1.61) (-5.55) (-0.52) (-2.59) (-5.44) 
d78749 -0.22 -0.0164169 -0.0405877 -0.1612989 -0.151772 
 (-2.72) (-0.33) (-1.75) (-2.99) (-5.80) 
d78751 -0.20 -0.0332009 0.1752547 -0.0780202 0.1361293 
 (-0.70) (-0.19) (2.67) (-0.57) (2.11) 
d78752 -0.05 -0.2122048 0.080056 -0.0216387 -0.0057084 
 (-0.24) (-1.37) (1.31) (-0.17) (-0.09) 
d78753 -0.29 0.0051353 -0.0499893 -0.2006323 -0.2104078 
 (-2.97) (0.08) (-1.68) (-3.19) (-6.50) 
d78754 0.01 0.2443674 -0.0178611 -0.1418497 -0.2448554 
d78724 
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Table D.1 Phase Model - Mueller Airport Analysis  
 
      
lnprice 1980-87 1987-93 1994-998 1999 2000-2001 
 (0.05) (1.26) (-0.33) (-1.24) (-4.02) 
d78756 0.12 0.1234738 0.2001831 0.0402142 0.2238053 
 (0.47) (1.12) (4.12) (0.37) (4.21) 
-0.10 0.0376949 0.0926142 0.1334379 
 (-1.10) (0.59) (2.07) (2.72) 
d78758 -0.11 0.0278587 -0.0583649 -0.203974 -0.1636918 
d78757 0.0874113 
(3.19) 
 (-1.36) (0.48) (-2.17) 
manoise2    
(-3.31) (-5.52) 
   
       
manoise65 -0.10 -0.0550523 -0.0950655 0.0297555 
 (-0.74) (-0.46) (-2.26) (1.19) (0.81) 
0.0853733 
manoise70 0.28 -0.1688074 -0.2421375 0.1307599 0.0643627 
 (1.07) (-0.92) (-3.54) (1.12) (1.08) 
manoise75 -0.03 -0.1641373 -0.2417874 0.3898175 0.2008142 
 (-0.10) (-0.54) (-1.24) (1.03) (2.07) 
madist1 0.30 0.0491092 0.0537751 -0.0788071 -0.119564 
 (1.14) (0.25) (0.74) (-0.53) (-1.69) 
madist2 0.21 -0.0313781 0.0927932 0.0913303 0.0460233 
 (0.91) (-0.2) (1.59) (0.76) (0.84) 
madist3 0.43 0.0078387 0.011259 -0.0131273 0.0529542 
 (1.74) (0.05) (0.20) (-0.11) (1.00) 
madist4 -0.29 0.0688804 -0.0858941 -0.0788822 -0.0438315 
 (-1.41) (0.49) (-1.70) 
madist5 0.02 -0.0355882 -0.0239556 -0.0219084 0.029462 
 (0.13) (-0.34) (-0.59) (-0.27) (0.77) 
0.17 0.0530179 0.1224844 0.0130781 0.0408051 
 (0.96) (5.24) (0.24) (1.59) 
manorrd2 -0.30 -0.2057887 -0.1463644 -0.1334768 
 (-1.60) (0.83) (-1.20) (-2.43) 
manorrd3 -0.44 0.2546136 -0.1459204 0.1199764 -0.1090736 
 (-2.41) (2.39) (-3.44) (1.43) 
abiaroute2 0.45 -0.0328077 0.0854765 -0.1056788 0.0067802 
 (2.78) (-0.34) (2.24) (-1.31) (0.18) 
0.10 -0.0771814 0.0304806 0.057718 0.0282066 
 (-1.24) (1.20) (1.12) (1.07) 
dcbd1   -0.0111683 0.3491263 0.1953725 












Table D.1 Phase Model - Mueller Airport Analysis  
 
      
lnprice 1980-87 1987-93 1994-998 1999 2000-2001 
dcbd2 -0.03 0.1410299 0.0265697 0.1600715 
 (-0.17) (1.59) (0.62) (0.56) 
dcbd3 -0.18 0.1077454 -0.008904 0.1073622 0.1061732 
 (-1.69) (1.69) (-0.29) (1.84) (3.45) 
2.52 0.1418896 0.2657121 0.4502477 0.1921643 
 (6.42) (0.7) (3.03) (2.61) (2.11) 
dut2 -0.25 0.0684207 0.2274176 0.1763875 
 (-1.34) (0.15) (2.56) (3.87) 
dut3 -0.22 0.0932271 0.0634628 0.1784963 0.0606943 
 (-2.01) (1.65) (2.47) (3.19) 
_cons 10.97 11.57655 11.06583 11.35358 11.29665 
 (40.59) (68.08) (147.24) (69.75) (138.13) 
     








684 2623 7474 1947 8659 
F-Stat 21.15 57.96 248.34 56.78 187.21 
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Table E.2  Full Regression Results for Pooled Model 
 
Base case for comparison is a new house with a single bath, constructed of wood 
in zip code 78759, more than three miles away from either the central business 
district or UT. 
 
Number of obs = 21387 
F(151, 21235) = 279.14 
R-squared      = 0.6650 
Adj R-squared = 0.6626 
Root MSE       = .36969 
 
lnprice  Coef. Std. Err.  t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
 
cons  10.96 .0546877 200.47 0.000 10.85599 11.0703   
tla  2.1e-06 1.86e-07 11.29 0.000 1.73e-06 2.46e-06 
age2  -.2422 .0105384 -22.99 0.000 -.2628969 -.2215847 
age3  -.1813 .0095247 -19.04 0.000 -.2000247 -.1626865 
age4  -.2121 .0111665 -18.99 0.000 -.2339954 -.1902209 
age5  -.2106 .0136321 -15.45 0.000 -.2373325 -.1838925 
age6  -.1568 .0178366 -8.79 0.000 -.191783 -.1218609 
dbath2  .05923 .0094779 6.25 0.000 .0406553 .07781 
dfire  .03462 .008055  4.30 0.000 .0188364 .050413 
dpool3  .10524 .0115814 9.09 0.000 .0825398 .1279405 
dspa  .10976 .0191012 5.75 0.000 .0723245 .1472042 
dgarage  .1058 .0099736 10.61 0.000 .086266  .1253641 
dcarport  .1160 .0125108 9.28 0.000 .0915196 .140564 
dmanuf  -.4865 .2176257 -2.24 0.025 -.913153 -.0600272 
dmasonry .0614 .0412889 1.49 0.137 -.019489 .1423698 
pcthsgrad -.4346 .171441  -2.54 0.011 -.7706981 -.0986237 
pctbchdeg -.1696 .150299  -1.13 0.259 -.464245 .1249497 
pctgrddeg 1.783 .1877522 9.50 0.000 1.415021 2.151038 
pctforbrn -.2411 .2100846 -1.15 0.251 -.6528867 .1706766 
pctpopbl  -.4615 .0555589 -8.31 0.000 -.5704578 -.3526584 
pctpopna .8944 .7549879 1.18 0.236 -.5853909 2.374276 
pctpopap -.3161 .2518957 -1.25 0.210 -.8098441 .1776252 
pctvachs  .0747 .1270543 0.59 0.556 -.1742965 .3237754 






Prob > F       = 0.0000 
gba  .00028 6.13e-06 46.67 0.000 .000274  .000298 
dbath3  .09143 .0124693 7.33 0.000 .0669945 .115876 
dbrick  .0354 .0066501 5.33 0.000 .0224435 .048513 
pctpopoth -.2416 .0829213 -2.91 0.004 -.4041376 -.0790735 
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lnprice  Coef. Std. Err.  t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
 
d1980  .2432 .0539016 4.51 0.000 .1376171 .3489195 
d1981  .1972 .0522948 3.77 0.000 .0947605 .2997641 
d1982  .2426 .0462623 5.25 0.000 .152014  .3333691 
d1983  .2148 .0541171 3.97 0.000 .1087776 .3209247 
d1984  .5166 .0397337 13.00 0.000 .4387189 .5944811 
d1985  .5257 .035333  14.88 0.000 .4565134 .5950242 
d1987  .4001 .0413953 9.67 0.000 .3190538 .4813298 
d1988  .1555 .0349041 4.46 0.000 .0871575 .223987 
d1989  .0866 .0308482 2.81 0.005 .0262096 .1471393 
d1991  -.0048 .0269641 -0.18 0.858 -.0576876 .0480157 
d1992  .07087 .0258785 2.74 0.006 .0201502 .1215979 
d1993  .0697 .0252253 2.76 0.006 .0202667 .1191535 
d1994  .1750 .0256185 6.83 0.000 .124817  .2252454 
d1996  .2561 .022219  11.53 0.000 .2125803 .2996819 
d1997  .2485 .0255573 9.72 0.000 .1984292 .2986176 
d1998  .0952 .044835  2.12 0.034 .0073787 .1831387 
d1999  .4244 .0233772 18.16 0.000 .378665  .4703071 
d2000  .5305 .0219188 24.20 0.000 .4875547 .5734797 
d2001  .5976 .0232389 25.72 0.000 .5521136 .6432135 
d78617  -.4006 .1025554 -3.91 0.000 -.6016376 -.199605 
d78653  -.1229 .0835004 -1.47 0.141 -.2865749 .0407593 
d78751  .1038 .0429594 2.42 0.016 .0196686 .1880758 
d78701  .2578 .1587879 1.62 0.104 -.0533884 .5690844 
d78702  -.5796 .0481464 -12.04 0.000 -.6740464 -.4853054 
d78703  .1325 .0317691 4.17 0.000 .0703066 .1948464 
d78704  .0779 .0267979 2.91 0.004 .0253741 .1304261 
d78705  .1100 .0577031 1.91 0.056 -.0030174 .2231875 
d78719  -.4569 .370532  -1.23 0.217 -1.183262 .2692796 
d78721  -.4015 .0536323 -7.49 0.000 -.5066956 -.2964488 
d78723  -.1253 .0388004 -3.23 0.001 -.2014322 -.0493289 
d78724  -.0478 .0421564 -1.13 0.257 -.1304596 .0347998 
d78725  -.3207 .1013757 -3.16 0.002 -.519456 -.1220479 
d78727  -.0907 .0180106 -5.04 0.000 -.1260338 -.0554296 
d78731  .01237 .021858  0.57 0.571 -.0304643 .0552224 
d78735  -.1804 .0237056 -7.61 0.000 -.2269184 -.1339889 
d78739  -.0579 .0226265 -2.56 0.010 -.1023447 -.0136455 
d78742  -.6483 .1355777 -4.78 0.000 -.914084 -.3825991 
d78744  -.3285 .0229192 -14.34 0.000 -.3735101 -.2836635 
d78745  -.1687 .0183387 -9.20 0.000 -.2046556 -.1327649 
d78746  10532 .0204888 5.14 0.000 .0651692 .1454884 
d78747  .0071 .0335604 0.21 0.830 -.0585844 .0729774 
d78748  -.1703 .0182707 -9.32 0.000 -.2061842 -.1345605 
d78749  -.1207 .0159566 -7.57 0.000 -.1520219 -.0894695 
d78752  .0138 .0399689 -0.35 0.728 -.0922169 .0644674 
 
d1986  .4892 .0422058 11.59 0.000 .4065102 .5719633 
d1995  .2172 .0226123 9.61 0.000 .1729078 .2615514 
d78722  -.0186 .0520417 -0.36 0.720 -.1206291 .0833824 
d78741  -.2634 .0368437 -7.15 0.000 -.3356674 -.1912344 
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lnprice  Coef. Std. Err.  t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval 
d78753  -.1671 .0199861 -8.36 0.000 -.206312 -.1279635 
d78754  -.1198 .03877  -3.09 0.002 -.1958736 -.0438893 
d78756  .1586 .033269  4.77 0.000 .0934226 .2238421 
d78757  .0718 .0197445 3.64 0.000 .0331267 .110528 
ma658793 -.0757 .1682678 -0.45 0.653 -.4055728 .2540623 
ma708793 -.5219 .3098329 -1.68 0.092 -1.129268 .0853237 
ma758793 -.6560 .4688006 -1.40 0.162 -1.574917 .2628522 
ma659498 -.0087 .1487795 -0.06 0.953 -.3003704 .2828676 
ma709498 -.3970 .2842953 -1.40 0.163 -.9542613 .1602193 
ma759498 -.2884 .4584155 -0.63 0.529 -1.186981 .6100775 
ma6599  -.0173 .1570425 -0.11 0.912 -.3251848 .2904455 
ma7599  .0031 .5540545 0.01 0.996 -1.082889 1.089089 
ma650001 -.0419 .1461221 -0.29 0.774 -.3283677 .2444531 
ma700001 -.2739 .2806687 -0.98 0.329 -.8241152 .2761486 
ma750001 -.0739 .4108766 -0.18 0.857 -.8793274 .7313712 
mad18793 -.1662 .1904476 -0.87 0.383 -.5395216 .2070619 
mad28793 -.0129 .1342836 -0.10 0.923 -.2761948 .250217 
mad38793 -.0757 .1650186 -0.46 0.646 -.3992118 .2476862 
mad48793 .2141 .1328017 1.61 0.107 -.04618  .4744229 
mad58793 .0900 .1085456 0.83 0.407 -.1227315 .3027838 
mad68793 -.2732 .0970237 -2.82 0.005 -.4634214 -.0830738 
mad19498 -.1143 .1660229 -0.69 0.491 -.4397331 .2111017 
mad29498 .1440 .1198061 1.20 0.229 -.0907743 .3788836 
mad39498 -.0114 .155141  -0.07 0.941 -.3155314 .2926446 
mad49498 .1115 .1167782 0.96 0.339 -.1173311 .3404571 
mad59498 .1100 .1005607 1.09 0.274 -.0871047 .3071084 
mad199  -.0367 .1833367 -0.20 0.841 -.396091 .3226165 
mad299  .3221 .1289828 2.50 0.013 .0693349 .5749671 
mad399  .1353 .1628994 0.83 0.406 -.183907 .4546831 
mad499  .2810 .1230007 2.28 0.022 .0399105 .522092 
mad599  .2628 .1078954 2.44 0.015 .0513207 .4742871 
mad699  -.1152 .0981049 -1.17 0.240 -.307549 .0770371 
mad10001 -.1206 .1631862 -0.74 0.460 -.4404802 .1992345 
mad30001 .1546 .1538959 1.01 0.315 -.1469677 .4563277 
mad40001 .2536 .1143692 2.22 0.027 .0294824 .4778271 
mad50001 .2830 .1002353 2.82 0.005 .0865491 .4794867 
mad60001 -.0964 .0922773 -1.05 0.296 -.2773061 .0844349 
manor28793 -.3840 .1774456 -2.16 0.030 -.7318882 -.0362745 
manor38793 -.1377 .1210112 -1.14 0.255 -.3749293 .0994529 
route28793 -.1955 .134697  -1.45 0.147 -.459596 .0684365 
manor29498 -.3960 .1468082 -2.70 0.007 -.6838143 -.1083039 
manor39498 -.2149 .1080278 -1.99 0.047 -.4267329 -.0032474 
route29498 -.1034 .1213395 -0.85 0.394 -.3412785 .1343907 
route39498 .1223 .0772301 1.58 0.113 -.0289993 .2737542 
 
d78758  -.1234 .0181821 -6.79 0.000 -.159069 -.0877923 
ma7099  -.3188 .2966357 -1.07 0.282 -.9002885 .2625683 
mad69498 -.0836 .0925301 -0.90 0.366 -.2650108 .097721 
mad20001 .2587 .1180244 2.19 0.028 .0273983 .4900717 
route38793 -.0203 .0837187 -0.24 0.808 -.1844748 .1437152 
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lnprice  Coef. Std. Err.  t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval 
manor299 -.7362 .1637858 -4.50 0.000 -1.057316 -.4152504 
route299 -.1715 .1323191 -1.30 0.195 -.4308742 .0878368 
route399 .2560 .0819962 3.12 0.002 .0953204 .4167578 
manor20001 -.4342 .1438576 -3.02 0.003 -.7162208 -.1522772 
manor30001 -.2814 .1064067 -2.65 0.008 -.4900611 -.0729309 
route20001 -.0637 .119502  -0.53 0.594 -.2979651 .1705006 
route30001 .2166 .0764022 2.84 0.005 .0669279 .3664361 
manoise65 .0145 .142548  0.10 0.919 -.2649019 .2939078 
manoise75 .2290 .4005552 0.57 0.567 -.5560271 1.01421 
madist1  .0598 .1611439 0.37 0.710 -.2560089 .3756997 
madist2  -.1539 .1178355 -1.31 0.191 -.3849233 .0770097 
madist3  -.0506 .15377  -0.33 0.745 -.3514618 .2513398 
madist4  -.2571 .1139011 -2.26 0.024 -.4804491 -.0339394 
madist5  -.2073 .1000845 -2.07 0.038 -.4035174 -.0111711 
madist6  .1742 .0910955 1.91 0.056 -.0042678 .3528405 
manorrd3 .1608 .1050544 1.53 0.126 -.0450748 .3667542 
abiaroute2 .1074 .1173422 0.92 0.360 -.1225408 .3374584 
abiaroute3 -.1544 .0753724 -2.05 0.040 -.3021587 -.0066876 
dcbd1  .1771 .0540046 3.28 0.001 .0713303 .2830364 
dcbd2  .1101 .0277477 3.97 0.000 .0557918 .1645671 
dcbd3  .0701 .0197166 3.56 0.000 .0315536 .1088458 
dut1  .2347 .0578808 4.06 0.000 .1212977 .3481993 
dut3  .0740 .0175907 4.21 0.000 .0395671 .1085254 
manor399 -.2822 .1159802 -2.43 0.015 -.5095818 -.0549217 
manoise70 .2971 .2758416 1.08 0.281 -.2435682 .8377724 
manorrd2 .2996 .1391604 2.15 0.031 .026916  .572446 
dut2  .1213 .0290232 4.18 0.000 .0644558 .1782311 
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APPENDIX E: SAMPLE SELECTION STATISTICS 
 
Table E.1  Number of Residential Sales and Mean Sale Prices in Study Area, by Year 
    
 
Residential Properties that 
Sold Twice During the Study 
Period** 
All Residential Properties that 






Residential Properties that 
Sold Once During the 
Study Period 
 Sales  Sales Price* 
Mean  Number  
Sales Price* of Sales 







































































































Table E.1  Number of Residential Sales and Mean Sale Prices in Study Area, by Year 
    
 
Residential Properties that 
Sold Twice During the Study 
Period** 
All Residential Properties that 






Residential Properties that 
Sold Once During the 
Study Period 
 Sales  Sales Price* 
Mean  Number  
Sales Price* of Sales 



















87,601 200,317 1,062 
 
197,580 1,751 
        
Full 
Study 
Period 5,374 $176,927 9,728 $171 099 21,386 









*Mean Sale Price is deflated using the Consumer Price 
Index (base=2001)  
  **Listed by year of first sale  

































E.3  Chart: Mean Noise Level by Year 
 
Chart 2.
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APPENDIX F: REGRESSION RESULTS FOR REPEAT SALES 
 
Table F.1  Repeat Sales: Depreciation Adjusted vs Age Differenced Models 
First Three Time Periods 
 dvote dlist dclose 
 lndep_ratio lnp_ratio lndep_ratio lnp_ratio lndep_ratio lnp_ratio 
       
Age Difference   -0.18297   -0.1830073   -0.183397 
   (-10.58)   (-10.59) 
Event Dummy 
  (-10.66) 
8.230 3.601 8.448 3.592 
 
-0.710 -0.073 
(87.82) (10.79) (93.79) (10.78) (-1.36) (-0.14) 
manoise65 -0.018 -0.013 0.055 0.004 0.051 0.026 
 (-0.08) (-0.06) (0.4) (0.03) (0.44) (0.23) 
manoise3 -0.271 -0.133 -0.026 0.004 0.240 0.242 
 (-0.81) (-0.42) (-0.11) (0.02) 
madist1 
(1.48) (1.53) 
0.181 0.095 0.156 0.120 0.231 0.211 
 (0.89) (0.49) (1.05) (0.82) (1.83) (1.71) 
madist2 0.099 0.228 0.146 0.243 0.221 0.278 
 (0.67) (1.61) (1.42) (2.43) (2.71) (3.49) 
madist3 0.159 0.118 0.199 0.247 0.264 0.311 
 (0.74) (0.58) (1.75) (2.22) (3.07) (3.71) 
madist4 0.215 0.420 0.137 0.288 0.104 0.228 
 (1.38) (2.83) (1.26) (2.71) (1.11) (2.48) 
madist5 0.186 0.211 0.267 0.266 0.241 0.248 
 (1.35) (1.6) (2.7) (2.75) (3.47) (3.66) 
madist6 -0.053 -0.026 0.056 0.079 0.174 0.181 
 (-0.41) (-0.21) (0.73) (1.06) (3.25) (3.47) 
manorrd2 -0.343 -0.475 -0.165 -0.246 -0.185 -0.242 
 (-1.66) (-2.41) (-1.1) (-1.69) (-1.37) (-1.83) 
manorrd3 -0.167 -0.273 -0.137 -0.187 -0.164 -0.179 
 (-0.89) (-1.53) (-0.93) (-1.30) (-1.40) (-1.56) 
abiaroute2 -0.138 0.055 0.014 0.084 0.121 0.175 
 (-0.69) (0.29) (0.11) (0.66) (1.23) (1.83) 
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Table F.1  Repeat Sales: Depreciation Adjusted vs Age Differenced Models 
First Three Time Periods 
 dvote dlist dclose 
 lndep_ratio lnp_ratio lndep_ratio lnp_ratio lndep_ratio lnp_ratio 
       
mills -0.067 -0.106 -0.064 -0.101 -0.059 -0.096 
 (-2.68) (-4.42) (-2.64) (-4.25) (-2.44) (-4.04) 
d1980 -0.269 (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) -9.152 -3.666 
 (-2.47)      (-17.21) (-6.02) 
d1981 -0.103 0.245 0.166 0.246 -8.985 -3.419 
 (-0.97) (2.41) (1.63) (2.43) (-16.92) (-5.70) 
d1982 -0.090 0.459 0.179 0.457 -8.971 -3.206 
 (-0.92) (4.65) (1.91) (4.65) (-16.93) (-5.44) 
d1983 (dropped) 0.603 0.265 0.601 -8.887 -3.062 
   (5.2) (2.51) (5.20) (-16.71) (-5.25) 
d1984 0.344 1.085 0.615 1.086 -8.536 -2.577 
 (3.73) (9.82) (6.98) (9.85) (-16.15) (-4.50) 
d1985 0.400 1.254 0.678 1.263 -8.459 -2.390 
 (4.54) (10.51) (8.07) (10.61) (-16.11) (-4.25) 
d1986 0.394 1.348 0.666 1.347 -8.476 -2.307 
 (4.15) (9.86) (7.33) (9.88) (-16.02) (-4.12) 
d1987 -7.925 -2.239 0.589 1.386 -8.551 -2.267 
 (-105.55) (-10.5) (6.48) (9.25) (-16.16) (-4.10) 
d1988 -8.003 -2.238 0.499 1.370 -8.647 -2.286 
 (-177.9) (-11.5) (5.85) (8.50) (-16.37) (-4.18) 
d1989 -7.945 -2.142 0.562 1.475 -8.585 -2.183 
 (-127.27) (-12.11) (6.9) (8.46) (-16.27) (-4.04) 
d1990 -7.930 -2.070 0.578 1.547 -8.567 -2.109 
 (-130.15) (-12.93) (7.2) (8.16) (-16.24) (-3.94) 
d1991 -7.771 -1.869 -7.728 -1.868 -8.402 -1.902 
 (-133.81) (-13.07) (-136.71) (-13.08) (-15.94) (-3.58) 
d1992 -7.513 -1.612 -7.473 -1.611 -8.152 -1.650 
 (-132.02) (-12.71) (-134.91) (-12.72) (-15.47) (-3.13) 
d1993 -7.299 -1.427 -7.256 -1.426 -7.255 -1.424 
 (-130.98) (-12.85) (-133.77) (-12.86) (-134.17) (-12.9) 
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Table F.1  Repeat Sales: Depreciation Adjusted vs Age Differenced Models 
First Three Time Periods 
 dvote dlist dclose 
 lndep_ratio lnp_ratio lndep_ratio lnp_ratio lndep_ratio lnp_ratio 
       
d1994 -6.962 -1.160 -6.919 -1.159 -6.917 -1.158 
 (-125.39) (-12.06) (-128.04) -12.07 (-128.46) (-12.1) 
d1995 -6.765 -1.057 -6.732 -1.056 -6.729 -1.055 
 (-144.48) (-13.67) (-147.69) (-13.67) (-148.2) (-13.72) 
d1996 -6.546 -0.842 -6.533 -0.841 -6.530 -0.838 
 (-150.78) (-13.58) (-154.59) (-13.58) (-155.08) (-13.6) 
d1997 -6.325 -0.638 -6.300 -0.636 -6.297 -0.633 
 (-125.02) (-11.2) (-127.94) (-11.18) (-128.34) (-11.17) 
d1998 -6.059 -0.548 -6.041 -0.561 -6.049 -0.567 
 (-69.67) (-6.54) (-71.24) (-6.69) (-71.73) (-6.81) 
d1999 -5.701 -0.203 -5.676 -0.202 -5.675 -0.200 
 (-132.86) (-4.95) (-135.88) (-4.93) (-136.37) (-4.91) 
d2000 -5.541 0.035 -5.522 0.035 -5.522 0.036 
 (-149.01) (0.86) (-152.58) (0.86) (-153.16) (0.88) 
d2001 -5.452 0.232 -5.420 0.232 -5.420 0.233 
 (-132.98) (4.33) (-135.85) (4.34) (-136.36) (4.39) 
_cons -5.296 0.335 -5.278 0.333 -5.280 0.330 
 (-198.3) (13.06) (-203.06) (12.97) (-203.98) (12.94) 
           
F-stat 751.89 22.89 789.36 23.3 773.96 24.23 
Prob > F 0 0 0 0 0 0 
R-squared 0.8272 0.1305 0.8341 0.1325 0.8354 0.1405 




Table F.2  Repeat Sales: Depreciation Adjusted vs Age Differenced Models 
Last Two Time Periods    
 dbuild dopen 
 lndep_ratio lnp_ratio lndep_ratio lnp_ratio 
   
Age Difference   -0.18321   -0.2125019 
   (-10.66)   (-10.36) 
Event Dummy 8.442 3.593 0.381 0.093 
 (94.32) (10.84) (9.10) (1.88) 
manoise65 0.059 0.038 0.091 0.058 
 (0.57) (0.38) (0.95) (0.61) 
manoise3 0.217 0.223 0.058 0.089 
 (1.42) (1.49) (0.33) (0.52) 
madist1 0.203 0.187 0.203 0.243 
 (1.81) (1.72) (1.72) (2.09) 
madist2 0.199 0.246 0.207 0.215 
 (2.67) (3.39) (2.88) (3.04) 
madist3 0.301 0.338 0.299 0.311 
 (3.88) (4.46) (4.02) (4.23) 
madist4 0.087 0.187 0.054 0.071 
 (1.09) (2.40) (0.70) (0.93) 
madist5 0.203 0.204 0.274 0.242 
 (3.37) (3.48) (4.49) (4.01) 
madist6 0.171 0.175 0.301 0.270 
 (3.61) (3.78) (6.39) (5.79) 
manorrd2 -0.125 -0.145 -0.018 0.022 
 (-1.05) (-1.24) (-0.14) (0.16) 
manorrd3 -0.139 -0.154 0.150 0.156 
 (-1.29) (-1.46) (1.41) (1.49) 
abiaroute2 0.118 0.159 0.136 0.110 
 (1.40) (1.94) (1.63) (1.34) 
mills -0.058 -0.094 -0.048 -0.089 
 (-2.37) (-3.97) (-2.00) (-3.76) 
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Table F.2  Repeat Sales: Depreciation Adjusted vs Age Differenced Models 
Last Two Time Periods    
 dbuild dopen 
 lndep_ratio lnp_ratio lndep_ratio lnp_ratio 
     
d1980 (dropped) (dropped) -8.113 -4.067 
    (-84.95) (-10.98) 
d1981 0.169 0.249 -7.936 -3.789 
 (1.67) (2.48) (-85.92) (-10.83) 
d1982 0.183 0.459 -7.931 -3.554 
(1.96) (4.70) (-94.52) (-10.84) 
d1983 0.267 0.604 -7.844 -3.366 
 (2.53) (5.26) (-81.35) (-10.79) 
d1984 0.617 1.088 -7.492 -2.861 
 (7.03) (9.93) (-96.33) (-9.99) 
0.692 1.277 -7.414 -2.640 
 (8.28) (10.79) (-101.45) (-9.94) 
d1986 0.678 1.358 -7.437 -2.540 
 (7.52) (10.03) (-92.45) (-10.24) 
d1987 0.603 1.398 -7.509 -2.469 
 (6.68) (9.38) (-92.86) (-10.80) 
d1988 0.508 1.381 -7.595 -2.446 
 (6.00) (8.61) (-101.57) (-11.80) 
d1989 0.569 1.482 -7.544 -2.325 
(7.03) (8.55) (-107.41) (-12.44) 
d1990 0.587 1.556 -7.528 -2.221 
 (7.35) (8.26) (-109.37) (-13.25) 
d1991 0.751 1.762 -7.355 -1.980 
 (9.65) (8.66) (-110.18) (-13.39) 
d1992 1.001 2.014 -7.108 -1.701 
 (12.99) (9.19) (-108.11) (-13.13) 
2.201 -1.489 
 (15.88) (9.36) (-106.38) (-13.31) 
d1994 -6.915 -1.157 -6.562 -1.196 




d1993 1.218 -6.895 
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Table F.2  Repeat Sales: Depreciation Adjusted vs Age Differenced Models 
Last Two Time Periods    
 dbuild dopen 
 lndep_ratio lnp_ratio lndep_ratio lnp_ratio 
     
d1995 -6.728 -1.055 -6.393 -1.065 
(-148.31) (-13.73) (-113.76) (-13.88) 
d1996 -6.529 -0.838 -6.205 -0.822 
 (-155.22) (-13.61) (-117.27) (-13.25) 
d1997 -6.297 -0.634 -5.973 -0.591 
 (-128.45) (-11.20) (-102.35) (-9.93) 
d1998 -6.047 -0.567 -5.688 -0.458 
 (-71.79) (-6.81) (-63.63) (-5.18) 
d1999 -5.674 -0.201 -5.446 -0.129 
 (-136.48) (-4.93) (-115.4) (-2.54) 
d2000 -5.521 0.035 -5.609 0.036 
 (-153.26) (0.88) (-154.06) (0.89) 
d2001 -5.421 0.231 -5.514 0.260 
 (-136.5) (4.35) (-137.43) (4.75) 
_cons -5.281 0.329 -5.250 0.336 
(-204.2) (12.89) (-202.05) (12.60) 
       
F-stat 798.08 25.16 800.6 25.26 
Prob > F 0 0 0 0 
R-squared 0.8356 0.1416 0.84 0.1456 






Table F.3  Repeat Sales: Event Dates, Depreciation Adjusted 
      
 dvote dlist dclose dbuild dopen 
 lndep_ratio lndep_ratio lndep_ratio lndep_ratio lndep_ratio
      
           
Event Dummy 8.230 8.448 -0.710 8.442 0.381 
 (87.82) (93.79) (-1.36) (94.32) (9.10) 
manoise65 -0.018 0.055 0.051 0.059 0.091 
 (-0.08) (0.4) (0.44) (0.57) (0.95) 
manoise3 -0.271 -0.026 0.240 0.217 0.058 
 (-0.81) (-0.11) (1.48) (1.42) (0.33) 
madist1 0.181 0.156 0.231 0.203 0.203 
 (0.89) (1.05) (1.83) (1.81) (1.72) 
madist2 0.099 0.146 0.221 0.199 0.207 
 (0.67) (1.42) (2.71) (2.67) (2.88) 
madist3 0.159 0.199 0.264 0.301 0.299 
 (0.74) (1.75) (3.07) (3.88) (4.02) 
madist4 0.215 0.137 0.104 0.087 0.054 
 (1.38) (1.26) (1.11) (1.09) (0.70) 
madist5 0.186 0.267 0.241 0.203 0.274 
 (1.35) (2.7) (3.47) (3.37) (4.49) 
madist6 -0.053 0.056 0.174 0.171 0.301 
 (-0.41) (0.73) (3.25) (3.61) (6.39) 
manorrd2 -0.343 -0.165 -0.185 -0.125 -0.018 
 (-1.66) (-1.1) (-1.37) (-1.05) (-0.14) 
manorrd3 -0.167 -0.137 -0.164 -0.139 0.150 
 (-0.89) (-0.93) (-1.40) (-1.29) (1.41) 
abiaroute2 -0.138 0.014 0.121 0.118 0.136 
 (-0.69) (0.11) (1.23) (1.40) (1.63) 
mills -0.067 -0.064 -0.059 -0.058 -0.048 
 (-2.68) (-2.64) (-2.44) (-2.37) (-2.00) 
d1980 -0.269 (dropped) -9.152 (dropped) -8.113 
 (-2.47)   (-17.21)   (-84.95) 
d1981 -0.103 0.166 -8.985 0.169 -7.936 
 (-0.97) (1.63) (-16.92) (1.67) (-85.92) 
d1982 -0.090 0.179 -8.971 0.183 -7.931 
 (-0.92) (1.91) (1.96) (-16.93) (-94.52) 
d1983 (dropped) 0.265 -8.887 0.267 -7.844 
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Table F.3  Repeat Sales: Event Dates, Depreciation Adjusted 
      
 dvote dlist dclose dbuild dopen 
 lndep_ratio lndep_ratio lndep_ratio lndep_ratio lndep_ratio
      
   (2.51) (-16.71) (2.53) (-81.35) 
d1984 0.344 0.615 -8.536 0.617 -7.492 
 (3.73) (6.98) (-16.15) (7.03) (-96.33) 
d1985 0.400 0.678 -8.459 0.692 -7.414 
(4.54) (8.07) (-16.11) (8.28) (-101.45) 
d1986 0.394 0.666 -8.476 0.678 -7.437 
 (4.15) (7.33) (-16.02) (7.52) (-92.45) 
d1987 -7.925 0.589 -8.551 0.603 -7.509 
 (-105.55) (6.48) (-16.16) (6.68) (-92.86) 
d1988 -8.003 0.499 -8.647 0.508 -7.595 
 (-177.9) (5.85) (-16.37) (6.00) (-101.57) 
d1989 -7.945 0.562 -8.585 0.569 -7.544 
 (-127.27) (6.9) (-16.27) (7.03) (-107.41) 
d1990 -7.930 0.578 -8.567 0.587 -7.528 
 (-130.15) (7.2) (-16.24) (7.35) (-109.37) 
d1991 -7.771 -7.728 -8.402 0.751 -7.355 
 (-133.81) (-136.71) (-15.94) (9.65) (-110.18) 
d1992 -7.513 -7.473 -8.152 1.001 -7.108 
 (-132.02) (-134.91) (-15.47) (12.99) (-108.11) 
d1993 -7.299 -7.256 -7.255 1.218 -6.895 
 (-130.98) (-133.77) (-134.17) (15.88) (-106.38) 
d1994 -6.962 -6.919 -6.917 -6.915 -6.562 
 (-125.39) (-128.04) (-128.46) (-128.56) (-101.77) 
d1995 -6.765 -6.732 -6.729 -6.728 -6.393 
 (-144.48) (-147.69) (-148.2) (-148.31) (-113.76) 
d1996 -6.546 -6.533 -6.530 -6.529 -6.205 
 (-150.78) (-154.59) (-155.08) (-155.22) (-117.27) 
d1997 -6.325 -6.300 -6.297 -6.297 -5.973 
 (-125.02) (-127.94) (-128.34) (-128.45) (-102.35) 
d1998 -6.059 -6.041 -6.049 -6.047 -5.688 
 (-69.67) (-71.24) (-71.73) (-71.79) (-63.63) 
d1999 -5.701 -5.676 -5.675 -5.674 -5.446 
 (-132.86) (-135.88) (-136.37) (-136.48) (-115.4) 
d2000 -5.541 -5.522 -5.522 -5.521 -5.609 
 (-149.01) (-152.58) (-153.16) (-153.26) (-154.06) 
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Table F.3  Repeat Sales: Event Dates, Depreciation Adjusted 
      
 dvote dlist dclose dbuild dopen 
 lndep_ratio lndep_ratio lndep_ratio lndep_ratio lndep_ratio
      
d2001 -5.452 -5.420 -5.420 -5.421 -5.514 
 (-132.98) (-135.85) (-136.36) (-136.5) (-137.43) 
_cons -5.296 -5.278 -5.280 -5.281 -5.250 
 (-198.3) (-203.06) (-203.98) (-204.2) (-202.05) 
           
F-stat 751.89 789.36 773.96 798.08 800.6 
Prob > F 0 0 0 0 0 
R-squared 0.8272 0.8341 0.8354 0.8356 0.84 




Table F.4  Repeat Sales Model: Event 
Dates    
      
 Vote  List  Close 
      
Event 0.139061  0.186331  -0.09601
 (1.54)  (2.10)  (-0.19) 
Noise65 -0.013849  0.024726  0.063676
 (-0.07)  (0.19)  (0.56) 
Noise3 -0.146915  0.012852  0.295729
 (-0.46)  (0.06)  (1.89) 
MAdist1 0.1070701  0.133565  0.267897
 (0.56)  (0.92)  (2.23) 
MAdist2 0.226329  0.244079  0.288262
 (1.59)  (2.43)  (3.60) 
MAdist3 0.1201507  0.240237  0.29608
 (0.58)  (2.14)  (3.50) 
MAdist4 0.4094119  0.282046  0.226904
 (2.74)  (2.63)  (2.44) 
MAdist5 0.2159986  0.270559  0.25188
 (1.63)  (2.78)  (3.69) 
MAdist6 -0.02492  0.079992  0.180599
 (-0.20)  (1.07)  (3.42) 
ManorRd2 -0.468308  -0.2462  -0.25684
 (-2.36)  (-1.68)  (-1.93) 
ManorRd3 -0.263816  -0.17844  -0.16782
 (-1.46)  (-1.23)  (-1.45) 
mills -0.089589  -0.0854  -0.08079
 (-3.72)  (-3.55)  (-3.37) 
d1980 -0.056758  (dropped)  -0.27606
 (-0.54)    (-0.53) 
d1981 0.0110407  0.06872  -0.20647
 (0.11)  (0.68)  (-0.39) 
d1982 0.0356464  0.090184  -0.18444
 (0.38)  (0.97)  (-0.35) 
d1983 (dropped)  0.054144  -0.2204
   (0.52)  (-0.42) 
d1984 0.2978727  0.354952  0.077763
 (3.37)  (4.08)  (0.15) 
d1985 0.2849018  0.350918  0.086877
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Table F.4  Repeat Sales Model: Event 
Dates    
      
 Vote  List  Close 
      
 (3.37)  (4.23)  (0.17) 
d1986 0.1936977  0.248469  -0.02095
 (2.13)  (2.77)  (-0.04) 
d1987 -0.113374  0.105827  -0.1606
 (-1.57)  (1.18)  (-0.31) 
d1988 -0.295372  -0.09402  -0.36596
 (-4.53)  (-1.12)  (-0.70) 
d1989 -0.380106  -0.17003  -0.44266
 (-6.33)  (-2.12)  (-0.85) 
d1990 -0.49224  -0.28091  -0.55212
 (-8.40)  (-3.54)  (-1.06) 
d1991 -0.474168  -0.47291  -0.5285
 (-8.49)  (-8.48)  (-1.02) 
d1992 -0.399487  -0.39819  -0.46068
 (-7.30)  (-7.28)  (-0.89) 
d1993 -0.395171  -0.39391  -0.39096
 (-7.38)  (-7.36)  (-7.33) 
d1994 -0.310175  -0.30908  -0.30614
 (-5.81)  (-5.80)  (-5.76) 
d1995 -0.388443  -0.38737  -0.3851
 (-8.63)  (-8.61)  (-8.60) 
d1996 -0.353422  -0.35235  -0.34914
 (-8.47)  (-8.45)  (-8.40) 
d1997 -0.316073  -0.31459  -0.31158
 (-6.50)  (-6.47)  (-6.44) 
-0.41243  -0.42528  -0.43273
 (-4.93)  (-5.08)  (-5.20) 
d1999 -0.243709  -0.24293  -0.24129
 (-5.91)  (-5.89)  (-5.88) 
d2000 -0.172775  -0.17289  -0.17256
 (-4.83)  (-4.84)  (-4.85) 
d2001 -0.155482  -0.15545  -0.15522
 (-3.94)  (-3.95)  (-3.96) 
Constant 0.2962928  0.293721  0.291657
 (11.54)  (11.45)  (11.42) 
      
d1998 
 243
Table F.4  Repeat Sales Model: Event 
Dates    
      
 Vote  List  Close 
      
Number of obs 5374 5374  5374
F-stat 811.85 796.67 824.29
0 0  
R-squared 0.8338 0.8353  0.84
Adj R-squared 0.8328 0.8343  0.839
0.52305 0.52067  0.51329
 
 




Table F.5  All Sales: Event Dates   
dbuild 
 
Only Environmental Variables Interact with Event Dummy  
(t-statistics in parentheses)     
     
  dlist dclose dopen 
Event Dummy 0.2871 -0.1931 -0.1204 -0.6584 
 (5.28) (-2.68) (-2.68) (-28.29) 
gba 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 
 (45.58) (45.73) (45.83) (45.82) 
tla 2.07E-06 2.07E-06 2.06E-06 2.06E-06 2.06E-06 






(10.98) (10.98) (10.98) 
-0.0126 -0.0122 -0.0121 -0.0120 -0.0122 
 (-20.52) (-20.25) (-20.14) (-20.48) 
agesq  0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 
 (19.69) (18.89) (18.54) (18.94) 
bath2  0.0530 0.0523 0.0507 0.0503 
 (5.61) (5.54) (5.37) (5.37) 
bath3  0.0748 0.0731 0.0733 0.0728 
 (6.00) (5.96) (5.82) (5.84) (5.80) 
0.0193 0.0193 0.0199 0.0202 0.0205 
 (2.41) (2.49) (2.52) (2.56) 
pool  0.1108 0.1091 0.1094 0.1090 
 (9.48) (9.40) (9.35) 
spa  0.1032 0.1024 0.1016 0.1018 
 (5.35) (5.32) (5.28) (5.29) (5.34) 
garage  0.1050 0.1035 0.1036 
 (10.44) (10.28) (10.34) (10.31) 






















 (10.49) (10.33) (10.29) (10.26) (10.03) 
manuf  -0.5689 -0.5883 -0.5875 -0.5843 
 (-2.47) (-2.61) (-2.70) (-2.70) (-2.69) 
masonry  0.0617 0.0674 0.0677 0.0666 0.0655 
(1.51) (1.65) (1.66) (1.63) (1.60) 
brick  0.0483 0.0493 0.0489 0.0489 0.0481 
 (7.42) (7.58) (7.52) (7.53) (7.40) 
hsgrad  -0.3940 -0.3965 -0.4015 -0.4075 -0.4891 
(-2.33) (-2.35) (-2.38) (-2.41) (-2.88) 
bchdeg  -0.3518 -0.3654 -0.3679 -0.3711 -0.4032 
 (-2.37) (-2.47) (-2.48) (-2.51) (-2.71) 
grddeg  1.8318 1.8595 1.8725 1.8578 1.9442 
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Table F.5  All Sales: Event Dates   
dbuild 
 
Only Environmental Variables Interact with Event Dummy   
(t-statistics in parentheses)     
      
  dvote dlist dclose dopen 
-0.5566 -0.5571 -0.5562 -0.5237 
 (-11.13) (-11.27) (-11.27) (-11.25) (-10.33) 
popna  1.5913 1.6688 1.7110 1.6713 1.7253 
 (2.12) (2.22) (2.28) (2.22) (2.29) 
popap  -0.5159 -0.5018 -0.4986 -0.4867 
 (-2.07) (-2.02) (-2.00) (-1.98) (-1.94) 
popoth  -0.2377 -0.2220 -0.2203 -0.2241 -0.2224 
 (-2.93) (-2.73) (-2.71) (-2.76) (-2.72) 
vacant -0.0437 -0.0453 -0.0287 -0.0185 0.0179 
 (-0.35) (-0.36) (-0.23) (-0.15) (0.14) 
ownocc  -0.0102 -0.0130 -0.0126 -0.0120 -0.0083 
 (-0.36) (-0.46) (-0.44) (-0.42) (-0.29) 
78617 -0.4551 -0.4559 -0.4541 -0.4541 -0.4484 
 (-4.39) (-4.40) (-4.39) (-4.39) (-4.33) 
78653 -0.1726 -0.1721 -0.1726 -0.1743 -0.1690 
 (-2.05) (-2.05) (-2.05) (-2.07) (-2.01) 
78701 0.3798 0.3789 0.3823 0.3781 0.3641 
 (2.38) (2.38) (2.40) (2.37) (2.29) 
78702 -0.5959 -0.5936 -0.5939 -0.5948 -0.5752 
 (-13.48) (-13.43) (-13.44) (-13.45) (-12.90) 
78703 0.1795 0.1727 0.1708 0.1731 0.1594 
 (5.90) (5.67) (5.60) (5.67) (5.15) 
78704 0.0785 0.0779 0.0778 0.0780 0.0839 
 (2.95) (2.93) (2.92) (-2.93) (3.14) 
78705 0.0512 0.0561 0.0660 0.0678 0.0972 
 (0.92) (1.01) (1.19) (1.22) (1.74) 
78719 -0.5451 -0.5450 -0.5428 -0.5430 -0.5322 
 (-1.45) (-1.46) (-1.45) (-1.45) (-1.42) 
78721 -0.3514 -0.3421 -0.3359 -0.3361 -0.3027 
 (-7.70) (-7.51) (-7.37) (-7.37) (-6.52) 
78722 -0.0492 -0.0463 -0.0425 -0.0417 -0.0013 
 (-1.26) (-1.19) (-1.09) (-1.07) (-0.03) 
78723 -0.1650 -0.1567 -0.1509 -0.1495 -0.1097 
 (9.89) (10.04) (10.01) (10.41) 
forbrn  -0.3225 -0.3574 -0.3699 
 (-1.57) (-1.74) (-1.80) (-1.83) 






Table F.5  All Sales: Event Dates    
Only Environmental Variables Interact with Event Dummy   
(t-statistics in parentheses)     
      
  dvote dlist dclose dbuild dopen 
 (-6.48) (-6.15) (-5.89) (-5.83) (-4.06) 
78724 -0.0110 -0.0028 -0.0008 -0.0024 -0.0228 
 (-0.28) (-0.07) (-0.02) (-0.06) (-0.56) 
78725 -0.3368 -0.3423 -0.3428 -0.3444 -0.3092 
 (-3.35) (-3.42) (-3.42) (-3.44) (-3.07) 
78727 -0.0982 -0.0960 -0.0951 -0.0961 -0.0945 
 (-5.44) (-5.31) (-5.27) (-5.32) (-5.23) 
78731 0.0333 0.0309 0.0299 0.0313 0.0201 
 (1.54) (1.43) (1.38) (1.45) (0.93) 
78735 -0.1845 -0.1843 -0.1835 -0.1831 -0.1823 
 (-7.72) (-7.72) (-7.69) (-7.67) (-7.63) 
78739 -0.0585 -0.0559 -0.0544 -0.0547 -0.0555 
 (-2.56) (-2.45) (-2.38) (-2.40) (-2.43) 
78741 -0.2556 -0.2499 -0.2463 -0.2471 -0.2329 
 (-7.48) (-7.32) (-7.21) (-7.23) (-6.64) 
78742 -0.6828 -0.6836 -0.6758 -0.6804 -0.6572 
 (-5.05) (-5.06) (-5.00) (-5.04) (-4.84) 
78744 -0.3594 -0.3606 -0.3597 -0.3601 -0.3592 
 (-15.73) (-15.79) (-15.75) (-15.77) (-15.69) 
78745 -0.1904 -0.1909 -0.1901 -0.1908 -0.1828 
 (-10.42) (-10.45) (-10.40) (-10.44) (-9.97) 
78746 0.1042 0.1020 0.1008 0.1013 0.0924 
 (5.14) (5.03) (4.97) (4.99) (4.53) 
78747 -0.0124 -0.0136 -0.0139 -0.0136 -0.0100 
 (-0.37) (-0.40) (-0.41) (-0.40) (-0.29) 
78748 -0.1971 -0.1960 -0.1946 -0.1953 -0.1908 
 (-10.80) (-10.74) (-10.66) (-10.7) (-10.44) 
78749 -0.1363 -0.1347 -0.1337 -0.1345 -0.1308 
 (-8.51) (-8.42) (-8.36) (-8.41) (-8.17) 
78751 0.1098 0.1270 0.1384 0.1469 0.1747 
 (3.59) (4.14) (4.49) (4.74) (5.37) 
78752 -0.0251 -0.0211 -0.0182 -0.0128 0.0288 
 (-0.78) (-0.66) (-0.57) (-0.40) (0.85) 
78753 -0.1837 -0.1830 -0.1821 -0.1829 -0.1791 
 (-9.22) (-9.19) (-9.14) (-9.18) (-8.98) 
78754 -0.1656 -0.1645 -0.1627 -0.1640 -0.1571 
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Table F.5  All Sales: Event Dates    
Only Environmental Variables Interact with Event Dummy   
(t-statistics in parentheses)     
      
  dvote dlist dclose dbuild dopen 
 (-4.25) (-4.22) (-4.18) (-4.21) (-4.03) 
78756 0.1471 0.1495 0.1511 0.1560 0.1876 
 (5.37) (5.43) (5.43) (5.60) (6.33) 
78757 0.0968 0.0977 0.0983 0.0990 0.1054 
 (5.04) (5.09) (5.12) (5.16) (5.47) 
78758 -0.1259 -0.1256 -0.1249 -0.1261 -0.1229 





manoise65 -0.0321 0.0306 -0.0450 -0.0952 -0.0167 
 (-0.24) (0.35) (-0.62) (-1.46) (-0.49) 
manoise3 0.1649 -0.0323 -0.1649 -0.1305 -0.1032 
 (0.80) (-0.24) (-1.48) (-1.33) (-1.96) 
0.0913 -0.0210 -0.0193 -0.0230 -0.0759 
 (0.64) (-0.21) (-0.23) (-0.28) (-1.69) 
madsit2 -0.1501 -0.1969 -0.1541 -0.0460 
 (-1.42) (-2.68) (-2.53) (-2.06) (-1.47) 
madist3 -0.1031 -0.1967 -0.1242 -0.1242 -0.1038 
 (-0.74) (-2.53) (-2.00) (-2.30) (-3.33) 
madist4 -0.2446 -0.1602 -0.1168 -0.1117 -0.1341 
 (-2.26) (-2.13) (-1.90) (-1.98) (-4.45) 
madist5 -0.2232 -0.1630 -0.1038 -0.1126 -0.0994 
 (-2.40) (-2.72) (-2.31) (-2.74) (-4.11) 
madist6 0.0569 -0.0384 -0.0564 -0.0510 0.0342 
 (0.74) (-0.85) (-1.66) (-1.67) (1.92) 
manorrd2 0.3502 0.2730 0.1512 0.1107 -0.0493 
 (2.65) (2.75) (1.75) (1.38) (-1.16) 
manorrd3 0.2359 0.1887 0.1196 0.0932 0.0252 
 (2.41) (2.83) (2.19) (1.88) (0.90) 
abiaroute2 0.0625 -0.0932 -0.0867 -0.0477 -0.0540 
 (0.60) (-1.25) (-1.49) (-0.92) (-1.84) 
abiaroute3 -0.1426 -0.1925 -0.1730 -0.1596 -0.0596 
 (-2.07) (-4.56) (-5.01) (-5.07) (-3.31) 
cbd1 0.0463 0.0609 0.0687 0.0783 
 (0.87) (1.14) (1.29) (1.46) (1.38) 
cbd2 0.0773 0.0815 0.0826 0.0838 0.0790 
 (2.85) (3.00) (3.04) (3.09) (2.89) 
cbd3 0.0603 0.0606 0.0605 0.0611 0.0591 
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Table F.5  All Sales: Event Dates    
Only Environmental Variables Interact with Event Dummy   
(t-statistics in parentheses)     
      
  dvote dlist dclose dbuild dopen 
 (3.07) (3.09) (3.09) (3.12) (3.01) 
ut1 0.2413 0.2518 0.2443 0.2432 0.2369 
 (4.27) (4.46) (4.33) (4.31) (4.16) 
ut2 0.1230 0.1307 0.1325 0.1313 0.1289 
 (4.52) (4.80) (4.86) (4.81) (4.64) 
ut3 0.0930 0.0979 0.0996 0.1004 0.0998 











d1980 (dropped) 0.2657 0.2652 0.2672 0.2720 
  (4.91) (4.91) (4.95) (5.04) 
d1981 -0.0330 0.2390 0.2415 0.2422 0.2485 
 (-0.48) (4.57) (4.62) (4.64) (4.77) 
0.0125 0.2860 0.2885 0.2900 
 (0.19) (6.25) (6.36) (6.34) 
d1983 -0.0188 0.2548 0.2571 0.2591 0.2624 
 (-0.27) (4.68) (4.73) (4.77) 
d1984 0.2905 0.5625 0.5622 0.5625 0.5687 
 (4.84) (14.19) (14.20) (14.22) 
d1985 0.2971 0.5803 0.5852 0.5859 0.5829 
 (5.21) (16.75) (16.91) (16.94) 
d1986 0.2583 0.5380 0.5396 0.5385 
 (4.17) (12.81) (12.87) (12.85) 
d1987 0.1121 0.3979 0.3987 0.3975 0.3895 
 (1.81) (9.51) (9.54) (9.52) (9.34) 
d1988 0.1758 0.1640 0.1659 0.1666 0.1742 
 (4.99) (4.65) (4.71) (4.73) 
d1989 0.0973 0.0972 0.0972 0.1005 
 (3.29) (3.12) (3.12) (3.12) (3.23) 
d1991 0.0037 0.0031 0.0036 0.0030 0.0029 
 (0.13) (0.11) (0.13) (0.11) (0.11) 
0.0848 -0.0609 0.0812 0.0807 0.0819 
 (3.25) (-1.43) (3.11) (3.09) (3.14) 
d1993 0.0813 -0.0647 0.0777 0.0781 0.0807 
 (3.19) (-1.54) (3.05) (3.07) (3.17) 
d1994 0.2175 0.0714 (dropped) 0.2181 0.2174 
 (8.49) (1.69)  (8.52) (8.50) 
d1995 0.2650 0.1188 0.0472 0.1209 0.2667 
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Table F.5  All Sales: Event Dates    
Only Environmental Variables Interact with Event Dummy   
(t-statistics in parentheses)     
      
  dvote dlist dclose dbuild dopen 
 (11.78) (2.95) (2.88) (3.00) (11.88) 




0.0953 0.1689 0.3130 
 (14.20) (4.17) (6.03) (4.22) (14.22) 
d1997 0.3066 0.1603 0.1622 0.3069 
 (12.03) (3.82) (4.37) (3.87) (12.06) 
0.1476 (dropped) -0.0729 (dropped) 0.1594 
 (3.29)  (-1.73)  (3.55) 
d1999 0.5061 0.3590 0.2868 0.3601 0.5099 
 (22.09) (8.88) (16.98) (8.92) (22.28) 
d2000 0.6111 0.4641 0.3919 0.4653 -0.0635 
 (28.03) (11.67) (25.58) (11.71) (-6.34) 
d2001 0.6743 0.5274 0.4552 0.5286 (dropped) 
 (29.09) (13.02) (26.46) (13.05)  
_cons 10.9869 11.1310 11.1984 11.1255 11.6499 
 (202.03) (172.61) (214.16) (172.59) (224.44) 
     
Number of obs 21387 21387 21387 21387 21387
F-stat 427.52 428.71 429.23 429.47 429.82
Prob > F 0 0 0 0 0
R-squared 0.6561 0.6567 0.657 0.657 0.6573




Table F.6 All Sales: Event Dates    
All Variables Interact with Event Dummy    
(t-statistics in parentheses)     
      
  dvote dlist dclose dbuild dopen 
      
Event Dummy (dropped) -0.5150 (dropped) -0.1315 (dropped) 
   (-1.76)   (-0.63)   
gba 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 
 (4.00) (7.79) (9.68) (10.74) (25.36) 
tla 2.28E-06 -5.60E-07 3.17E-07 -3.62E-07 1.38E-06 
 (0.46) (-0.44) (0.37) (-0.47) (4.60) 
age  -0.0028 -0.0093 -0.0112 -0.0115 -0.0130 
 (-0.36) (-2.41) (-4.02) (-4.64) (-13.00) 
agesq  0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 
 (0.35) (2.01) (4.15) (4.56) (10.78) 
bath2  0.1114 0.1312 0.1225 0.1125 0.0889 
 (1.20) (2.38) (2.96) (3.03) (5.39) 
bath3  0.1463 0.1784 0.2161 0.1855 0.1290 
 (1.18) (2.51) (4.06) (3.91) (6.04) 
fire  0.1461 0.0847 0.0773 0.0624 0.0343 
 (2.11) (2.01) (2.36) (2.07) (2.50) 
pool  0.0970 0.1154 0.1547 0.1605 0.1445 
 (0.88) (1.92) (3.48) (4.00) (7.62) 
spa  0.1234 0.1002 0.1242 0.1369 0.1105 
 (0.69) (1.20) (1.95) (2.32) (3.70) 
garage  0.0683 0.1057 0.1036 0.1138 0.1169 
 (0.72) (1.84) (2.36) (2.96) (6.55) 
carport  -0.0191 0.0854 0.0769 0.0897 0.1261 
 (-0.16) (1.12) (1.36) (1.77) (5.67) 
manuf  -0.5310 -0.6327 -0.6153 -0.6270 -0.5166 
 (-0.78) (-1.01) (-1.02) (-1.05) (-1.82) 
masonry  -0.5141 -0.2802 -0.1137 -0.0694 0.0077 
 (-0.97) (-1.01) (-0.50) (-0.36) (0.10) 
brick  0.0405 0.0735 -0.0238 -0.0016 0.0415 
 (0.63) (2.05) (-0.89) (-0.07) (3.81) 
hsgrad  1.0587 -0.3194 -2.3704 -1.6272 -1.0271 
 (0.65) (-0.34) (-3.27) (-2.47) (-3.47) 
bchdeg  -0.6718 -0.2452 -1.1496 -0.7770 -0.4740 
 (-0.46) (-0.30) (-1.85) (-1.37) (-1.84) 
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Table F.6 All Sales: Event Dates    
All Variables Interact with Event Dummy    
(t-statistics in parentheses)     
      
  dvote dlist dclose dbuild dopen 
      
grddeg  3.6149 2.0767 0.9452 1.4704 2.1336 
 (2.10) (2.06) (1.23) (2.11) (6.69) 
forbrn  -0.6336 0.1597 2.0188 1.0652 -0.3875 
 (-0.29) (0.14) (2.23) (1.29) (-1.06) 
popbl  0.1015 -0.4581 -0.6274 -0.4256 -0.5356 













 (-0.37) (0.15) (1.43) (1.62) (2.23) 
popap  -0.6316 -1.4393 -4.2046 -2.7989 -0.5218 
 (-0.22) (-1.02) (-3.860 (-2.83) (-1.19) 
popoth  0.1216 -0.2947 -1.1033 -0.8101 -0.2041 
 (0.15) (-0.62) (-2.97) (-2.44) (-1.40) 
vacant 0.4373 0.3312 -0.3307 -0.3228 0.0619 
 (0.36) (0.44) (-0.58) (-0.62) (0.28) 
ownocc  -0.0865 -0.0052 0.2363 0.2013 0.0255 
 (-0.31) (-0.03) (2.04) (1.91) (0.53) 
78617 -0.0236 0.2885 0.1833 0.2525 -0.2794 
 (-0.04) (0.63) (0.42) (0.59) (-1.37) 
78653 (dropped) 0.2814 0.4650 0.4829 0.0822 
   (0.44) (1.41) (1.63) (0.59) 
78701 (dropped) 2.2818 2.4769 2.3840 0.8717 
   (3.28) (3.84) (3.77) (3.00) 
78702 -0.2777 -0.5770 -1.0499 -1.0507 -0.7455 
 (-0.50) (-1.82) (-4.11) (-4.62) (-8.45) 
78703 0.0000 0.2185 0.0941 0.0930 0.1113 
 (-1.34) (1.27) (0.72) (0.77) (2.05) 
78704 -0.0807 0.0381 -0.0370 -0.0104 0.0532 
 (-0.38) (0.28) (-0.35) (-0.11) (1.17) 
78705 -2.1199 0.0681 -0.1493 -0.1058 0.0179 
 (-2.52) (0.18) (-0.59) (-0.46) (0.18) 
78719 (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) 
           
78721 -1.3980 -1.0945 -1.0932 -1.0201 -0.4333 
 (-2.53) (-3.02) (-3.75) (-3.81) (-4.33) 
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Table F.6 All Sales: Event Dates    
All Variables Interact with Event Dummy    
(t-statistics in parentheses)     
      
  dvote dlist dclose dbuild dopen 
      
78722 0.2091 -0.1931 -0.4179 -0.3884 -0.0605 
 (0.32) (-0.54) (-1.50) (-1.64) (-0.64) 
78723 -0.1580 -0.1119 -0.2603 -0.2803 -0.1290 
 (-0.33) (-0.42) (-1.31) (-1.63) (-1.82) 
78724 -0.3929 -0.3634 -0.3080 -0.4750 0.0772 
 (-0.75) (-1.29) (-1.30) (-2.26) (1.06) 
78725 -0.4743 -0.3137 -0.0407 -0.3949 -0.3361 
 (-0.59) (-0.47) (-0.09) (-1.10) (-1.96) 
-0.1183 -0.0961 -0.0999 -0.0740 -0.0780 
 (-0.66) (-1.01) (-1.41) (-1.15) (-2.56) 
78731 -0.1655 -0.0571 0.0254 -0.0311 -0.0270 













(-0.37) (-0.19) (-0.66) (-5.99) 
0.0678 0.0546 0.0188 0.0466 0.0047 
 (0.23) (0.37) (0.19) (0.53) (0.12) 
78741 -0.4210 -0.1691 -0.1701 -0.1449 -0.2356 
 (-1.06) (-0.74) (-0.95) (-0.90) (-3.69) 
78742 -0.3053 -0.2524 -1.1546 -1.1659 -0.6380 
 (-1.55) (-2.12) (-1.90) (-1.94) (-2.84) 
78744 -0.1760 -0.1297 -0.2289 -0.2706 -0.3349 
(-1.11) (-1.37) (-2.45) (-3.18) (-8.53) 
78745 0.1062 0.1075 -0.1542 -0.1371 -0.1446 
 (0.60) (1.05) (-2.12) (-2.06) (-4.63) 
78746 -0.4657 -0.1842 -0.0472 -0.0060 0.0326 
 (-1.98) (-1.15) (-0.60) (-0.08) (0.96) 
78747 -0.1552 -0.0716 -0.0601 -0.0371 0.0377 
 (-0.87) (-0.74) (-0.51) (-0.33) (0.66) 
78748 -0.2012 -0.0951 -0.3757 -0.3145 -0.1741 
 (-1.36) (-1.12) (-5.12) (-4.71) (-5.63) 
78749 -0.3558 -0.0463 -0.0777 -0.0680 -0.0891 
 (-0.69) (-0.16) (-1.23) (-1.19) (-3.29) 
78751 0.0005 -0.0761 -0.1158 -0.0371 0.0706 






Table F.6 All Sales: Event Dates    
All Variables Interact with Event Dummy    
(t-statistics in parentheses)     
      
  dvote dlist dclose dbuild dopen 
      
78752 -0.2787 -0.1382 -0.0654 -0.0053 
 (-1.57) (-0.73) (-0.39) (-0.07) 
78753 -0.0360 -0.0742 -0.0975 -0.1313 
(-0.09) (-0.90) (-1.29) (-3.84) 
78754 -0.0436 0.1530 0.0870 -0.0541 
 (-0.13) (0.69) (0.49) (-0.80) 
78756 -0.0751 0.1030 0.1249 0.1305 
 (-0.46) (0.71) (0.99) (2.28) 
78757 -0.1321 -0.0834 0.0557 0.0567 0.1032 
 (-0.88) (0.71) (0.80) (3.12) 
78758 -0.0544 -0.0004 -0.0155 -0.0789 
 (-0.22) (-0.01) (-0.24) (-2.55) 
manoise65 0.1536 -0.0409 -0.0859 -0.0414 
 (0.43) (-0.32) (-0.75) (-0.87) 
manoise3 0.0987 -0.0567 -0.0827 -0.1151 
 (0.20) (-0.29) (-0.49) (-1.57) 
madist1 0.1875 0.2352 0.0371 
 (0.17) (0.79) (1.12) (0.43) 
madsit2 0.2760 0.0325 0.0713 0.0855 
 (0.63) (0.17) (0.43) (1.24) 
madist3 -0.3417 0.0424 0.0200 0.0112 
 (-0.95) (0.22) (0.12) (0.17) 
madist4 -0.0936 -0.0772 -0.0455 -0.0547 
(-0.30) (-0.46) (-0.31) (-0.92) 
madist5 0.0674 0.0054 -0.0041 -0.0042 
 (0.39) (0.04) (-0.04) (-0.09) 
madist6 -0.1551 0.0818 0.0963 
 (-0.47) (0.89) (1.28) (3.41) 
manorrd2 -0.2640 0.2034 0.1169 -0.1081 
 (-0.84) (1.16) (0.72) (-1.58) 
manorrd3 0.2946 0.1863 0.1180 -0.0261 
 (1.09) (1.45) (1.01) (-0.54) 
abiaroute2 0.0736 0.0386 0.0668 0.0070 
 (0.36) (0.32) (0.64) (0.16) 




































Table F.6 All Sales: Event Dates    
All Variables Interact with Event Dummy    
(t-statistics in parentheses)     
      
  dvote dlist dclose dbuild dopen 
      
   (-0.84) (-0.89) (-0.19) 
cbd1 -0.0381 -0.0030 0.1988 0.1395 
 (-0.13) (-0.01) (0.92) (1.47) 
cbd2 -0.1154 0.1071 0.0852 0.0388 
 (-0.61) (0.79) (0.80) 
cbd3 2.5226 0.2404 0.1073 0.0912 0.0424 
 (3.41) (1.31) (1.21) (1.24) 









(-0.24) (0.79) (1.06) (2.77) 
ut2 -0.0720 -0.0179 -0.0304 0.0833 -0.0010 
 (-0.41) (-0.01) (-0.14) (-0.26) 
ut3 -0.0238 0.2888 0.0778 0.0701 
(1.65) 
 (-0.20) (3.20) (1.06) (1.06) 
0.1038 
(3.44) 
d1980 -0.0560 0.2402 0.2460 0.2593 
 (-0.48) (2.76) (-2.83) (3.02) (3.89) 
d1981 -0.0083 0.2902 0.2021 0.2092 
 (-0.07) (3.81) (2.41) (2.52) 
d1982 (dropped) 0.2933 0.2678 0.2730 
   (3.27) (3.66) (3.78) 
d1983 0.2397 0.5553 0.2543 0.2568 
 (2.34) (8.45) (2.93) (2.99) 
d1984 0.2536 0.5672 0.5289 0.5368 
 (2.60) (9.75) (8.33) (8.55) (10.90) 
d1985 0.2467 0.5476 0.5429 0.5524 
 (2.32) (7.95) (9.74) (10.05) 
0.0837 0.4067 0.5414 0.5376 
 (0.78) (5.91) (8.12) (8.15) 
d1987 0.1872 0.1675 0.3710 0.3821 
 (3.24) (2.90) (5.57) (5.81) 
d1988 0.1760 0.1087 0.1559 0.1679 
 (3.44) (2.14) (2.78) (3.03) 
d1989 -0.0003 0.0049 0.0861 0.0892 
 (-0.01) (0.11) (1.75) (1.83) 
d1991 0.0893 0.3177 -0.0060 -0.0035 























Table F.6 All Sales: Event Dates    
All Variables Interact with Event Dummy    
(t-statistics in parentheses)    
      
  dvote dlist dclose dopen 
      
 
dbuild 
d1992 0.0874 0.3158 0.0655 0.0689 0.0844 
 (2.09) (4.69) (1.57) (1.68) 
d1993 
(2.49) 
0.2252 0.4536 0.0788 0.0788 0.0858 
 (5.36) (6.72) (1.94) (1.96) (2.60) 
d1994 0.2527 0.4811 0.4074 0.2081 0.2197 
 (6.87) (7.45) (1.83) (5.14) (6.61) 
d1995 0.2691 0.4975 0.4349 0.4811 0.2735 
 (7.46) (7.75) (1.97) (7.69) (9.36) 
d1996 0.3144 0.5428 0.4513 0.4975 0.3182 
 (7.55) (8.06) (2.04) (8.00) (11.11) 
d1997 -0.2284 (dropped) 0.4966 0.5428 0.3198 
 (-3.11)   (2.24) (8.32) (9.64) 
d1998 0.3762 0.6046 -0.0462 (dropped) 
 (10.09) (9.32) (-0.20)   
d1999 0.4774 0.7058 0.5584 






0.5074 0.7358 0.6596 0.7058 0.9572 
 (13.50) (11.32) (2.98) (11.42) (10.42) 
d2001 11.4995 11.2711 0.6896 0.7358 0.9872 
 (332.48) (177.78) (3.11) (11.68) (10.68) 
_cons 10.9869 11.5888 11.3173 11.2711 11.0196 
 (202.03) (469.98) (21.21) (183.49) (120.16) 
           
Number of obs 21386 21386 21386 21386 21386 
F-stat 18.4 28.54 40.15 44.89 165.79 
Prob > F 0 0 0 0 0 
R-squared 0.0707 0.1108 0.1506 0.1654 0.4226 
Root MSE 0.61402 0.60146 0.58788 0.58273 0.48468 
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APPENDIX G: DIFFERENCE MODELS 
 
 
Table G.1  Regression Results for Single Difference Models 
Both Airports - 
Corrected        
(t-statistics in 
parentheses)       
          
  preVote  preList preClose preBuild preOpen  Final 
gba  0.000287  0.0002945 0.0002149 0.0002668 0.0002606  0.0003303 
  (7.89)  (11.22) (6.56) (8.33) (29.93)  (35.18) 
tla  2.43E-06  
-
0.00000092 0.00000341 -0.00000219 0.00000147  0.00000299 
  (0.99)  (-1.28) (2.1) (-2.57) (5.03)  (11.49) 
age  -0.00323  -0.0114352 -0.0169357 -0.0084795 -0.0106995  -0.0079949 
  (-0.82)  (-3.89) (-4.61) (-2.52) (-11.87)  (-8.69) 
agesq  5.48E-05  0.0001297 0.0003161 0.0001202 0.0001124  0.0000935 
  (0.64)  (2.84) (5.01) (2.27) (7.99)  (8.04) 
dbath2  0.10839  0.0934638 0.200687 0.0780279 0.0783717  0.0119354 
  (2.33)  (2.07) (3.89) (1.39) (5.32)  (0.9) 
dbath3  0.139136  0.1507311 0.334098 0.0613787 0.1087411  0.0084502 
  (2.24)  (2.72) (5.08) (0.91) (5.71)  (0.47) 
dfire  0.147089  0.0671685 0.0142729 0.0008347 0.0305278  0.0046072 
  (4.21)  (1.93) (0.35) (0.02) (2.46)  (0.4) 
dpool3  0.077152  0.0962254 0.249355 0.1959832 0.134005  0.0542092 
  (1.39)  (2.17) (4.66) (3.49) (7.89)  (3.05) 
dspa  0.125898  0.1329356 0.0922553 0.1421836 0.0917735  0.092768 
  (1.42)  (2.46) (1.16) (1.44) (3.28)  (2.95) 
dgarage  0.06195  0.1088596 0.0835296 0.1816683 0.124772  0.0793545 
  (1.3)  (2.37) (1.52) (3.17) (7.84)  (5.69) 
dcarport  -0.02536  0.1160452 0.1167437 0.0991244 0.1424108  0.0902062 
  (-0.41)  (1.89) (1.64) (1.31) (7.01)  (5.3) 
dmanuf  -0.67576  (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) -0.4188638  (dropped) 
  (-1.97)     (-1.79)   
dmasonry  -0.5046  -0.1684565 0.1649879 -0.1035322 0.1530835  0.0681341 
  (-1.91)  (-0.74) (0.5) (-0.41) (2.26)  (1.27) 
dbrick  0.039422  0.086298 -0.1329954 0.0926327 0.063724  0.0626335 
  (1.22)  (3.32) (-4.02) (2.79) (6.49)  (6.62) 
hsgrad  0.010961  -0.0069862 -0.0477758 0.0151627 -0.0082374  0.0044173 
  (1.34)  (-0.9) (-4.86) (1.51) (-3.06)  (1.8) 
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Table G.1  Regression Results for Single Difference Models 
Both Airports - 
Corrected        
(t-statistics in 
parentheses)       
          














bchdeg  -0.00387  -0.0034007 -0.022983 0.007951 -0.0013193  -0.000627 
  (  (-0.56) (-2.91) (0.89) (-0.56)  (-0.29) 
grddeg  0.031375  0.0228065 -0.0024613 0.0345025 0.0225515  0.0189116 
  (3.35)  (2.89) (-0.25) (3.08) (7.69)  (6.77) 
forbrn  -0.00618  0.0039827 0.0591812 -0.039728 -0.0157114  -0.0006704 
  (-0.56)  (0.43) (5.15) (-3.15) (-4.72)  (-0.23) 
popbl  0.001161  -0.0088179 -0.0125164 -0.0020069 -0.0041176  -0.0043455 
  (0.37)  (-2.96) (-2.71) (-0.4) (-4.61)  (-5.7) 
popna  -0.01057  0.0329661 0.1002295 0.0182775 0.028382  -0.0031418 
  (-0.32)  (1) (2.43) (0.41) (2.41)  (-0.29) 
popap  -0.00511 -0.0203782 -0.089597 0.0407894 0.0084232  -0.0035268 
  (-0.35)  (-1.88) (-6.4) (2.69) (2.12)  (-0.99) 
popoth  -0.00017  -0.0045278 -0.025417 0.0100213 0.0015309  -0.0006815 
  (-0.04)  (-1.2) (-5.06) (1.77) (1.13)  (-0.56) 
vacant  0.005628  0.0011734 -0.0130671 -0.0013913 0.0009264  0.0005657 
  (0.93)  (0.18) (-1.65) (-0.17)  (0.32) 
ownocc  -0.00072  -0.0004732 0.0049 0.0006102 -0.0007226  -0.0002061 
  (-0.51)  (-0.42) (3.25) (0.37) (-1.62)  (-
d78617  0.00158 (dropped) (dropped) -0.9007389  -0.3996283 
  (0)      (-3.28) 
d78653  (dropped)  0.4190061 0.4653934 0.6192656  -0.5237036 
    (1.23) (1.27) (1.44)  (-4.46) 
d78701  2.216434 (dropped) (dropped) (dropped)  -0.2331117 
  (5.26)     (2.08)  (-1.17) 
d78702  -0.01943  -0.5039953 -1.914725 -0.563268  -0.5220619 
  (-0.06)  (-1.85) (-4.95) (-1.19) (-7.47)  (-7.76) 
d78703  0.338992  0.0423734 -0.0343111 0.3138738 0.1680366  0
  (1.96)  (0.32) (-0.2) (1.47) (3.39)  (3.89) 
d78704  -0.0012  0.0752335 -0.103817 0.2342378 0.0933151  0.1458794 
  (-0.01)  (0.72) (-0.74) (1.25) (2.25)  (3.76) 
d78705  (dropped)  -0.1477291 -0.4428707 1.136527 0.0946336  0.1953552 
   (-0.38) (-1.67) (1.81) (1.03)  (2.4) 
d78719 (dropped)  (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) (dropped)  -0
         (-1.18) 
d78721  -1.33867  -0.4073917 -0.77757 -0.3862599 -0.1752669  -0.3497715 
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  (-4.64)  (-0.83) (-1.56) (-0.58) (-1.85)  (-4.79) 
d78722  0.244336  - -0.3983766 -0.090884 0.0782322  -0.0541205 
  (0.7)  (-0.22) (-0.79) (-0.26) (0.9)  (-0.77) 
d78723  -  0.2807601 -0.2272767 -0.2097269 -0.0414244  -0.1704624 
  (-0.91)  (1.01) (-0.86) (-0.73) (-0.63)  (-3.21) 
d78724  -0.4153  0.0467286 -0.0046734 -0.8122495 0.1636697  -0.2980246 
  (-1.59)  (0.2) (-0.01) (-2.13) (2.62)  (-4.88) 
d78725  -0.44935  (dropped) -0.1055028 -1.468064 -0.226403  -0.1753029 
  (-1.09)   (-0.19) (-3.69) (-1.46)  (-1.15) 
d78727  -0.11247  -0.0826514 -0.0094968 0.0045962 -0.0737081  -0.1025465 
  (-1.26)  (-1.21) (-0.11) (0.05) (-2.66)  (-3.86) 
d78731  -0.08075  -0.1270488 0.1349262 -0.2534298 -0.0166642  0.0626284 
  (-0.81)  (-1.44) (1.22) (-2.12) (-0.5)  (1.9) 
d78735  -0.06401  -0.0704227 0.1337538 -0.3829145 -0.2591489  -0.0774653 
  (-0.5)  (-0.74) (0.99) (-2.47) (-8)  (-2.06) 
d78739  0.101311  0.0528738 -0.0681714 0.1550974 0.060711  -0.1372322 
  (0.68)  (0.5) (-0.6) (1.41) (1.81)  (-4.11) 
d78741  -0.35792  0.258324 0.0095752 -0.1738231 -0.1279344  -0.1759012 
  (-1.46)  (0.98) (0.04) (-1.84)  (-
 (dropped)  (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) -0.132394  -0.4425343 
       (-0.47)  (-2.21) 
d78744  -0.10307  -0.1679257 -0.1171921 -0.8887748   -0.3053983 
  (-0.7)  (-1.2) (-0.74) (-4.65) (-5.42)  (-7.45) 
d78745  -0.13982  -0.1058193 -0.1477368 -0.0978325 -0.1258756  -0.2229983 
  (-1.72)  (-1.39) (-1.57) (-4.37)  (-8.23) 
d78746  0.175953  0.0216786 -0.2560393 0.0525852  0.1908662 
  (1.81)  (0.29) (-2.51) (1.86) (1.7)  (6.13) 
d78747  -0.41404  0.2282576 0.2094392 0.0519413 0.1558854  -0.108926 
  (-3.41)  (1.59) (1.43) (0.21) (2.79)  (-2.23) 
d78748  -0.1255  -0.0466269 -0.5909202 -0.0605934 -0.088184  -0.1886173 
  (-1.39)  (-0.66) (-6.32) (-0.6) (-3.15)  (-6.92) 
d78749  -0.1768  - 0.0122676 -0.0787518 -0.0861312  -0.1720412 
  (-2.37)  (-0.42) (0.16) (-0.95) (-3.49)  (-7.25) 
d78751  -0.38182  0.273486 -0.0384199 0.2679504 0.1819529  0.037551 
  (-1.43)  ( (-0.13) (0.98) (2.52)  (0.63) 
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d78752  0.001693  0.1473663 -0.2210648 0.3294841 0.0762728  -0.0616002 
 (0.01)  (0.56) (-0.97) (1.22) (1.18)  (-1.12) 
 -0.25148  -0.0811177 0.1007411 -0.150288 -0.1315501  -0.2389592 
 (-2.8)  (-0.99) (0.9) (-1.3) (-4.25)  (-8.18) 
 -0.01452  0.1152618 0.5285423 -0.1342048 -0.0645318  -0.2517681 
 (-0.07)  (0.49) (1.5) (-0.68) (-1.13)  (-4.59) 
 0.096772  0.2545953 0.0826103 0.2244657 0.1865941  0.1763133 
 (0.53)  (1.42) (0.5) (1.27) (3.6)  (3.67) 
 -0.05021  0 0.110732 0.0186548 0.1092204  0.0808649 
 (-0.6)  (0.44) (1.09) (0.17) (3.61)  (2.83) 
 -0.11082  -0.0179253 0.1052187 -0.0547723 -0.0981291  -0.1881084 
 (-1.46)  (-0.25) (1.1) (-0.55) (-3.45)  (-7) 
-0.02537        
 (-0.43)        
 -0.05864        
(-1.01)       
d1982  -0.01441       
  (-0.26)       
d1983         
        
d1984  0.238269       
  (4.68)       
d1985  0.251237       
  (5.16)       
d1986  0.241098       
  (4.56)       
d1987  0.081477  0.3310107     
 (1.52)  (1.98)     
d1988    0.1643407     
    (5.35)     
d1989    0.0985567     
    (3.68)     
d1990         
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    (     
d1992         
        
d1993        
         
d1994     -0.0248923    
     (-0.78)    
d1995      -0.1261351   
      (-6.28)   
d1996      -0.0839082   
     (-4.26)   
d1997      -0.0767368   
      (-3.4)   
d1998      -0.2486129   
     (-6.32)   
d1999        -0.0928607 
        (-9.08) 
d2000        
         
d2001        0.0665122 
        (6.6) 
dcbd1  (dropped)  -0.4846961 0.260653 -0.0157914  0.1670081 
    (-1.51) (0.96) (-0.16)  (2.28) 
dcbd2  0.053444  -0.028636 -0.3260626 0.0581898  0.1279845 
  (0.35)  (-0.24) (1.27)  (3.23) 
0.3697379 -0.0005213  -0.1011856 


























dcbd3  -0.10923  0.0535848 0.181229 -0.2662677 0.0263061  0.0952056 
  (-1.1)  (0.66) (1.71) (-1.82) (0.83)  (3.42) 
dut1  0.264144  0.6950504 0.0104064 0.3555266 0.2258459  0.2301284 
  (0.8)  (2.26) (0.03) (0.74) (2.46)  (2.87) 
dut2  -0.22103  0.0370998 -0.0039679 0.0874537 0.0753612  0.1994283 
  (-1.37)  (0.27) (-0.02) (0.46) (1.66)  (4.8) 
dut3  -0.17296  0.0886977 0.119842 0.1150324 0.0802475  
  (-1.77)  (1.1) (1.36) (1.16) (2.94) 





























































madist2  0.200514  -0.4395802 -0.2151265 0.1399207 0.0671563  0.0655258 
  (0.97)  (-1.57) (-0.86) (0.55) (1.09)  (1.31) 
madist3  0.364192  -0.3765675 -0.0839095 -0.0820167 -0.0057852  0.0479522 
  (1.65)  (-1.45) (-0.35) (-0.34) (-0.1)  (0.99) 
madist4  -0.30449  -0.3241363 -0.0053455 -0.052886 -0.1008616 -0.0374217 
(-1.68) (-1.34) (-0.02) (-1.9) 
  
  
  0.0488866 0.1196263  0.0290061 
  (0.96)  (1.25) (0.17) (0.59) (4.84)  (1.25) 
manorrd2  -0.20767  0.288517 0.0200514 -0.0484669 -0.2126014  -0.1433534 
  (-1.26)  (1.55) (0.07) (-0.14) (-3.54)  (-2.85) 
manorrd3  -0.29235  0.2049377 0.4121979 -0.0369173 -0.1374699  -0.0783156 
  (-1.85)  (1.44) (2.32) (-0.19) (-3.19)  (-2.25) 
abiaroute2 0.375782  0.0344021 -0.1482598 0.0798771 0.0527516  0.017671 
  (2.41)  (0.22) (-0.84) (0.47) (1.24)  (0.49) 
abiaroute3 0.158463  -0.025772 -0.0939997 -0.0772786 0.037757  0.0563218 
  (1.44)  (-0.29) (-0.85) (-0.67) (1.35)  (2.28) 
manoise65 -0.06118  0.1174489 0.0283267 -0.2645826 -0.0560713  0.0455588 
  (-0.5)  (0.74) (0.12) (-1.64) (-1.28)  (1.37) 
manoise3  0.157581  0.0231441 -0.0535476 -0.1549001 -0.2058776  0.1112666 
  (0.86)  (0.09) (-0.19) (-0.59) (-3.03)  (2.22) 
abia_dist1  (dropped)  (dropped) -0.7911345 (dropped) -0.0029161  -0.3223977 
     (-1.54)  (-0.01)  (-1.67) 
abia_dist2  (dropped)  -0.1927188 -0.5402685 (dropped) -0.2407211  -0.4097155 
    (-0.45) (-1.29)  (-2.39)  (-4.56) 
abia_dist3  0.051216  -0.0917506 0.1322909 0.4368151 -0.067714  -0.0993581 
  (0.16)  (-0.49) (0.63) (1.09) (-1.06)  (-1.63) 
abia_dist4  -0.20566  -0.0792785 0.0049734 0.528533 -0.1360678  -0.100072 
  (-1.43)  (-0.61) (0.03) (3.11) (-3.24)  (-2.69) 
abia_dist5  -0.12097  -0.0442246 -0.0429251 0.2151928 -0.0488789  -0.0964313 
  (-0.99)  (-0.42) (-0.34) (1.52) (-1.51)  (-3.4) 
_cons  10.78443  10.91086 11.95849 10.5402 11.32314  11.32259 
  (42.47)  (49.58) (42.25) (34.01) (138.8)  (151.96) 
          
Both Airports - 
Corrected 
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  preVote  preList preClose preBuild preOpen  Final 
N  787  977 1361 805 7107  10349 
Adj R2  0.6914  0.7500 0.6025 0.6284 0.7153  0.6364 
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45.94 0 0.00027 0.000294 
tla 2.01E-06 1.87E-07 10.72 0 1.64E-06 2.37E-06 
age -1.17E-02 6.04E-04 -19.35 0 -0.01288 -1.05E-02 
agesq 0.000144 8.29E-06 17.34 0 0.000128 0.00016 
dbath2 0.052395 0.00948 5.53 0 0.033812 0.070977 
dbath3 0.074733 0.012536 5.96 0 0.05016 0.099305 
dfire 0.020008 0.008031 2.49 0.013 0.004265 0.03575 
dpool3 0.107087 0.011616 9.22 0 0.084318 0.129855 
dspa 0.09913 0.019148 5.18 0 0.061599 0.136662 
dgarage 0.099921 0.010081 9.91 0 0.080162 0.11968 
dcarport 0.120818 0.012555 9.62 0 0.096209 0.145427 
dmanuf -0.50823 0.2184 -2.33 0.02 -0.93631 -0.08015 
dmasonry 0.07924 0.041252 1.92 0.055 -0.00162 0.160097 
dbrick 0.048308 0.006472 7.46 0 0.035622 0.060994 
pcthsgrad -0.29096 0.173046 -1.68 0.093 -0.63014 0.048222 
pctbchdeg -0.33439 0.151559 -2.21 0.027 -0.63146 -0.03732 
pctgrddeg  0.192355 10.78 0 1.697068 2.451127 
pctforbrn -0.28231 0.212469 -1.33 0.184 -0.69877 0.134143 
pctpopbl -0.43911 0.056415 -7.78 0 -0.54969 -0.32854 
pctpopna 1.327101 0.763179 1.74 0.082 -0.16879 2.822989 
pctpopap -0.49528 0.254095 -1.95 0.051 -0.99333 0.002762 
pctpopoth -0.14178 0.086189 -1.64 0.1 -0.31071 0.02716 
pctvachs -0.00925 0.128108 -0.07 0.942 -0.26035 0.24185 
pctownocc 0.009634 0.028667 0.34 0.737 -0.04655 0.065823 
d78617 -0.33835 0.10433 -3.24 0.001 -0.54284 -0.13386 
d78653 -0.17067 0.083878 -2.03 0.042 -0.33508 
d78701 0.306719 0.159353 1.92 0.054 -0.00562 0.619063 
d78702 -0.59539 0.050003 -11.91 0 -0.6934 -0.49738 
d78703 0.154044 0.032215 4.78 0 0.090899 0.217188 
d78704 0.096061 0.026889 3.57 0.043356 0.148766 
d78705  0.058554 1.62 0.106 -0.02014 
d78719  0.373201 -1.20 0.23 -1.17953 0.283476 
d78721 -0.38085 0.056167 -6.78 0 -0.49094 
d78722 -0.02002 0.053129 -0.38 0.706 -0.12415 0.084119 
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0d78723 -0.14138 0.039828 -3.55 -0.21944 -0.06331 











-1.90 0.058 -0.40987 0.006725 
d78727  0.018103 -5.37 0 -0.13266 -0.0617 
0.004921 0.022132 0.22 0.824 -0.03846 0.048301 
d78735 -0.18617 0.02389 -7.79 0 -0.23299 -0.13934 
d78739 -0.06054 0.022765 -2.66 0.008 -0.10516 -0.01592 
d78741 -0.14685 0.044899 -3.27 -0.05884 
d78742 -0.38286 0.16632 -2.30 0.021 -0.70886 -0.05686 
d78744 -0.30006 0.029395 -10.21 0 -0.35768 -0.24245 
d78745 -0.18934 0.018591 -10.18 0 -0.22578 -0.1529 
d78746 0.091444 0 4.42 0 0.050873 0.132015 
d78747 -0.02201 0.033812 -0.65 0.515 -0.08828 0.044267 
d78748 -0.19676 0.018494 -10.64 0 -0.23301 -0.16051 
d78749 -0.13828 0.016113 -8.58 0 -0.16986 -0.10669 
d78751 0.074216 0.044516 1.67 0.095 -0.01304 0.16147 
d78752 -0.02943 0.040282 -0.73 0.465 -0.10838 0.049529 
d78753 -0.19382 0.020222 -9.58 0 -0.23345 -0.15418 
d78754 -0.15702 0.038953 -4.03 -0.23337 -0.08067 
d78756 0.164229 0.033479 4.91 0 0.098608 0.229849 
d78757 0.080387 0.019677 0 0.041818 0.118956 
d78758 -0.13249 0.018335 -7.23 0 -0.16842 
d1980 0.306649 0.201983 1.52 0.129 -0.08925 0.70255 
d1981 0.278244 0.201507 1.38 0.167 -0.11673 0.673212 
d1982 0.330002 0.199856 1.65 0.099 -0.06173 0.721734 
d1983 0.299841 0.201947 1.48 0.138 -0.09599 0.695672 
d1984 0.603653 0.198586 3.04 0.002 0.21441 0.992896 
d1985 0.608581 0.197625 3.08 0.002 0.221221 
d1986 0.58086 0.198998 2.92 0.004 0.190809 0.97091 
d1987 0.428273 0.192187 2.23 0.026 0.051573 0.804974 
d1988 0.165636 0.035257 4.70 0 0.09653 0.234742 
0.09575 0.031072 3.08 0.002 0.034847 0.156653 
d1991 0.004162 0.033157 0.13 0.9 -0.06083 0.069153 
d1992 0.075493 0.043317 1.74 0.081 -0.00941 0.160397 
d1993 0.021916 0.043874 0.50 0.617 -0.06408 0.107912 
d1994 0.007202 0.054064 0.13 0.894 -0.09877 0.113173 
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 0.078636 1.57 0.117 -0.03091 0.277356 
d1997 0.118194 0.079659 1.48 0.138 0.274331 
d1998 -0.02958 0.087771 -0.34 0.736 -0.20161 0.14246 
d1999  0.081806 2.93 0.003 0.079247 0.399938 
d2000 0.332686 0.082438 4.04 0 0.171102 0.494271 
d2001 0.397335 0.082809 4.80 0 0.235023 0.559648 
dcbd1 0.06862 0.055529 1.24 0.217 -0.04022 0.17746 
dcbd2 0.088632 0.028588 3.10 0.002 0.032598 0.144666 
dcbd3 0.062442 0.020052 3.11 0.002 0.023139 0.101744 
dut1 0.232053 0.058487 3.97 0 0.117414 0.346693 
dut2 0.120809 0.029544 4.09 0 0.0629 0.178718 
dut3 0.078983 0.017786 4.44 0 0.04412 0.113846 
manoise65 -0.0228 0.130915 -0.17 0.862 -0.2794 0.233804 
manoise3 0.140984 0.206606 0.68 0.495 -0.26398 0.545948 
madist1 0.114609 0.146859 0.78 0.435 -0.17325 0.402464 
madist2 -0.13749 0.109977 -1.25 0.211 -0.35305 0.078075 
madist3 -0.05106 0.142023 -0.36 0.719 -0.32943 0.227318 
madist4 -0.24846 0.111651 -2.23 0.026 -0.4673 -0.02961 
madist5 -0.23085 0.095273 -2.42 0.015 -0.41759 -0.04411 
madist6 0.085693 0.077986 1.10 0.272 -0.06717 0.238551 
manorrd2 0.284222 0.135992 2.09 0.037 0.017668 0.550776 
0.194559 0.09937 1.96 -0.00021 
abia_dist1 -0.653 0.41888 -1.56 0.119 -1.47404 0.168038 
abia_dist2 0.104621 0.382551 0.27 0.784 -0.64521 0.854449 
abia_dist3 0.037436 0.15728 0.24 0.812 -0.27084 0.345716 
abia_dist4 -0.07263 0.072815 -1.00 0.319 -0.21536 0.070088 
abia_dist5 -0.14759 0.064243 -2.30 -0.27351 -0.02167 
abiaroute2 -0.03984 0.137112 -0.29 0.771 -0.30859 0.228914 
abiaroute3 -0.14925 0.071247 -2.09 0.036 -0.2889 -0.0096 
dlist 0.0637 0.194994 0.33 0.744 -0.3185 0.445902 
dclose 0.061308 0.197886 0.31 0.757 -0.32656 0.449179 
dbuild 0.27303 0.200548 1.36 -0.12006 0.666119 
dopen 0.23009 0.208878 1.10 0.271 -0.17933 0.639508 
dfinal 0.296332 1.41 0.159 -0.11603 0.708693 
list_madist1 -0.33607 0.246475 -1.36 0.173 -0.81918 0.14704 
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list_madist2 -0.12781 0.153872 -0.83 0.406 -0.42941 0.17379 
list_madist3 -0.19195 0.17674 -1.09 0.277 -0.53838 0.154471 
list_madist4 0.109987 0.158779 0.69 0.489 -0.20123 0.421206 
list_madist5 0.089859 0.130019 0.69 0.489 -0.16499 0.344707 
list_madist6 -0.15922 0.102003 -1.56 0.119 -0.35915 0.040714 
close_madi~1 -0.20017 0.212408 -0.94 0.346 -0.6165 0.21617 
close_madi~2 0.077844 0.153545 0.51 0.612 -0.22312 0.378805 









2.04 0.041 0.012168 0.609178 
close_madi~5 0.17982 0.110663 1.62 0.104 -0.03709 0.396727 
close_madi~6 -0.15409 0.090205 -1.71 0.088 -0.3309 0.022714 
build_madi~1 -0.27957 0.245724 -1.14 0.255 -0.7612 0.20207 
build_madi~2 0.132074 0.169235 0.78 0.435 -0.19964 0.463787 
build_madi~3 -0.11955 0.173143 -0.69 -0.45892 0.219825 
build_madi~4 0.16406 0.165689 0.99 0.322 -0.1607 0.488824 
build_madi~5 0.161487 0.125989 1.28 0.2 -0.08546 0.408435 
build_madi~6 -0.11982 0.09773 -1.23 0.22 -0.31138 0.07174 
open_madist1 -0.1895 0.151856 -1.25 0.212 -0.48715 0.108144 
open_madist2 0.147659 0.111868 1.32 0.187 -0.07161 0.36693 
open_madist3 0.009204 0.143755 0.06 0.949 0.290975 
open_madist4 0.103539 0.114706 0.90 0.367 -0.12129 0.328372 
open_madist5 0.138926 0.095778 1.45 0.147 -0.04881 0.326659 
open_madist6 0.019698 0.079882 0.25 0.805 -0.13688 0.176272 
final_madi~1 -0.14128 0.148176 -0.95 0.34 -0.43171 0.149159 
final_madi~2  0.109432 2.32 0.021 0.039049 0.468039 
final_madi~3 0.139658 0.14156 0.99 0.324 -0.13781 0.417125 
final_madi~4 0.244466 0.111413 2.19 0.028 0.462844 
final_madi~5 0.31187 0.094805 3.29 0.001 0.126045 0.497695 
final_madi~6 -0.02154 0.079115 -0.27 0.785 -0.17661 0.133528 
list_manor2 -0.14806 0 -0.73 0.468 -0.5475 0.251382 
list_manor3 -0.01355 0.143276 -0.09 0.925 -0.29438 0.267285 
close_manor2  0.229371 -2.95 0.003 -1.12542 -0.22625 
close_manor3 -0.30325 0.133288 -2.28 0.023 -0.56451 -0.042 
build_manor2 -0.47427 0.268336 -1.77 0.077 -1.00023 0.05169 
build_manor3 -0.29342 0.143242 -2.05 0.041 -0.57418 -0.01265 
open_manor2 -0.39459 0.143867 -2.74 0.006 -0.67658 
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Table G.2  Difference-in-Differences  
Results    
       
       
lnprice Coef. Std.Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
open_manor3 -0.23947 0.102598 -2.33 0.02 -0.44057 -0.03837 
final_manor2 -0.44899 0.140109 0.001 -0.72361 -0.17436 
final_manor3 -0.30535 0.10044 -3.04 0.002 -0.50222 -0.10848 
vote_route2 0.16 0.875 -0.32827 0.385653 
vote_route3  0.100869 -0.31 0.754 -0.22927 0.166148 
 0.168487 0.05 0.96 -0.32187 0.338623 
close_route3 0.064431 0.091208 0.71 0.48 0.243205 
build_route2 0.24234 0.176265 1.37 0.169 -0.10315 0.587832 
build_route3 0.117118 0.10267 0.254 -0.08412 0.318359 
open_route2 0.040283 0.141082 0.29 0.775 -0.23625 0.316814 
open_route3 0.073503 2.04 0.042 0.00561 0.293752 
final_route2 0.081986 0.138537 0.59 0.554 -0.18956 0.35353 
0.22512 0.072067 3.12 0.002 0.083863 0.366376 
list_noise65 0.140246 0.198915 0.71 0.481 0.530136 
list_noise3 -0.26563 0.292483 -0.91 0.364 -0.83892 0.307658 
close_noi~65 -0.16023 0.197707 0.418 -0.54775 0.227294 
close_noise3 -0.51423 0.276884 -1.86 0.063 -1.05694 0.028485 
build_noi~65 0.178403 -1.49 0.137 -0.61503 0.084335 
build_noise3 -0.08728 0.293249 -0.30 0.766 -0.66207 0.487514 
open_noise65 0.054333 0.137994 0.39 0.694 -0.21614 0.324811 
open_noise3 -0.22252 0.217855 -1.02 0.307 0.204494 
final_noi~65 0.009752 0.13408 0.07 0.942 -0.25305 0.272559 
final_noise3 -0.09183 0.211495 0.664 -0.50638 0.322714 
(dropped)      
vote_abiad2      
vote_abiad3 0.105974 0.294446 0.36 0.719 -0.47116 0.683111 
0.074542 0.096187 0.77 0.438 -0.11399 0.263076 
vote_abiad5 0.172247 0.086075 2.00 0.045 0.34096 
close_abiad1 (dropped)      
close_abiad2 -0.82058 0.465542 0.078 -1.73307 0.09192 
close_abiad3 -0.03635 0.200043 -0.18 0.856 0.35575 
close_abiad4 0.097576 0.12 0.902 -0.17925 0.20326 
close_abiad5 0.02492 0.079818 0.31 0.755 -0.13153 0.181369 
build_abiad1 (dropped)      
build_abiad2 -1.36524 0.542487 -2.52 0.012 -0.30192 























Table G.2  Difference-in-Differences  
Results    
       
       
lnprice Coef. Std.Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
build_abiad4 -0.03102 0.109119 0.776 -0.2449 0.182862 




Adj R-squared =  0.6596 
 
-0.30438 0.073914 
open_abiad1 0.473972 1.62 0.104 -0.15918 1.698862 
open_abiad2 -0.41106 0.387881 -1.06 0.289 -1.17133 0.34922 
open_abiad3 -0.08674 0.16393 -0.53 -0.40805 0.234576 
open_abiad4 -0.04198 0.072827 -0.58 0.564 0.100762 
open_abiad5 0.06076 0.06505 0.93 0.35 -0.06674 0.188262 
final_abiad1 0.333163 0.430789 -0.51122 1.177543 
final_abiad2 -0.4958 0.385247 -1.29 0.198 -1.25091 0.259311 
final_abiad3 0.162253 -0.92 0.357 -0.46761 0.168444 
final_abiad4 -0.00302 0.071745 -0.04 -0.14364 0.137605 
final_abiad5 0.105569 0.063835 1.65 0.098 -0.01955 0.23069 
_cons 10.88848 0.202704 53.72 0 11.28579 
       
Left out dummy for MA variables is B4Vote; left out dummy for ABIA is B4List 
      
       
Source         SS        df MS  Number of obs =   21386 
     F(186, 21199) =  223.76 
Model    5739.47 186 30.85735  Prob > F      =  0.0000 
Residual    2923.38 21199 0.13790157  R-squared     =  0.6625 
     










APPENDIX H: RELATIONSHIP LOGIT MODELS 
 
This appendix does not introduce a theoretically-specified model, nor one 
that represents the causal structure that accounts for the airport re-location 
decision.  Rather, this model follows Anderton, et al. (1994) and Baden and 
Coursey (2002) and employs logit regressions to suggest whether the relationships 
between the demographic variables in the model confound the simple 
comparisons presented thus far.  The results are logistic regression odds for 
presence.  When the odds ratios are less than one, an increase in the demographic 
variable would lower the odds that the tract contains one of the environmental 
variables.  Five separate models are run with a dichotomous dependent variable 
indicating (1) whether or not a house was within three miles of the new airport, 
(2) whether or not a house was within three miles of the old airport, (3) whether 
or not the house was impacted by noise at the old airport, (4) whether or not a 
house was on the main routes to the new airport, and (5) whether or not a house 
was on the main route to the old airport. The independent variables are the 
demographic variables from the with-without tables, though percent white is the 
left-out dummy variable to avoid over-specification of the model. The results are 
given in Tables H.6 – H.10. 
 
Distance 
The first logit model uses a dichotomous dependent variable indicating 
whether a house is located within three miles of the new airport.  As would be 
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expected from the with-without comparison of the means, increases in the median 
income would decrease the likelihood that the house is located within three miles 
of the old Air Force base, at the time when the AFB was chosen as the new site 
for the airport, and an increase in the percent of the census tract living below the 
poverty line or in the percent black, increases this likelihood.  However, the sign 
on the percent Hispanic and foreign-born is the opposite of what is expected from 
the with-without comparison of the means.  In both of these cases, the mean 
comparison shows significantly higher percentages of Hispanic and foreign-born 
households living in the area within three miles of the new airport, yet the 
multivariate effect finds a significant but negative relationship between these 
variables and the odds of the new airport being located within three miles.   
 
Table H.1  Logit Results for ABIA Distance Model 
ABIA Distance Coef. Odds Ratio Std.Err. 
Income -0.6954 0.499 0.2278 -3.05 
Poverty 0.0806 1.084 0.0081 9.99 
-0.4721 0.624 0.0192 -24.57 
Black 0.0071 1.007 0.0025 2.83 
Native American 1.0861 0.0843 12.88 
Asian Pacific 0.1863 1.205 0.0304 6.13 
Other 0.3668 1.443 0.0133 
Hispanic -0.0547 0.947 0.0086 -6.32 
Constant 2.0181 * 2.4330 0.83 
the 99% confidence level. 
 
Even the percent black in a census tract has less of an impact than would 
be expected looking solely at the with-without comparison of the means.  Odds 
ratios near one indicate a weak influence, making percent black, poverty, and 





A “z” statistic greater than 2.33 indicates significance at 
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Alaska Native have the most influence on the odds for the new airport distance, 
followed by income, “other,” Asian or Pacific Islander, and foreign-born.  Since 
distance to the new airport is a disamenity, this model finds some evidence of 
environmental injustice in intent, though the groups who bear most of the burden 
are not the groups traditionally cited in the literature. 
 
 
Table H.2  Logit Results for Mueller Distance Model 
Mueller Distance Coef. Odds Ratio Std. Err. z 
Income 0.062 0.0096 -18.02 
Poverty 0.1272 1.136 0.0084 17.12 
Foreign-Born 0.1090 1.115 8.37 
Black 0.0396 1.040 0.0026 15.66 
Native American 0.5246 1.690 0.1083 8.18 
Asian Pacific -0.5105 0.600 0.0107 -28.69 
Other 0.3215 1.379 0.0211 20.97 
Hispanic 0.697 0.0083 -30.18 
Constant 28.1981 * 1.6647 16.94 
A “z” statistic greater than 2.33 indicates significance at 





The second logit model uses a dichotomous dependent variable indicating 
a house is located within three miles of the old airport.  As would be expected 
from the with-without comparison of the means, increases in the median income 
would decrease the likelihood that the house is located within three miles of the 
old airport.  In this model, median income is the most influential factor in the 
location of the old airport, giving rise to injustice in outcome for the poor.  Native 
American, Asian Pacific, other, and Hispanic follow in influence.  Hispanic and 
Asian Pacific actually have a negative relationship to the old airport distance 
siting.  Poverty, foreign-born, and black all have positive relationships to the old 
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airport distance siting but they have the weakest influence, black being the least 
influential of all.   
 
Noise 
The third logit model uses a dichotomous dependent variable indicating a 
house is located under the noise contours of the old airport.  As would be 
expected from the with-without comparison of the means, increases in the median 
income would decrease the likelihood that the house is located under a noise 
contour at the time when flights in and out of the airport were at their peak.  An 
increase in the percent of the census tract living below the poverty line, in the 
percent foreign-born, black, Native American or other, increases this likelihood.  
However, similar to the distance contours around both airports, the sign on the 
percent Hispanic is the opposite of what is expected from the with-without 
comparison of the means.  Once again income is the most influential factor, and 
Native American and Asian Pacific are the most influential race categories.  
While the odds ratios for percent black and percent with an income below the 
poverty line are close to even odds, this is based on a 1% increase.  Looking at 
Table H.4, the percent difference between tracts with houses under the noise 
contours and other tracts, the mean percentage of blacks differs by over 19%.  A 
19% higher black population translates into an odds ratio of 1.853, a much larger 
effect.68 
 
                                                 
68 Exp(19 x ln(1.033)) = 1.853 
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Table H.3 Logit Results for Mueller Noise Model 
Noise Coef. Odds Ratio Std. Err. z 
Income -0.8396 0.1342 -2.70 
Poverty 0.0676 1.070 0.0120 6.02 
Hispanic -0.1924 0.825 0.0168 
Foreign-Born 0.2311 1.260 0.0241 12.10 
Black 0.0323 1.033 0.0026 13.00 
0.9995 2.717 0.3623 7.49 
Asian Pacific -0.2872 0.750 0.0196 -11.00 
Other 0.1654 0.0308 6.33 
Constant 3.4214 * 3.3316 1.03 
A “z” statistic greater than 2.33 indicates significance at 
the 99% confidence level. 
 
 Noise plays a peculiar role for the old airport because the double-
difference coefficients in the last period are not significantly different from zero.  
Thus, the groups impacted by noise neither lose nor gain when looking over the 
entire policy period in the model.  However, assuming that noise had depressed 
the house prices in the pre-period of the model, these communities may still suffer 
from injustice in outcome because the house prices did not significantly increase 








The fourth logit model uses a dichotomous dependent variable indicating a 
house is located within a half-mile of the route to the old airport.  Unlike the 
findings in the previous three models and what would be expected from the with-
without comparison of the means, increases in the median income have no impact 
on the likelihood that the house is located within a half-mile of the route to the old 
airport, at the time when the old airport was still operating, though increases in the 
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percent in poverty increase the likelihood of being on the route to the old airport.   
Once again increases in the percent Hispanic and Asian Pacific decrease the odds 
of being along the route and Native American, black, and foreign-born increase 
the odds.  At the time of the 1990 census, being along the route to the airport had 
a positive effect on house prices, so the minority groups concentrated along the 
route gained from the original location of the airport. Once the airport changed 
locations, this advantage was replaced with sharp decrease in house prices, 
disproportionately affecting these poor and minority communities. 
 
 
Table H.4 Logit Results for Mueller Route Model 
Coef. Odds Ratio Std. Err. z 
Income 1.016 0.2500 0.06 
Poverty 0.0942 8.96 
Hispanic -0.0855 0.918 -4.08 
Foreign-Born 0.1085 1.115 0.0251 
Black 0.1142 1.121 0.0039 32.79 
Native American 0.9259 2.524 0.2873 8.14 
-0.1167 0.890 0.0251 -4.14 
Other 0.866 0.0273 -4.55 
Constant 2 .6952 -1.72 
A “z” statistic greater than 2.33 indicates significance at the 
99% confidence level. 
 
Finally, the fifth logit model uses a dichotomous dependent variable 
indicating a house is located within a half-mile of the route to the new airport, 
where house prices gained the most as a result of the policy change.  These odds 
ratios look similar to the odds for the old airport distance and noise models: 
increases in the median income would decrease the likelihood that the house is 
located within a half-mile of the route to the new airport.  Poverty, foreign-born, 












and Asian Pacific again have a negative relationship to the new airport route 
siting.  Median income is that most influential factor in this model; Native 
American, percent in poverty, Asian Pacific, and other follow in influence.  Once 
again, percent black has a small, but positive odds ratio based on a 1% change.  
Table H.6 reveals that the percent black differential on communities on the route 
to the new airport reveal more like a 16% difference, bringing the effective odds 
ratio to 1.795. 
 
 
Table H.5 Logit Results for ABIA Route Model 
ABIA route Odds Ratio  Std. Err. z 
Income -1.2951 0.0520 -6.82 
Poverty 0.1229 1.131 16.46 
Foreign-Born 0.0322 1.033 0.0127 
Black 0.0340 1.035 0.0020 17.38 
Native American 1.0950 3.003 0.2105 






Constant 8.7410 * 2.0253 4.32 
A “z” statistic greater than 2.33 indicates significance at 
the 99% confidence level. 
 
Together, these five models show that lower income groups, American 
Indian and Alaska Native, black, and often foreign-born, populations were most 
impacted by the airport change.  These groups may represent communities least 
likely to engage in collective action activities against a noxious siting, either 
because they represent a small portion of the population or because they are least 
assimilated into the politics of the city.  Surprisingly, the Hispanic population has 






Hispanic -0.0763 0.927 
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percent Hispanic in a tract actually decreases the likelihood that the tract will be 
impacted by one or more airport variables.   
It is clear the old airport was sited in a low income community with 
significant minority populations, but it is not clear whether in net these 
populations were made better or worse off by the airport move since they were 
both positively and negatively affected.  The same is true for the new airport.  
Given that these neighborhoods both have significantly different compositions 
than the rest of Austin, whether the net effect of the airport move is positive or 
negative for these groups determines whether the airport re-location cures 
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